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Introduction
In the last years the criticism of neoclassical economics together with the 
conception of homo economicus has been increasing. Of course, neoclassical 
economists have been criticized from the very beginning. However, recently 
the criticism has intensified. It comes from within economics, and from outside 
economics. Neoclassical economics is mostly criticized by other social sciences 
(e.g., psychology, sociology, political sciences) and philosophy. The most visible 
strand of criticism is descriptive and it concerns homo economicus (e.g., people 
are not: 1) fully rational, 2) fully egoistic, 3) atoms independent of society). 
The criticism also concerns revealed preference theory and the assumption that 
people know what is best for them. Beyond descriptive criticism, neoclassical 
economics also faces more sophisticated criticism from philosophy. The big part 
of criticism concerns a view cherished by many economists that economics is 
value-free. This belief is strong among some economists who think that value-
-freeness is what distinguishes economics from the other social sciences and 
makes economics closer to hard sciences. A methodological criticism concerns 
also the method used by economists, e.g., deduction, the overuse of mathematics, 
overreliance on models, idealizations and focus on predictive power. 
When we analyse how strongly neoclassical economics has been criticized in the 
last years, it comes as no surprise that not many admit being diehard neoclassical 
economists. In some circles it is a dirty word and not many people want to be 
connected with it. The result of this extensive criticism is the postulate that 
economics should change. Namely, it should be more pluralistic and open for 
heterodoxy. Of course, different schools propose their own visions of economics. 
Behavioural economists want economics to incorporate psychology, institutional 
economists want economics to incorporate sociology, and philosophers of 
economics want economics to incorporate philosophy.
Some economists argue that economics has changed due to the incorporation of 
the knowledge from other social sciences like psychology, sociology, etc. (e.g. 
(Cedrini, & Fontana, 2018; Colander, 2000, 2010; Colander, Holt, & Rosser, 2004, 
2011; Davis, 2006, 2008; Fontana, 2014; Vromen, 2007)). The most telling case 
is behavioural economics which started to be perceived as a new mainstream 
(Angner, 2019; Thaler, 2016; Truc, 2018). Moreover, it is argued that economics 
is not so heavily theoretical anymore and we could observe ‘empirical turn’ in 
the last years (Backhouse, & Cherrier, 2017). In general, the process of opening 
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economics to other social sciences has been noticed. It is called “reverse 
imperialism.”
However, many economists (the author of this book among them) argue that 
despite the changes, the foundations of economics have not really changed 
and mainstream economics predominately works as it used to be (e.g., (Berg, 
& Gigerenzer, 2010; Dobusch, & Kapeller, 2009; Dow, 2012; Elsner, 2013; Fine, 
2019; Fourcade, Ollion, & Algan, 2015; Hodgson, 2012b; Madra, 2016; Ostapiuk, 
2019a)). Everyone agrees that economics has incorporated many insights from 
other social sciences. However, they are only adjustments and the paradigm 
has not changed. Economists still rely on rationality, utility, equilibrium, homo 
economicus, revealed preferences, deductive thinking, and mathematics.
To recognize that neoclassical economics has not changed we can look at the 
syllabuses and textbooks used by most economics students around the world 
(Colander, 2015; Graupe, 2019). Of course, the change in textbooks and syllabuses 
is slower than the changes in specialistic journals. However, they have an 
enormous influence on millions of economics students. As Samuelson writes 
“I don’t care who writes a nation’s laws – or crafts its advanced treaties – if I can 
write its economics textbooks” (Samuelson, as cited in Skousen, 1997, p. 150). 
The unmodified economics textbooks show that the change concerns particular 
branches of economics (e.g., behavioural economics, institutional economics, 
evolutionary economics, complexity economics), whereas most economists 
use a toolkit of neoclassical economics. What can be even more important in 
this story is how economists are perceived by other social scientists and public 
opinion. Here, we will not go into the discussion of how much blame we should 
assess to economists for the bad image of homo economicus which is perceived 
as a fully egoistic and rational calculator. Now, it is important to point out that 
the criticism of neoclassical economics is not a straw man. Some economists 
really believe that homo economicus exists and that economics is value-free. It is 
especially important, because theories are the lenses by which economists look 
at reality and people.
The introduction of this book should give a reader an impression, shared by 
many, that economics is in a process of some kind of “paradigm shift” ((Kuhn, 
1962); see also (Colander et al., 2004; Davis, 2006; Dobusch, & Kapeller, 2012; 
Dow, 2012; Etzioni, 2011; Thaler, 2015, 2016)).1
Most economists see the limitations of neoclassical economics. However, they 
are not sure how the future of economics should look like. Whether neoclassical 
economics should change dramatically or adjust a little by adding the bits of 
1 The expectation for change in economics is mostly visible in the case of movements like 
“Institute for New Economic Thinking” and “Rethinking economics”.
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psychology, sociology, etc. This is the conundrum that this book addresses. 
The main question is: Do the weaknesses of value-free economics imply the 
need for a paradigm shift?
As was indicated earlier, despite the criticism of value-free economics, 
a paradigm (in Kuhnian understanding (Kuhn, 1962)) in economics has not 
changed. There seem to be two main reasons for this. Firstly, the criticism is not 
severe and structured enough. Secondly, the alternative paradigms proposed by 
the critics are not conceptually sound enough. To answer the first objection the 
author synthesizes criticisms from different perspectives (from behavioural to 
methodological). Special attention is put on choices over time, because it seems 
that in this area value-free economics has the most problems (methodological and 
descriptive). The enriched concept of multiple self is proposed and investigated. 
Thanks to that, it is possible to identify the main weaknesses of value-free 
economics in order to overcome them. However, it is not enough to present 
the criticisms towards value-free economics. For scientists, a bad paradigm is 
better than no paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). This is why the author considers whether 
value-based and goal-oriented economics with normative approaches such as 
economics of happiness, capability approach, libertarian paternalism, and the 
concept of multiple self can be the alternative paradigm for value-free economics.
What a reader can gather from the introduction so far, the scope of this book is 
quite extensive. It is impossible to fully analyse economics as science on 200 pages. 
Therefore, the focus is put on a few main ideas which can contribute to the current 
debate on economics. Firstly, I use ‘scientific research programme’ proposed by 
Lakatos (1980). It is quite an old-fashioned approach that has fallen from grace 
in economics. However,  it is a very useful method to analyse how neoclassical 
economics works. I indicate and analyse ‘hard core’ and ‘protective belt.’ Thanks 
to this analysis we can understand how economists can absorb the descriptive 
criticism and leave hard core and paradigm of neoclassical economics unchanged. 
Tautologicality of rationality and utility used in economics is well-known (Boland, 
1981; Hodgson, 2012b; Kirchgässner, 2013; Sen, 1977). However, Lakatosian 
method explains how neoclassical economists could absorb descriptive criticism 
towards homo economicus by changing the very meaning of the terms ‘rationality’ 
and ‘utility.’ Lakatosian approach sets the stage for the whole book. It concerns 
the methodology of economics, because the descriptive criticism is not enough to 
change neoclassical economics which is based on axioms. Therefore, we need to 
analyse the methodological assumption of neoclassical economics from which the 
most important one is its value-freeness.
At this point, I used a notion of value-freeness a few times. Moreover, the 
title of the book contains “value-free economics.” Now I will give only a few 
words of explanation but what I mean by value-free economics should be fully 
understandable after reading this book. In general, I treat value-freeness as one 
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of the most important assumptions of neoclassical economics, which in many 
ways dictates how economists should do their work. Firstly, it is assumed that 
economists are like engineers who only try to solve a problem but they do not 
analyse the problem itself. It means that economics is all about means not ends. 
To use the most popular definition, “economics is the science which studies 
human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have 
alternative uses” (Robbins, 1932, p. 16). It means that economists do not decide 
what is good or bad and what goals people should have. The only thing that 
matters is effectiveness. Economists want to be objective scientists like physicists 
(physics envy). Therefore, economists do not want to deal with normative 
statements, values, and goals. That is why economists rely on axiomatic revealed 
preference theory which is perceived as a neutral framework. This framework is 
similar to mathematics in which we have axioms from which we deduce theories. 
The belief in objectivity is supported by the axiomatic assumption of revealed 
preference theory – what people do is the best for them. In economists’ eyes it is 
not a normative statement – we just wait and see what people choose; and what 
people choose is the best for them. Otherwise why they would choose something? 
Therefore, many economists think that they do not need to be entangled in 
a discussion on human goals and motivations. Neoclassical economists rely on 
human choices (revealed preferences) (Gul, & Pesendorfer, 2008). 
The next part of the title concerns the conception of multiple self. It must be 
stated once more that the entire criticism of neoclassical economics with homo 
economicus is so vast that a separate book should be devoted to this issue (see 
(Dzionek-Kozłowska, 2018)). Therefore, here the focus is put on choices over 
time. There we can observe the crucial problems with neoclassical economics. 
It especially concerns revealed preference theory with its assumptions: people 
choose what is the best for them, they have stable preferences and can compare 
choices over time by utility measurements.
The axiomatic assumption that what people do is the best for them leads to 
many problems. When economists do not decide what is the best for people and 
they assume that people choose what is the best for them, they support ‘short-
-term human’ who frequently falls into temptation and chooses simple pleasures 
and regrets it later. Revealed preference theory provides economics with false 
objectivity (assuming that what people do is the best for them is a normative 
claim) and it has a negative impact on individuals’ well-being. 
The conception of multiple self shows that people have different preferences over 
time which cannot be integrated within utilitarian measurement. The conception 
of multiple self is used as a starting point for the discussion on the problems of 
revealed preference theory. The author develops this idea and he proposes the 
enriched conception of multiple self with the conceptual framework designed 
to normatively decide between selves (short-term versus long-term). In the 
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author’s opinion value-free economics do not have a luxury not to decide what 
is good for people (not deciding means supporting “short-term human”).
Even though the focus of the book is on choices over time, the author also 
synthesizes different criticisms toward neoclassical economics which aspires 
to be value-free. Both kinds of criticisms are investigated: descriptive and 
methodological. After the synthesis of criticism toward value-free economics, 
the author investigates some alternative normative approaches in economics. 
The goal is to check whether normative approaches can be a new paradigm 
that changes how economics is practiced. It should answer the question how 
economics should look in the future. Trying to answer such a broad question 
is essential, because it is not enough to criticize an old paradigm. To have 
a successful ‘paradigm shift’ scientists need to have a better paradigm than the 
old one. The author analyses some normative approaches, e.g., economics of 
happiness, the conception of multiple self, capability approach, and libertarian 
paternalism. The common theme in these approaches is that they ask what is 
good for people and how to improve people’s life. In some way it is the same 
kind of questions that economists ask at the beginning (e.g., (Marshall, 1920; 
Mill, 1874; Smith, 1869)). The problem with these normative approaches is if it is 
possible to improve people’s life and guarantee their freedom at the same time. 
I think it is a good idea to tell the readers what they can expect from the book. 
It is also crucial to indicate to whom the book is written and what the author 
wants to achieve. This book is interdisciplinary in its approach. Many topics 
are analysed (philosophy, economics, psychology, etc.) and the author connects 
ideas from different fields. However, philosophy of economics is the main 
perspective which is used in this book (1) rationality, 2) ethics, 3) methodology). 
The book is written predominately for people interested in the philosophy and 
methodology of economics. However, the broad scope of the book means that 
it is not solely written for economists but for a wider audience. It can be an 
engaging read (hopefully!) for people interested in economics as a science and 
also for scientists who are curious about the responsibilities and goals of social 
sciences. Of course, economics differs from other social sciences. However, the 
questions on positive vs normative dichotomy are as important in psychology, 
sociology, and political science. 
The main goal of this book is to present the argument that economics cannot 
be value-free, must be open toward methodological pluralism and normative 
approaches. On their own, these statements are not new. They had been made 
by many economists who are more experienced than the author of the book. 
However, Lakatosian framework together with multiple self conception used here 
can form a new argument that can persuade economists who still are not sure 
whether economists should deal with normative approaches, because they are 
afraid to be unscientific.  
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The book engages in a general discussion on ‘paradigm shift’ which is an 
extremely rich and large topic. Even though the scope of the book is quite 
extensive, the main goal is always underlined. It is to present the limits of 
neoclassical economics that wants to be value-free. In the book I argue that 
being completely value-free is impossible and this belief leads economists to 
methodological and practical problems. The argument presented in this book 
is as follows. If science cannot be completely value-free, economists should put 
their values on the table to analyse them and make them transparent.
Some claims made in this book can be controversial for the orthodox 
economists, because the very method they used is criticized. However, for me 
a possible discussion is good news. Starting the ‘conversation’ (Rorty, 1979) 
is one of the goals of this book. This is a conversation, because there are no 
ironclad arguments about how economics should be done. Therefore, I do not 
want to pretend that I have arguments that will end “strife over methods” 
(Methodenstreit) which seems to be a never-ending story. However, at least 
we can discuss our methodological positions. The message of this book is that 
value-free economics uses normative values that are hidden in the disguise of 
objectivity. Unfortunately, many economists do not see this. This book should 
show why this is a crucial problem and why economists should not believe 
that they are value-free engineers. 
Now, let us have a brief presentation of the content of this book. In Chapter 1 the 
origins of neoclassical economics and the process of becoming value-free science 
are presented. The main assumptions of neoclassical economics are investigated. 
Special attention is paid to revealed preference theory and positive/normative 
dichotomy. Thanks to the historical analysis a reader should understand what 
the author means by value-free economics.
In Chapter 2 ‘scientific research programme’ (Lakatos) is used to analyse 
Becker’s economic approach. The economic approach is chosen, because it is 
treated as the embodiment of neoclassical economics. The conclusions from this 
analysis are extrapolated on value-free economics. The ‘hard core’ is indicated 
(instrumental rationality and utility ad libitum) together with ‘protective 
belt’ and ‘negative heuristics.’ It is presented how thanks to ‘protective belt’ 
economists could absorb descriptive criticism and ‘hard core’ has remained 
unchanged. It is argued that the economic approach and value-free economics 
are degenerative programmes, because instrumental rationality and utility ad 
libitum lead to tautology. The analysis of value-free economics by ‘scientific 
research programme’ shows that descriptive criticism of homo economicus
(e.g. people are altruistic and irrational) is not enough to change the ‘hard core’ 
of value-free economics. However, due to ‘scientific research programme’ we 
obtain the tools to see the problems and limitations of the paradigm used by 
neoclassical economists. 
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If we agree that value-free economics is a degenerative programme, then the 
natural question which arises is what economists should use instead. The answer 
to this question is the topic of Chapter 3. The natural alternative is economics of 
happiness which tries to answer the question what is good for people and what 
improves their well-being. The main assumptions and origins of economics of 
happiness are presented. Moreover, the limits of this approach are demonstrated 
(1) malleability of preferences, 2) other values than happiness, e.g., freedom). 
Due to these problems the other approaches that indicate objective goals are 
analysed. The comprehensive analysis of economics of happiness can indicate 
the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. Thanks to that, it is possible to 
answer the question whether economics of happiness is better (both descriptively 
and methodologically) than revealed preference theory when it comes to well-
-being.
Chapter 4 starts with a discussion on personal identity. Firstly, the economics’ 
perception of self over time is analysed. Secondly, the philosophical discussion 
which concerns the question whether it is possible to identify one person over 
time is investigated (Hume, Lock, Parfit). Then, we move into the analysis of 
the conception of multiple self which is critical towards neoclassical economics, 
because the latter copes with different choices over time within the utilitarian 
framework (the discounted utility model (Samuelson, 1937)). The conception 
of multiple self demonstrates that people do not always choose what is best for 
them which is a core of revealed preference theory. To support this claim the 
philosophical discussion on weakness of will is analysed within the context of 
value-free economics. The main goal of this chapter is to provide a normative 
framework thanks to which we can decide between selves (‘short-term human’ 
vs ‘long-term human’). It has not been done successfully by the inventors of 
multiple self conception (Elster, Schelling). Moreover, the enriched conception 
of multiple self can indicate what people’s real preferences are. 
The conception of multiple self is normative, because we try to establish goals 
and values that are independent of people’s choices. As was indicated before, 
many economists do not like normativity and treat this endeavour as unscientific. 
In Chapter 5 the author delves into the epistemological discussion on the 
value-freeness of science to show that this perception of normative approaches 
is not justified. Over the last 50 years, we can observe the criticism towards the 
idea of objective science and the possibility of finding the Truth2 and iron-clad 
methodology (see (Feyerabend, 1993; Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1980; McCloskey, 
1985; Quine, 1969; Rorty, 1979)). The conclusions from the philosophy of 
science have not been accepted by many economists who are under the spell of 
logical positivism or some versions of it (Blaug, 1992; Caldwell, 1982; Fiedor, 
2 Truth with capital T refers to the epistemological ideal of absolute and objective Truth.
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& Ostapiuk, 2017; Hands, 2001; Hardt, 2017; Hausman, 2007; Hausman, 
McPherson, & Satz, 2017; Lawson, 1997, 2003; McCloskey, 1983, 1985; Reiss, 
2013). The main unresolved problem is a normative/positive distinction which 
is still a cherished methodological position in orthodox economics (Dasgupta, 
2005; Fiedor, & Ostapiuk, 2017; Friedman, 1953; Hausman et al. 2017; Lawson, 
2003, 2015; Mirowski, 1991, 2002; Ostapiuk, 2017a, 2019a; Reiss, 2017; Zboroń, 
2013). The methodological literature identifying the problems with positive/
normative distinction is still not well-known to many economists (Blaug, 1992; 
Colander, & Su, 2015; Czarny, 2010; Fiedor, 2013; Hands, 2012; Kincaid, Dupré, 
& Wylie, 2007; Kwarciński, 2016; Mongin, 2006; Myrdal, 1970; Putnam, 2002; 
Putnam, & Walsh, 2011; Sedláček, 2011) and it concerns mainly philosophers 
of science and philosophers of economics. Therefore, Chapter 5 synthesizes 
and clarifies this large discussion in the context of value-free economics. 
Next in Chapter 5, Max Weber is analysed to show that many economists 
misinterpreted his concepts of value-freeness and ideal type. He is commonly 
used as a justification for value-free economics. It is argued that it was not what 
he meant. In the end, Weber argued that scientists cannot escape from using 
values in their research (Weber, 2012). At the end of Chapter 5 two ethical systems 
(consequentialism and deontology) are analysed. The goal is not to compare these 
two ethical systems but to present and argue for a difference between intrinsic 
and instrumental values. Intrinsic values are independent of consequences, and 
their existence is necessary if we want to choose which self should be in control. 
Kant’s deontological system is presented as an attempt to establish the ultimate 
intrinsic values. It shows the limits of consequential reasoning used in economics 
(revealed preference theory). Moreover, the analysis of deontology is used to 
establish goals that are independent from people’s choices.
The crucial problem with establishing intrinsic goals that are independent of 
people’s choices is that they can curb people’s sovereignty and freedom, because 
revealed preferences are dismissed. In Chapter 6 the capability approach is 
analysed to reconcile objective goals with freedom. Sen’s capability approach 
is also analysed, because he is the most salient critic of neoclassical economics 
and revealed preference theory. Moreover, capability approach is used to 
support the argument made in this book that reason establishes freedom and 
autonomy. Sen’s approach is connected and analysed within the context of Kant 
and contemporary philosophers (Dworkin and Frankfurt). The argument is 
that acting on given preferences as in neoclassical economics is not sufficient 
to establish freedom. Besides analysing capability approach, the criticism 
towards Sen’s approach is presented. Especially the argument that his approach 
is paternalistic. The difference between Sen’s and Nussbaum’s account is 
presented to show why Sen’s approach perceives freedom as intrinsic value. 
His framework is chosen to support the conception of ‘long-term human.’
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First six chapters concern methodology. They conclude that economics cannot 
be value-free. Therefore, economists need to ‘get their hands dirty’ and be 
entangled in the normative discussion on human well-being. Chapter 7
concerns libertarian paternalism and is presented as a practical application of 
the previous methodological chapters. Moreover, the conception of libertarian 
paternalism proposed by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) has attracted a lot of 
attention, mostly negative one (Binder, 2014; Fumagalli, 2016; Gigerenzer, 
2015; Glaeser, 2006; Grüne-Yanoff, 2012; Hédoin, 2017; Infante, Lecouteux, 
& Sugden, 2016; McQuillin, & Sugden, 2012; Mitchell, 2005; Qizilbash, 2009, 
2012; Schnellenbach, 2016; Sugden, 2008b, 2009a, 2010, 2015, 2017, 2018; White, 
2013). One of the reasons for such strong criticism is Thaler’s and Sunstein’s 
inability to base libertarian paternalism upon a strong philosophical foundation. 
They claim that libertarian paternalism guarantees both freedom and well-being 
for individuals. However, they were not able to provide enough arguments to 
make this claim convincing for many.
I use the conclusions from this book to put libertarian paternalism on a more solid 
methodological foundation. The discussion is not solely focused on libertarian 
paternalism but also on behavioural welfare economists that cast doubts on 
consumer sovereignty. They argue that we can find purified preferences which 
rational human would choose to have if it were not for cognitive biases. This 
claim is strongly criticized. To answer some of the criticisms I use the concept 
of ‘long-term human’ to argue that we can find, at least in some cases, purified 
preferences. Even though libertarian paternalism can be defended against a lot 
of criticism, it does not mean that we should close our eyes to the dangers 
of libertarian paternalism. Therefore, only a limited version of libertarian 
paternalism is supported. 
In the end, it is presented that we cannot discuss concepts like libertarian 
paternalism without indicating our values first. This idea resonates with the 
main goal of this book – economists need to put their values on the table and 
make them transparent. They should not be hidden in the disguise of objectivity. 
Of course, it can mean that we will never end this debate but at least our 
‘conversation’ can be more fruitful.
Chapter 1
The origins of value-free economics
Economic theorists, like French chefs in regard to food, have developed stylized models 
whose ingredients are limited by some unwritten rules. Just as traditional French cooking 
does not use seaweed or raw fish, so neoclassical models do not make assumptions 
derived from psychology, anthropology, or sociology
(Akerlof, 1984, p. 2)
1.1. Introduction
We are on the verge of a ‘paradigm shift’. Homo economicus and the assumptions 
of neoclassical economics have been criticized for a long time. However, it seems 
that fundamental change still has not come and neoclassical economics prevails 
as a dominant paradigm, despite reverse imperialism. One of the reasons may 
be that many economists still believe in positive-normative dichotomy and 
they think that economics must be value-free. The economic approach is the 
example where this faith can lead. Becker’s economic approach is analysed 
as the embodiment and capstone of value-free economics (Becker, 1968, 1974, 
1976, 1993; Becker, & Murphy, 1988; Stigler, & Becker, 1977). It can be perceived 
as the lens by which economists look at reality. Many economists believe in 
‘hard core’ assumptions of the economic approach (maximization of utility 
and instrumental rationality). Becker’s approach is so attractive for economics, 
because it is an extremely effective research programme that can absorb every
kind of criticisms and it has made economics the most influential social science 
(Lazear, 2000; Mäki, 2009a; Mäki, Walsh, & Pinto, 2017). The economic approach 
is analysed in the context of ‘scientific research programme’ (Lakatos, 1980). 
The author examines ‘hard core’ of economic approach (maximization of utility, 
instrumental rationality), ‘protective belt’ and ‘heuristics.’ It is checked whether 
economic approach is ‘degenerative programme.’ The conclusions from this 
analysis can be extrapolated on value-free economics, because in the author’s 
opinion the economic approach in some respects can be perceived as the 
embodiment of value-free economics. 
The analysis of Becker’s economic approach is so crucial, because it gives one 
the possibility to understand what is the ‘hard core’ of neoclassical/value-
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-free economics.1 Still a lot of neoclassical economists perceive utility and 
instrumental rationality as positive conceptions. Positive/normative dichotomy 
is investigated to assess whether economists’ belief is justified and to what 
problems it leads. After reading the next two chapters, it will be possible to 
decide whether economics should stick to an effective value-free approach or 
should it look towards some goal-oriented normative approaches.
Before moving to Becker and his economic approach it is necessary to analyse 
the history of economic thought, which is the goal of the first chapter. It will 
enable us to indicate what are the cornerstones and the origins of neoclassical 
economics, and how they have changed over the years. We need to begin 
with the marginal revolution which started in the early 1870s when three 
independent economists (Jevons, Menger, and Walras) came up with a similar 
idea. The notion of revolution is not accidental, because the primary interest of 
economics shifted at that time from the production of wealth to utility which 
is gained from consumption. Moreover, the focus shifted from analysing 
the whole economy towards individuals and their wants (methodological 
individualism). 
It is hard to overestimate the influence of utility conception on value-free 
economics. In this context, it can even be stated that Bentham was one of the 
fathers of contemporary economics. Certainly he is regarded as the founder of 
utilitarianism. For him utility can mean everything that is beneficial for someone. 
What is more important, in Bentham’s opinion people always seek to maximize 
utility and this is because “nature has placed mankind under the governance of 
two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure” (Bentham, 1907, I.1). Furthermore, 
Bentham underlines that pleasure and pain are not only our empirical ‘masters’ 
but also they define how we should behave “It is for them alone to point out what 
we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do” (Bentham, 1907, I.1). 
This accentuation is essential, because in economics utilitarianism is discerned 
only as a system that describes human behaviour. It deals with individual choices 
not with ethics in which a predominant feature is universalism.2
1 The term ‘neoclassical economics’ is often overused and it leads to obscurity (Colander, 
2000). In this book terms ‘neoclassical’ and ‘value-free economics’ are used interchangeably, 
because both of them are based mainly on revealed preference theory which is not interested 
in human goals, assumes that people do what is best for them, and rationality is defined by 
technical criteria (consistency, completeness of preferences) 
2 Universalism means that ethical systems have some rules that must be followed in all 
circumstances by all people. Generally, universalism is identified with deontological 
approaches (Kant’s categorical imperative) when people must follow some duty/rules no 
matter what the consequences are (Kant, 1993). However, also consequentialist approaches 
(utilitarianism) are universal in the sense that all people need to follow some rule (maximize 
utility). More about the relationship between ethics and economics see (Etzioni; 1988; Fiedor, 
& Ostapiuk, 2017; Hardt, 2020; Róna, & Zsolnai, 2017).
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Especially Jevons relied on utilitarianism. For him all pleasures and pains can be 
reduced to a single dimension of utility and all desires can be simplified to the 
desire to maximize utility. In the first generation of neoclassical theory, the utility-
-based choice can be characterized by the cardinal and hedonistic notion of utility. 
Cardinal approach means that it is possible to assess utility and give it numerical 
values. The hedonistic notion is connected with the amount of pleasurable or 
painful psychical feeling that consumer gets from some goods or actions (Hands, 
2009). What makes value-free economics and Bentham so similar is their reluctance 
to indicate some goals of human actions. Bentham finds the maximization of 
utility as an end itself. Therefore, he criticizes the Greek ancient philosophers who 
believed that some pleasures depreciate human being. The English philosopher 
scoffs at their searching for the highest good (summum bonum) and claims that this 
is the “consummate nonsense” (Bentham, 1983, p. 134). In his opinion, searching 
for something better and different from pleasure does not have any sense, as it is 
impossible to be found. Plato, with his realm of ideas, is for Bentham “the master 
manufacturer of nonsense” (Bentham, 1983, p. 137). Bentham also states that there 
is no distinction between better and worse pleasures. He writes: “Prejudice apart, 
the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and 
poetry” (Bentham, 1825, p. 206). In his opinion, both activities are equally good 
if they give the same amount of utility. However, there is a crucial difference 
between not deciding which goods are more worthy (Bentham) and assuming 
that people always maximize their utility which implies that people choose what 
is the best for them (value-free economics).
1.2. Pareto turn – economics and psychology
At the beginning of the 20th century, economics got rid of psychology and this 
process is called ‘Pareto turn.’ Many economists, and among them Bruni and 
Sugden (2007), comprehensively explained how it was done. Therefore, in this 
section only the main factors in this process will be analysed. To begin with, 
it must be stated that marginalists believed in cardinal utility. However, they 
could not find a convincing method to measure utility (see (Stigler, 1950)). 
Of course, the lack of a method to measure utility attracted a lot of criticism. 
Robbins underlines that marginal utility theory was severely criticized, because 
of its psychological hedonism foundation: 
The borderlands of Economics are the happy hunting ground of minds averse 
to the effort of exact thought, and, in these ambiguous regions, in recent 
years, endless time has been devoted to attacks on the alleged psychological 
assumptions of Economic Science. (Robbins, 1932, p. 83) 
Psychological hedonism quickly lost intellectual credibility and it was evident 
for marginalists that they had to reform its theoretical foundations. Cardinal 
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approach with the belief that it is possible to assess utility was untenable. 
Therefore, economists started to use the ordinalistic approach where consumers 
can only rank their preferences. It means that consumers may not be able to 
indicate the exact amounts of utilities that they derive from commodities, but 
they can judge whether the satisfaction obtained from a commodity is equal, 
lower than, or higher than another. In this perspective, consumers are presented 
with a number of various combinations of goods and they can rank or order them 
according to the personal scale of their preferences. The inability to assess utility 
not only resulted in a new ordinal approach but also in escaping from a debate 
on human goals. Despite these problems, Pareto did not consider psychological 
knowledge as something unworthy to study. Quite the contrary – for him 
economic phenomena have a psychological explanation. However, economics 
in order to make progress must be a separate science and it needs to establish its 
fundamental laws (Bruni, & Sugden, 2007). Pareto thought that happiness and 
pleasure are too elusive terms and economics should not waste its time on the 
discussion about them. This escape from psychology and hedonistic foundation 
ended with Samuelson and his theory of revealed preferences. 
Samuelson (1938) tried to base consumer choice theory on strictly observable 
foundations. However, the purpose of Samuelson’s approach was not to ‘reveal’ 
preferences, but to create a strictly operational theory of consumer choice in 
which preferences or utility do not matter at all.3 He promised to remove the last 
“vestigial traces of the utility concept” (Samuelson, 1938, p. 61) from consumer 
choice theory. Samuelson was not interested in explanation (why people choose 
something), but he only wanted to describe the world. In order to do that we 
need to have a method of measurement. This is why Samuelson based his model 
on observable terms and consequences. He was operationalist, which means that 
his views were strongly influenced by logical positivism (Vienna circle) – the 
philosophical theory which had a considerable impact on value-free economics. 
Samuelson did not believe that the purpose of science should be finding the 
Truth. For him science had a more practical purpose. He wrote that “those who 
can, do science; those who can’t prattle about its methodology” (Samuelson, 
1992, p. 240).4
3 He writes that “The view that consumers maximize utility is not merely a law of economics, 
it is a law of logic itself” (as cited in Ainslie, 2001, p. 8).
4 Of course, Samuelson was not implying that methodology was unnecessary for economics, 
but he stated that if science worked, then no methodology would be required. Here this quote 
will not be discussed further because later the methodological discussion about this issue 
will be examined. Now it can only be stated that economist must deal with philosophy no 
matter whether they want this or not. Back in 1982 there was a debate between Tobin and 
Nozick, which illustrates this point. Tobin said to Nozick: “There’s nothing more dangerous 
than a philosopher who’s learned a little bit of economics.” To which Nozick immediately 
responded: “Unless it’s an economist who hasn’t learned any philosophy” (Hutchison, 1996,
p. 187).
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The primary purpose of revealed preferences was to remove operational terms 
from economic theory (Hands, 2014). We need to have observable and measurable 
data to build a theory. It is impossible to observe preferences. Thus, we can only 
look at the act of choice, and on this assumption Samuelson based his theory. 
The basic idea of revealed preference is as follows. If one chooses option x
instead of option y, then option x is revealed to be preferred to option y. Choices 
are consistent if they satisfy the ‘weak axiom of revealed preference’ (WARP), 
which means that, if x is revealed to be preferred to y, then y must not be revealed 
to be preferred to x. If choices satisfy the consistency conditions, then we can 
construct a complete, transitive and continuous revealed-preference ordering 
from them (Sen, 1971, 1973).
From the perspective of this book, the most crucial feature of revealed preferences 
theory is the perception of rationality. In this theory agents are rational when 
they act by the weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP). Therefore, 
rationality is treated instrumentally, because economists do not know and do 
not want to know about the motivations of people. Neoclassical economists are 
only interested in the results but not in the causes of behaviour. The economists 
stopped being interested in human motives and they assumed a priori that 
people are always rational and that they always maximize their utility. However, 
it is essential to understand that utility here is entirely different from Bentham’s 
utility and utility used by marginalists. Nowadays, when economists say that 
individuals maximize utility, they are only saying that people do not rank any 
feasible option above the option they choose. Sometimes economists speak 
about individuals who are aiming to maximize utility or seeking more utility. 
However, it does not mean that utility is an object of choice or it is perceived as 
an ultimately (or absolutely) good thing. Utility is only an index of preferences. 
Utility maximizer only does what she prefers. To say that agents maximize 
their utility say nothing about the nature of their preferences. The only thing 
it does is to connect preference and choice. Rational individuals rank available 
alternatives and choose what they prefer the most (Hausman, 1992, p. 18).
In the end, however, it must be stated that Samuelson has not achieved what he 
wanted. In 1938 he tried to base consumer choice theory on strictly observable 
foundations which would differentiate his theory from both cardinal and ordinal 
approaches. In the paper from 1938, he did not introduce the term ‘revealed 
preferences’ (Samuelson, 1938). He started to use this term in 1948 (Samuelson, 
1948). This change is important, because if well-ordered preferences exist, then 
they can be represented by an ordinal utility function. It means that utility is 
still in the interest of economics (Hands, 2009). In 1938 Samuelson perceived 
revealed preference theory as an alternative to utility theory. In 1950, however, 
it was obvious that this theory was nothing different from the ordinal approach 
As Wong (2006, pp. 73, 74) summed it up: 
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The upshot of our interpretation of the purpose of the theory is that the 
revolutionary significance of the Samuelson Theory is lost. The development of 
the theory does not represent a break with the tradition in economic theory in 
which consumer behaviour is explained in terms of preferences (and material 
circumstances). Consequently, the attendant philosophical and psychological 
controversies of utility theory, which Samuelson hoped to evade with his 
observational theory, are not exorcised from the corpus of economic theory. 
Although Samuelson was not able to introduce a theory different than ordinal 
utility approach, his efforts had an enormous influence on neoclassical economics 
which still perceives rationality in an instrumental way, has no interest in human 
motivations, and assumes that choice “reveals” human preferences. 
1.3. Robbins and value-free economics 
It is hard to overestimate the importance of Lionel Robbins’ Essay on the nature
and significance of economic science (Robbins, 1932). It was described as a “classic 
tract” (Caldwell, 1982, p. 99) and “the ‘official’ statement of the general ontology 
and epistemology of the discipline” (Ross, 2005, p. 87). Witztum (2007, p. 58) 
indicates three central tenets of Robbins’ most important essay:
1. The subject matter of economics is the tension between scarcity and wants 
(the means-ends problem). 
2. Economics is based on axioms (abstractions) which are derived from 
experience and which lead to statements about reality (hence, the ‘scientific’ 
nature of the subject).
3. Economics is not concerned with ends but only with the means available to 
achieve those ends. It is, thus, value free. 
These tenets were necessary to achieve three goals. Firstly, they define economic 
science as the study of scarcity-constrained rational choice. Secondly, they 
put economics on a firmer epistemological foundation (moving away from 
hedonism). Thirdly, they make an argument against interpersonal utility 
comparisons (Hands, 2007). If these three goals had been achieved, marginalist 
economic would have been provided with exclusive rights to the title of 
scientific economics. Of course, the profession would still need historical data 
and other empirical evidence provided by the institutionalist or historical 
schools.5 However, it leaves the pure science of economics to marginalism alone 
(Hands, 2007). In this chapter, each of these goals will be analysed, especially in 
the context of value-free economics. 
When it comes to the first assumption, Robbins writes that “economics is the 
science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and 
5 Robbins mentions “a Schmoller, a Veblen, or a Hamilton” (Robbins, 1932, p. 116).
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scarce means which have alternative uses“ (Robbins, 1932, p. 16). This is probably 
one of the most recognizable quotations in economics. In these few words, it is 
explained what economics is all about. According to Robbins, man: 
has to choose. He has to economise. Whether he chooses with deliberation or 
not, his behaviour has the form of choice. The disposition of his time and his 
resources has a relationship to his system of wants. It has an economic aspect. 
(Robbins, 1932, p. 12)
It goes without saying that time is limited and we cannot do a few things at the 
same time. Therefore, we always need to choose. This means that economics 
can deal with almost all issues (economic imperialism), and later Becker stuck 
fundamentally to this perception of economics. Before Robbins economists 
had a completely different understanding of economics. For them (e.g., Mill, 
Marshall, Smith) economics was a study of wealth. Robbins who was influenced 
by logical positivism could not agree with this. Firstly, the previous definition 
becomes a kind of tautology, because economists decide what wealth is. 
Therefore, Robbins underlines that this definition is incapable of describing its 
ultimate subject-matter (Robbins, 1932, p. 4). Secondly, the division between 
economic and noneconomic spheres is arbitrary, because if the conception 
of wealth is taken literally, the important parts of the generalizations of the 
science fall outside the area of economics (Robbins, 1932, pp. 5–8). This problem 
is visible on the example of Marshall and his perception of economics as the 
science of material welfare ((Marshall, 1920); see also (Dzionek-Kozłowska, 
2007)). Robbins argues that many things are material without being economic
(e.g., a pile of wood in the forest, worthless rocks, sand on the beach) and many 
other things are economic without being material (e.g., services). Due to these 
problems, it is understandable that Robbins’ definition is more precise. 
Now, it is possible to analyse the most critical assumption from the perspective 
of this chapter – value-freeness. Before going deeper into Robbins’ ideas it is 
essential to understand how logical positivism classifies sentences. Therefore, 
it will be possible to comprehend the distinction between normative and positive 
approaches that still exists in economics. The logical positivists introduced 
a tripartite classification of sentences: 1) synthetic, 2) analytic, 3) nonsense (after 
Wittgenstein) (Putnam, 2002, pp. 10, 18). Synthetic judgments are empirically 
verifiable or falsifiable. They contain statements that can be verified by reality 
(facts). For example, we can say that Mount Everest is the highest mountain in 
the world. It is easy to check whether if this statement is true or false. We know 
how to measure height and we can measure all mountains in the world. 
The second type of statements are those which cannot be logically verified by 
reality. These analytical statements take the form of tautologies. This means that 
it is possible to indicate whether they are true or false on the basis of the logical 
rules alone. The purpose of tautologies is not to tell something about reality but 
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they show the logical structure of the world (Sady, 2013, p. 11). For example, we 
assume that the sum of angles in a triangle is 180 degrees or we can state that all 
bachelors are unmarried men. The third group of statements include all ethical, 
metaphysical and aesthetic judgments that are “cognitively meaningless” 
(Putnam, 2002, p. 10). Logical positivists perceive them as unscientific, because 
they are unverifiable. It is worth noticing that “This terminology [nonsense]6
is to be understood as implying a logical, not say a psychological distinction; 
its use is intended to assert only that the statements in question do not possess 
a certain logical characteristic common to all proper scientific statements” 
[namely verifiability]7 (Carnap, 1934, pp. 26, 27). Some philosophical problems 
arise in the case of ethics in which norms are used in the form of constative 
sentences, e.g., “killing is wrong.” People very often thought that this statement 
must be right or wrong. However, logical analysis proves that from the statement
“killing is wrong” we cannot derive any statements which will tell about future 
experiences. Therefore, this statement is unverifiable and nonsensical (Carnap, 
1935, § 1.4). It is important to bear this in mind, because logical positivists 
considered every value statements as meaningless. This reluctance towards 
value statements will be visible in the context of normative positive dichotomy. 
The distinction between positive and normative economics was popularized by 
John Neville Keynes. The separation of the positive and the normative was the 
part of Keynes’ more general distinction between positive science, normative 
science, and art. Positive science contains a study of fact (what is), normative 
science contains the study of norms and rules (what ought to be), and art is
focused on policy application (what can be achieved). Keynes (1999, p. 22) writes 
about these differences: 
As the terms are here used, a positive science may be defined as a body of 
systematized knowledge concerning what is; a normative or regulative science 
as a body of systematized knowledge relating to criteria of what ought to 
be, and concerned therefore with the ideal as distinguished from the actual; 
and art as a system of rules for the attainment of a given end. The object of 
a positive science is the establishment of uniformities, of a normative science 
the determination of ideals, of an art the formulation of precepts.
At the beginning of neoclassical economics, the difference between positive 
and normative approach was sharp, but economists did not undermine the 
necessity of a normative approach. They thought that ethics is necessary, but
it should not be the area of interest for economics. One of the reasons for this 
belief was specialization. Economists could not deal with every problem, so 
they needed to specialize. This kind of reasoning was initiated by Jevons who 
wrote that “Various social sciences, also, are needed to promote the welfare of 
6 Added by the author.
7 Added by Putnam (2002, p. 18).
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mankind [...]. But Political Economy is distinct from all these other sciences, and 
treats of wealth itself” (Jevons, 1911, p. 7). Political economy takes wealth as the 
object of study, which is a component not the whole, of human welfare. Against 
those who complained about the narrow focus on wealth, Jevons (1911, p. 8) 
referred to the principle of division of labour: 
But these complainers misunderstand the purposes of a science like political 
economy. They do not see that in learning we must do one thing at a time. We 
cannot learn the social sciences all at the same time [...]. There must be many 
physical sciences, and there must also be many social sciences, and each of these 
sciences must treat of its own proper subject, and not of things in general. 
Until the 1920s, most economists believed that the relationship between 
economics and ethics was hierarchical. Economics was the science of wealth, and 
ethics used the insights from economics and the other social sciences to make 
judgments about which courses of action were ethically desirable (Yuengert, 
2000). In value-free approach, economists are like engineers who tell individuals
how to resolve some problems efficiently but they will not tell individuals what 
should they do.8 Economists only help people with achieving the goals that 
people set themselves. Economists are proud of this separation from ethics, 
because they can be perceived as objective scientists who deal only with facts. 
The argument of specialization was also used by Robbins who responded to 
Mill’s assertion that good economics contributes to the ethical debate in these 
words “we may not agree with J.S. Mill that ‘a man is not likely to be a good 
economist if he is nothing else.’ But we may at least agree that he may not be as 
useful as he otherwise might be” (Robbins, 1932, p. 150). Specialization was an 
important factor in dismissing ethics from economics; but it was Robbins who 
established the dichotomy between normative and positive science. Moreover, he 
considered normative approach as unscientific and he believed that economists
should not take ethics into consideration. Nowadays, the positive-normative
dichotomy is widely recognized in mainstream economics. For example, the 
most famous introductory economics textbook of all time explains the difference 
between positive economics and normative economics in this way:
In thinking about economic questions, we must distinguish questions of fact 
from questions of fairness […]. 
Positive economics deals with questions such as: Why do doctors earn more 
than janitors? Does free trade raise or lower the wage of most Americans […].
Normative Economics involves ethical precepts and norms of fairness. Should 
poor people be required to work if they are to get government assistance? 
(Samuelson, & Nordhaus, 2001, pp. 7, 8)
8 Now we look at economists more as the plumbers who lay the pipes and fix the leaks. The 
conclusion from this metaphor is that economists should be more practical and check what 
works rather than creating grand theories that do not work in reality (see (Duflo, 2017)). 
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Hands (2012, p. 4) excellently explains how differently economists perceive 
these two approaches:
The dichotomy – the strict separation of the positive and the normative – was 
replaced by an epistemic condemnation and prohibition of the normative; 
not only was it necessary to recognize that positive and normative statements 
were fundamentally different, in addition it was argued that the normative 
was scientifically illegitimate and should be prohibited from proper economic 
science. According to logical positivism there were only two types of meaningful 
discourse – empirical science (synthetic knowledge) and logic/mathematics 
(analytic knowledge) – everything else was meaningless metaphysics. Since 
normative economics was based on presuppositions that were not derived 
from either of these two sources, normative economic science ceased to be any 
type of science at all, and was relegated to the epistemic dustbin along with 
religion, metaphysics, and other “meaningless” discourse. This positivist view 
of the normative was often combined with an emotivistic view of ethics – that 
ethical statements were simply expression of attitude or emotion.
Undoubtedly Robbins was influenced by logical positivism which assumed 
that ethical statements do not express propositions but emotional attitudes. 
Moreover, this view simplified all different value judgments to ethical ones. Due 
to logical positivism, debates about ethics were declared unresolvable (ethical 
values are simple statements of preference and, as such, are not the subjects of 
rational dispute) which meant for Robbins that economics had to be separated 
from ethics. He expressed the difference between ethics and positive economics 
in a few famous quotations. He writes:
Economics deals with ascertainable facts; ethics with valuations and 
obligations. The two fields of inquiry are not on the same plane of discourse. 
Between the generalisations of positive and normative studies there is a logical 
gulf fixed which no ingenuity can disguise and no juxtaposition in space or 
time bridge over. (Robbins, 1932, p. 132)
And he continues: 
If we disagree about ends it is a case of thy blood or mine—or live or let live 
according to the importance of the difference, or the relative strength of our 
opponents. But if we disagree about means, then a scientific analysis can often 
help us resolve our differences. If we disagree about the morality of the taking 
of interest (and we understand what we are talking about), then there is no 
room for argument. (Robbins, 1932, p. 134)
Due to logical positivism, all value judgments were put into the one bag of 
nonsenses about which we cannot rationally discuss. Because of these problems, 
Robbins wanted to distinct economics from ethics and he argued that “economic 
analysis is wertfrei (value-free)” (Robbins, 1932, p. 91). Later economics became, 
in the words of Amartya Sen, “self-consciously non-ethical” (Sen, 1987, p. 2). 
Many years after the publication of Robbins’ essay, Kenneth Boulding, in his 
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presidential address to the American Economic Association, regretted that 
economics had evolved into a social science which is very different from moral 
science. He wrote:
We are strongly imbued today with the view that science should be wertfrei
and we believe that science has achieved its triumph precisely because it has 
escaped the swaddling clothes of moral judgment and has only been able to 
take off into the vast universe of the ‘is’ by escaping from the treacherous 
launching pad of the ‘ought’. (Boulding, 1969, p. 1)
It was almost 50 years ago and still a lot of economists preach false normative-
positive dichotomy. Steven Levitt, the author of bestseller Freakonomics, wrote 
that “morality, it could be argued, represents the way that people would like 
the world to work – whereas economics represents how it actually does work” 
(Levitt, & Dubner, 2005, p. 13). 
The next assumption of value-free economics is that we cannot compare utility 
between agents. Robbins used the prohibition of normative approach in his 
argument against utility comparisons. He wrote:
It is a comparison which necessarily falls outside the scope of any positive 
science. To state that A’s preference stands above B’s in order of importance 
is entirely different from stating that A prefers n to m and B prefers n and m in 
a different order. It involves an element of conventional valuation. Hence it is 
essentially normative. It has no place in pure science. (Robbins, 1932, p. 139) 
It goes without saying that Robbins was a supporter of ordinal not cardinal 
approach towards utility. He believes that people can rank their preferences. 
How did he know that? Robbins answered that it was enough to look at everyday 
inner experience (i.e., introspection):
The main postulate of the theory of value is the fact that individuals can 
arrange their preferences in an order, and in fact do so […]. We do not need 
controlled experiments to establish their validity: they are so much the stuff 
of our everyday experience that they have only to be stated to be recognized 
as obvious. (Robbins, 1932, pp. 78, 79) 
For Robbins thanks to experience which is observable, ordinal approach has 
a solid scientific base in contrast to cardinal approach. Robbins’ arguments 
support the revealed preference theory and they persuade many economists 
that value-free economics is an objective science. 
1.4. Positive versus normative approach 
In this section, it will be argued that a gulf between normative and positive 
judgments is not as wide as it is commonly thought by many economists (Blaug, 
1992; Colander, & Su, 2015; Fiedor, 2013; Hands, 2012, Hardt, 2020; Kwarciński, 
2016; Mongin, 2006; Putnam, 2002; Putnam, & Walsh, 2011). In order to show 
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that, the misinterpretation of value judgments by economists will be presented. 
Moreover, it will be argued that normative assumptions and values exist in 
positive economics. However, many economists often believe in some normative 
axioms without even realizing that they are normative. 
Nowadays, the dichotomy between positive and normative, facts and values 
seems straightforward, but for a long time it has been the subject of philosophical 
debate. Much of the discussion can be traced to David Hume and this is why the 
difference between normative and positive is also called ‘Hume’s dichotomy,’ 
‘Hume’s fork,’ and ‘Hume’s guillotine.’ Hume’s primary concern was to block 
efforts to ground ethics in the facts of nature (Putnam, 2002, p. 2). In the famous 
passage Hume (1896, p. 319) writes that:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remark’d that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of 
reasoning, and establishes the being of God, or makes observations concerning 
human affairs; when of a sudden I am supriz’d to find, that instead of the usual 
copulations of propositions, is, and, is not, I meet with no proposition that is 
not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; 
but is, however, of the last consequence. For as ought, or ought not, expresses 
some new relation of affirmation, ’tis necessary that it should be observ’d 
and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what 
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction 
from others, which are entirely different from it. 
Hume was right that there is no relationship between the statement ‘I give to 
charity’ and the statement ‘I ought to give to charity.’ That something is does 
not imply that it should be that way, and that it should be that way does not 
imply that it is. Hence, the difference between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ seems significant 
enough to call it a dichotomy (Hands, 2012). 
However, the fact/value dichotomy comes out as something different than in 
Hume’s writing. He did not use a term which we now call ‘value judgments’ 
(though he had the term ‘morals’). Admittedly, he discussed individual value 
terms, for example, ‘virtue,’ ’ought’ and so on. However, he put them into 
the context of ethics (Putnam, 2002, pp. 18, 19). Thus, he wrote about ethical 
judgments, not about all value judgments. Later a lot of philosophers forgot 
about this distinction and ethical statements started to be identified with value 
statements. This is visible in the case of the positivists. Carnap generally spoke 
not of “value judgments” but only of the statements of “regulative ethics” (or 
sometimes “normative ethics”) (Putnam, 2002, p. 18). The goal of positivists was 
to challenge objectivity and rationality of ethics. So, their fact/value dichotomy 
was not based on any serious examination of the nature of values or valuation 
at all. They examined the nature of “fact” in a narrow empiricist spirit (Putnam, 
2002, pp. 28, 29). Therefore, the proper analysis is necessary if we want to 
understand the nature of value judgments. 
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Hands indicates that normative statements are something more than ethical 
valuations. He writes: 
In general normative terms are simply terms that are action-guiding or 
prescriptive, and normative statements are statements involving such terms. 
The relevant norms might be social, legal, epistemological, aesthetic, or a host 
of other types; ethical norms are just one very special case of such prescriptive 
terms. (Hands, 2012, p. 9) 
Outside economics, it is obvious that not everything that is ‘normative’ involves 
ethics. For example, if someone says ‘you ought to eat more vegetables’ it does 
not mean that you should eat them to be more moral. It means that you ought 
to eat vegetables to be healthy. Therefore, it is a norm but the norm of good 
health, not an ethical norm. Economists have problems with this distinction, 
which is visible in the case of welfare economics where any value component is 
automatically considered as ethical. For Mongin the problem is deeper than it 
looks at first glance. He writes: 
The economists’ confounding of ethical with non-ethical evaluations is perhaps 
only secondary; they are trapped into confusion at an earlier stage. They think 
of evaluations in terms of judgments, not propositions. This psychologistic 
preconception fosters the belief that there cannot be an evaluation without 
a person’s commitment, and personal commitments are supposedly typical of 
morality. (Mongin 2001, p. 13)
Therefore, if one says “I do believe that recent actions of government were 
positive” it does not always mean that one wants to evaluate their actions but it 
could also mean that one gives information to someone about the actions of the 
government.9
The other side of the problem is that many economists use normative assumptions 
without realizing that. However, before going to explain what it means we 
need to understand that economists sometimes unknowingly derive ‘ought’ 
from ‘is.’ It is possible, because economics has been significantly influenced by 
utilitarianism which is a consequentialist system. For a utilitarian one ought 
to do what gives one the most pleasure. Therefore, if A causes more pleasure 
than B, then A ought to be done. In this way, utilitarianism connects economic 
evaluations with prescriptions (Mongin, 2006). Of course, these assumptions lead 
economists to choose a particular policy. Hands shows how this process works. 
If an economist had to choose between policy A and B he would probably use 
this criterion “The best (good) policy (ceteris paribus) is the one that makes people 
better off (that is, it leads to the highest level of utility or preference satisfaction 
9 Terms like ‘honest,’ ‘generous,’ or ‘courageous’ can be perceived as thick predicates of 
morality. The defining feature of thick predicates is that they have both an evaluative and 
a descriptive side in an opposition to ethical good which is typically thin predicate (Mongin, 
2006).
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among the relevant individuals)” (Hands, 2012, p. 16). So, if economic analysis 
tells us that policy A (ceteris paribus) makes people better off than policy B, then 
society ought to do A. Of course, economics does not indicate what things make 
people better off. However, it assumes that what people do maximizes their 
utility. In the end, it means that economics knowing what is (what people do – 
positive facts) tells us how it ought to be (normative). 
The next problem also arises from is/ought dichotomy. For economists this 
distinction proves that economics is positive and value-free. Klappholz (1964, 
pp. 98, 99) points that out:
The ‘orthodox’ position rests on Hume’s observation that norms or proposals 
cannot be deduced from descriptive statements alone [...] Since ‘the scientific 
part of economics consists exclusively of descriptive statements, it cannot 
have any ethical entailment, and is therefore value-free’. If this is what we 
mean by ‘value-free’ then, as J. N. Keynes said, it seems trivially true that 
economics, and the social sciences in general, can be value-free. 
Moreover, Mongin highlights that “positive economics starts from assumptions 
that are phrased in terms of factual statements alone and it proceeds by 
making deductions from these statements” (Mongin 2001, p. 20). However, this 
understanding is flawed, because Hume’s dichotomy only works when initial 
premises are exclusively factual and economics contains the evaluative vocabulary 
of preference. The statements like ‘I prefer a to b’ designate an evaluative concept 
which makes the proposition an evaluative one (Mongin, 2001).
Having explained these problems, it is now possible to scrutinize two concepts 
which are essential for neoclassical economics: Pareto optimum and rational 
choice theory. Pareto optimum shows how neoclassical economics perceives 
welfare. Firstly, this concept is based on methodological individualism. Look at 
these two statements: 
(1) state x is better than y for individual i,
(2) state x is better than y for society. 
In the first case, betterness is connected with the preferences of people. 
Therefore, the state which satisfies people’s preferences more is the better one. 
The second example is problematic, because we do not know what satisfies 
preferences of society. We can only refer to individual preferences and then 
sum them up (Mongin, 2001). However, from the 1930s and 1940s, economics 
ceased to make interpersonal utility comparisons and started to use the Pareto 
criterion. According to this theory, a specific distribution of resources is Pareto 
Optimal (efficient) only when reallocation that would make one person better 
off, would also make someone else worse off. This idea was the basis for the 
‘First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics’ in which any competitive 
equilibrium leads to Pareto efficient allocation of resources. Why did economics 
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shift towards Pareto criterion in the 1930s? Because it helped economists to avoid 
the troublesome normative issues associated with interpersonal comparisons of 
utility. Thanks to that, economists look more ‘scientific.’ They were able to make 
positive/scientific judgments about social welfare and microeconomic policy 
(Hands, 2012). However, Pareto optimum (or economic efficiency) is normatively 
laden theory and welfare economics cannot be perceived as positive science 
(Blaug, 1992; Hausman, 1992; Hausman, & McPherson, 2006). Pareto criterion 
is not value-free, because it is based entirely on satisfying the preferences of 
the particular economic agent. Therefore, being better or worse off is caused 
by individual preference satisfaction. For Hausman and McPherson, Pareto 
criterion functions “as a Trojan horse smuggling ethical commitments into the 
theoretical citadel of positive mainstream economics” (Hausman, & McPherson, 
2006, pp. 67, 68). Many economists believe that economic efficiency is value-
-free and it allows them to “conclude that, ceteris paribus, perfectly competitive 
equilibria are morally desirable and market imperfections that interfere with 
the achievement of competitive equilibria are morally undesirable” (Hausman, 
& McPherson, 2006, p. 66). This view has a significant influence on a contemporary 
free market society. 
The second issue is rational choice theory and the fact that many economists 
consider it a positive approach. It would be a descriptive theory if economists 
made a systematic empirical observation of agent’s preferences and choices, 
then generalized those observations to derive some scientific laws of economic 
behaviour (Hands, 2012). However, this is not how economic analysis is done 
in most cases. As it was mentioned before, economists cannot observe people’s 
preferences, beliefs, and desires. Therefore, they are concentrated on people’s 
choices. However, neoclassical economists not only state that someone chooses 
something but they also assume that someone chooses something, because it 
maximizes one’s utility or satisfies one’s preferences. Moreover, neoclassical
economists assume that one’s choice is rational. Economists are satisfied to 
use instrumental rationality which enables them to be value-free, because they 
do not state which choice people should make to maximize their utility. From 
that perspective, economics only deals with means not ends that people put 
on themselves. However, some economists forget that they make normative 
assumptions about instrumental rationality. They assume that preferences 
must be transitive and complete to be called rational. These assumptions are 
treated as positive by many neoclassical economists and this is the reason why 
Thaler’s article Toward a positive theory of consumer choice surprised so many of 
them. Thaler (1980, p. 39) points out that: 
Economists rarely draw the distinction between normative models of 
consumer choice and descriptive or positive models. Although the theory 
is normatively based (it describes what rational consumers should do) 
economists argue that it also serves well as a descriptive theory (it predicts 
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what consumers in fact do). This paper argues that exclusive reliance on the 
normative theory leads economists to make systematic, predictable errors in 
describing and forecasting consumer choices.
One of the goals of behavioural economics was to demonstrate the situations 
when people behave differently than the neoclassical theory assumes.10 Although 
the criticism of neoclassical economics is severe, later it will be examined how 
economics thanks to Becker was able to defend their hard core assumptions 
(maximization of utility, instrumental rationality) and absorb descriptive 
criticism. Even though behavioural economics show that rational choice theory 
does not represent how people behave, many economists consider it to be 
positive, not a normative theory. It seems even stranger when we take into 
consideration that philosophers perceive economic rationality as a normative 
theory (Sugden, 1991). However, it is not strange at all if we realize that over the 
last dozen years economists and philosophers have not had a lot of contact with 
each other. However, this is changing now. Due to the philosophy of economics, 
normative characterization of rationality has been more recognizable among 
economists (e.g., (Blaug, 1992; Boland, 1997; Davis, 2003, 2010; Hands, 2012; 
Hausman, 1992; Hausman et al., 2017; Mongin, 2006; Reiss, 2013; Ross, 2005)). 
1.5. Conclusions
To summarize this chapter, it can be stated that the distinction between is and 
ought is exaggerated in economics and too strong conclusions are derived from it. 
Following the advice of the philosopher Hilary Putnam, the dichotomy should 
be ‘disinflated:’
If we disinflate the fact/value dichotomy, what we get is this: there is 
a distinction to be drawn (one that is useful in some contexts) between ethical 
judgments and other sorts of judgments. This is undoubtedly the case, just 
as it is undoubtedly the case that there is a distinction to be drawn (and one 
that is useful in some contexts) between chemical judgments and judgments 
that do not belong to the field of chemistry. But nothing metaphysical follows 
from the existence of a fact/value distinction in this (modest) sense. (Putnam, 
2002, p. 19) 
Moreover, economists must understand that they are not objective and positive 
scientists even though many of them see themselves as such. Economic theories 
(rational choice theory, Pareto optimum) contain normative components but 
to realize that economists must extricate themselves from positivistic influence 
10 For example, dictator game/ultimatum game (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986), mental 
accounting (Thaler, 1985), prospect theory (Kahneman, & Tversky, 1979), hyperbolic 
discounting (Ainslie, 1975), inner motivations crowding-out (Frey, & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). 
The most important achievements of behavioural economics are presented in (Thaler, 2015).
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(e.g., value judgments are not ethical judgment). In general, it seems justified 
to point out that specialization has not been always profitable for economists. 
They need to listen to other social scientists and ethicists, because economists 
are not value-free engineers who deal only with means, not ends. No social 
science can be entirely value-free and scientists deal with human goals in the 
end. Therefore, it is better to do it properly rather than not do it at all. To do that 
properly, economists need to have an honest debate on goals and normative 
approaches. However, before we move to normative approaches and their 
methodological justification, we need to analyse Becker’s economic approach, 
because this approach enables economists to rebut every kind of descriptive 
criticisms towards the ‘hard cores’ of value-free economics (maximization of 
utility, instrumental rationality). And so, economics still is perceived by many 
economists as a positive and value-free science.
Chapter 2
Lakatosian perspective  
on Becker’s economic approach
To abandon neoclassical theory
 is to abandon economics as a science
(North, 1978, p. 974)
2.1. Introduction
Until the 1970s methodological views among the majority of economists were 
based on the philosophy of logical positivism. Especially, they preached the 
hypothetico-deductive model of scientific explanation which was introduced 
by the Vienna circle (Blaug, 1992, p. 4; Caldwell, 1982, pp. 11–18). These ideas 
were brought to economics mainly by Hutchison (1938). After the Second 
World War positivism had the most influence on economics. Especially, after 
the publication of Friedman’s seminal essay The methodology of positive economics
(Friedman, 1953). However, over the last few decades, the post-positivists 
philosophers of science (e.g., Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos) had gained importance. 
From the perspective of our analysis, one of them (Lakatos) is essential. 
Lakatos’ main idea is that the unit of scientific achievements is not an isolated 
hypothesis but a ‘scientific research programme.’ Scientific research programme 
consists of (1) hard core, (2) protective belt, and (3/4) positive/negative 
heuristics. (1) Hard core contains the fundamental metaphysical assumptions 
of the research programme. It is a framework of general hypotheses which 
elements are irrefutable by the empirical evidence. Hard core remains fixed in 
spite of programme’s development, because the rejection of hard core means 
the abandonment of the programme itself (Hands, 2001, p. 122). (2) Protective 
belt contains auxiliary hypotheses, empirical conventions, and other theoretical 
structures of the programme which may be falsified. In this area, changes occur 
as programme moves through time. Protective belt is a buffer zone between hard 
core and empirical evidence. Protective belt changes in response to changes in 
empirical evidence (Hands, 2001, p. 122). (3/4) Positive and negative heuristics 
provide information about what should (positive) and should not (negative) 
be sought during the development of the programme. They constitute a set of 
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accepted methodological rules (Lakatos, 1980, p. 47). More specifically, positive 
heuristic is a “set of suggestion or hints” which help with adjusting sections 
of the protective belt (Lakatos, 1980, p. 50). Negative heuristic veers criticism 
about falsity or inadequacy towards the protective belt which makes hard 
core irrefutable (Lakatos, 1980, pp. 48–50). Lakatos was influenced by Kuhn 
(1962) and his model is consistent in some areas with Kuhn’s view of science. 
Usually, most things that happen in scientific research programme take place in 
protective belt, whereas hard core remains untouched. A scientific revolution 
occurs when hard core is replaced. For Lakatos scientific progress takes place 
when degenerating research programme is replaced by new progressive one 
which leads to the discovery of novel phenomena (for more information see 
(Lakatos, 1980; Redman, 1993)). 
At the beginning of the 1970, the idea of scientific research programme gained 
popularity among economists. It was possible, because Lakatos answered 
problems to which Popper (1959) did not. It was the case in the areas in which 
a tension between falsificationism and the actual practice of economics exists. 
This problem was captured by Blaug who wrote that “the central weakness 
of modern economics is in fact the reluctance to produce theories which yield 
unambiguously refutable implications” (Blaug, 1975, p. 425). It goes without 
saying that neoclassical economics contains many hard cores which define 
the research programmes used by economists (Hands, 1993). However, the 
conception of scientific research programme did not fit into economics as 
perfectly as it was thought at the beginning. The decline of Lakatos’ influence 
on economics started at Capri conference in 1989. Many economists interested in 
economic methodology (e.g., Backhouse, Blaug, Caldwell, Hands, Hoover, Mäki, 
de Marchi, Mirowski, Morgan, Smith, Weintraub) met there (see (Gonzalez, 
2014)). The result of this conference was the book Appraising economic theories
(de Marchi, & Blaug, 1991) which was mostly negative towards Lakatos. Since 
then, Lakatos’ method has lost its popularity among economic philosophers 
to the present day (see (Backhouse, 1994; Hands, 1993; Hausman, 1992, ch. 6; 
Rosenberg, 1992, ch. 4)). Why has it happened? The purpose of this section 
is not a general methodological discussion on science and its limitations. It is 
constrained to two reservations towards Lakatos which were summarized 
by Blaug. Firstly, it is impossible to establish the hard cores of any research 
programme in economics about which everyone would agree.1 Secondly, 
measuring scientific progress by empirical criterion (prediction of novel facts) 
is inappropriate for economics (de Marchi, & Blaug 1991, p. 500). This argument 
was also underlined by Hands (1984, 1990) who argued that social science like 
economics lacks “crucial experiments” which would enable us to predict novel 
1 As an example see the critical analysis of “neo-Walrasian research programme” (Weintraub 
1985, p. 109) by Hausman (1992, pp. 87, 88).
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facts. This point is crucial, because for Lakatos prediction of novel facts gives 
scientists a chance to compare and decide which rival scientific programme is 
better (Hands, 1990). Although Lakatos’ scientific research programme cannot 
indicate hard core and which programme is better with absolute certainty, it still 
can be a useful method. Despite the criticism presented above, many economists 
continue to employ Lakatosian models of methodological explanation in almost 
all fields of economics (Drakopoulos, & Karayiannis, 2005; Hands 2001, pp. 299, 
300). Lakatos is still popular in economics, because his idea gives economists 
a chance to identify the structure of various research programmes. Identification 
of hard core, protective belt, positive heuristic, and negative heuristic helps 
organize our thoughts about numerous approaches in economics. Moreover, 
thinking in categories of progress or deterioration can help (to some degree) 
with assessing whether some research programme is useful or not. 
This analysis can be especially fruitful in the case of Becker’s economic approach. 
There are a few reasons why we should analyze the economic approach in 
the context of scientific research programme. For some economists, Becker 
represents accurately what is called ‘neo-classical economics.’ This identification 
is supported by Becker himself (1976) as well as other writers (Coleman, 1993, 
p. 169; Hands, 2001, p. 273). Others (e.g., (Blaug, 1992, p. 221)) refer to Becker as part 
of the Chicago school. Generally, Becker is considered to be connected with “the 
standard,” “mainstream” or “neo-classical mainstream” of economics (Hands, 
2001, pp. 271–273). Overall, he is regarded as the ‘face’ of neoclassical economics 
by other social scientists. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of Becker. 
According to Fuchs, Becker is “one of the most influential social scientists of the 
second half of the 20th century […] [whose] influence on the other social sciences 
exceeds that of any economist of his generation” (Fuchs, 1994, pp. 183, 184). 
Having this in mind, it is surprising that more attention was not paid to Becker in 
the books about economic methodology. In a widely cited book of Hands (2001), 
Becker appears only in an indirectly laudatory introductory quotation by Boland 
(1997, p. 1) and then in a critical case study in a section about feminist economics 
(Boland, 1997, pp. 270, 271). Even less information we can find in Hausman (1992) 
where Becker is only shortly mentioned a few times. We can find more about 
Becker in Blaug (1992). He writes about Becker’s theoretical and methodological 
contributions to marginal productivity theory (p. 175), human capital theory 
(p. 207), methodological individualism (pp. 209–211), and the new economics 
of the family (pp. 220–228). Moreover, there is comprehensive literature that 
analyses economic imperialism (e.g., (Lazear, 2000; Mäki, 2009a; Mäki, Walsh, 
& Pinto, 2017)). However, Becker’s approach has not been thoroughly investiga-
ted from the perspective of scientific research programmes.2 It is quite startling 
2 The partial analysis in (Blaug, 1992). 
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that the economic approach was not eagerly examined in the context of Lakatos’ 
research programme, because it can be easily done. The economic method has 
some axioms from which the meaningful predictions about human behaviour 
are deducted. Becker writes that “the combined assumptions of maximizing 
behavior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences, used relentlessly and 
unflinchingly, form the heart of the economic approach as I see it” (Becker, 
1976, p. 5). He believes that “the economic approach provides a valuable 
unified framework for understanding all human behavior” (Becker, 1976, p. 14). 
However, understanding here does not mean common sense understanding. 
For Stigler and Becker (1977) economic method must be judged in terms of its 
predictive power, not in terms of the descriptive realism of its assumptions 
or explanations (see (Becker, 1993, pp. 402, 403)). It fits into scientific research 
programme framework in which hard core contains assumptions that do not 
need to reflect reality. For Becker understanding human behaviour means being 
able to make predictions, and in this regard we can observe the influence of 
Friedman’s book to which we referred earlier in this section (Friedman, 1953). 
The second person who had an enormous influence on Becker was Robbins. 
His impact is observable in two areas. Firstly, Becker believes that economics 
could and should be value-free. Therefore, economics should not assess people’s 
goals and decide which things are worth pursuing. Secondly, Becker based his 
method on the notion of scarcity. For him people always have to choose, because 
they cannot do two things at the same time, so time is a scarce resource. Due to 
this understanding, economics deals with every human choice (religion, love, 
childbearing, etc.). This is why economics started to analyse problems of other 
social sciences. This process is explained by Radnitzky and Bernholz who write: 
Acting rationally, using appropriate means to achieve one’s ends, involves 
essentially taking into account ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’, whereby ‘costs’ and 
‘benefits’ are taken in its widest sense. Since resources are always scarce – 
last not least our life-time – rational conduct is governed by principles of 
economics. Hence, it is plausible that new and important knowledge can be 
gained by applying the perspective of economics, the methods and tools of 
economics – some of them suitable generalized – to fields of enquiry that 
have traditionally been thought to lie outside the competence of economics. 
(Radnitzky, & Bernholz, 1987, p. VIII)
Precisely for imperialism Garry Becker was awarded Nobel Memorial Prize. 
The prize was awarded for “having extended the domain of economic theory 
to aspects of human behaviour which had previously been dealt with – if at 
all – by other social science disciplines such as sociology, demography, and 
criminology” (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 1993, p. 1). 
Becker with his economic approach had an enormous influence on other social 
sciences and the reason for that lies in hard core assumptions of this method. 
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These axioms and a belief in being positive science give economics the dominant 
role among the other social sciences. However, in this chapter, the author will 
check whether the economic approach is the dead end for economics. Although 
it provides an answer to every problem, these answers are not necessarily 
correct. Moreover, it is worthwhile to analyse the Becker’s economic approach 
in the context of scientific research programme to investigate how economists 
reacted to the criticism from the other social sciences. Due to the protective belt, 
they were able to rebut every kind of descriptive criticism and hard cores remain 
unchanged. Nowadays, still many economists are reluctant towards normative 
approaches or methodological pluralism. This is the result of a coherent 
economic method that can ‘explain’ everything. Thus, the question if economics 
should stick to its hard cores is more than justified. 
2.2. Becker’s economic approach  
as scientific research programme
Lakatos’ scientific research programme will be used as a framework to 
understand how Becker’s economic approach works and how it was changed 
by the criticisms towards neoclassical economics. Thanks to the conclusions 
from this investigation, it will be possible to answer the question if this research 
programme should be replaced by something else. Becker’s economic approach 
can be easily perceived as research programme. Becker indicates ‘hard core’ of 
his approach when he writes that “the combined assumptions of maximizing 
behavior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences, used relentlessly and 
unflinchingly, form the heart of the economic approach as I see it” (Becker, 
1976, p. 5). However, in this section hard core of the economic approach is 
maximization of utility and instrumental rationality. This incongruity between 
Becker’s hard cores and those indicated in this book is possible, because it is 
difficult to establish hard cores to which everyone would agree (de Marchi, 
& Blaug 1991). Of course, hard cores presented in this section (maximization 
of utility, instrumental rationality) are open for further discussion. Before 
analysing each of the hard cores a few words of explanation are necessary. First 
and foremost, in this section equilibrium is not considered as hard core, because 
our focus is on how economics perceives a human being. However, undoubtedly 
this assumption is often used as a justification for a free market system and it 
is important to keep in mind that effectiveness is not a positive statement but 
a normative one. The second assumption stable preferences will be analyzed 
as ‘negative heuristic.’ The third assumption maximizing behaviour is divided 
into maximization of utility and instrumental rationality even though Becker 
perceived them as the same thing. He writes that “by ‘behaving rationally,’ I mean 
‘maximizing’ consistent behavior that looks forward and tries to anticipate as far 
as possible what the future will bring. This is common to all versions of rational 
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choice that I know of” (Becker as cited in Swedberg, 1990, p. 40). The distinction 
between instrumental rationality and maximization of utility is made, because it 
is important to point out that utilitarianism had a huge influence on economics. 
Moreover, the fact that economics perceives rationality in an instrumental way 
is something worth noticing, especially if we look at how rationality is perceived 
among the other social sciences. The purpose of the analysis of the economic 
approach in the context of scientific research programme is to show how thanks 
to the expansion of the protective belt, the economic approach could absorb 
every criticism of its hard cores. 
(1) Maximization of utility. Becker did not hide how much he derived from 
utilitarianism and Bentham. For Nobel Prize winner it was also crucial to assume 
that individuals are always seeking to maximize their utility. Becker argues that 
“everyone recognizes that the economic approach assumes maximizing behavior 
more explicitly and extensively than any other discipline, be it the utility or 
wealth function of the household, firm, union, or government bureau that is 
maximized” (Becker, 1976, p. 5). According to Becker, more important than 
utility measurement is how utility is perceived. He understands utility ad libitum,
which means that utility could mean everything. By broadening the conception 
of utility, Becker answered two different kinds of criticisms of homo economicus
(Ostapiuk, 2017b). Firstly, he embraced all altruistic behaviours into the process 
of maximization. From its beginning, and especially after the marginalists 
revolution, economics had been accused of perceiving people as selfish creatures 
who do not think about the others. Becker did not identify maximization of 
utility with self-interest. He argued that “individuals maximize welfare as they 
conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic” 
(Becker, 1993, p. 386). This relativistic perception of utility causes that this term 
started to be the ‘black box’ which could contain everything. Therefore, it does 
not matter if people are altruists or egoists, because in the end they always 
maximize their utility (Sen, 1977). Secondly, “the extended conception of utility 
causes that we cannot establish any objective values which human beings want 
to pursue. It is impossible to compare utility between people and also between 
any choices made by the particular person.” (Ostapiuk, 2019b, p. 641). In this 
respect, it is visible that Becker strongly supported the ordinal approach and 
value-free economics. What is even more important than maximization of 
utility is a consequential way of thinking used in the economic approach. There 
are no goods or goals which have value per se. The only thing that matters is 
a choice and when people choose they maximize their utility. Perceiving utility 
ad libitum creates a protective belt. It is obvious that sometimes people make 
bad decisions and they do not maximize their utility (e.g., taking hard drugs, 
smoking, and driving after drinking). These bad choices are anomalies and they 
pose a threat to hard core assumptions that people always maximize their utility. 
Therefore, utility is perceived ad libitum. As a consequence, all behaviours can be 
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explained as actions which maximize utility. In this way, hard core is saved from 
anomalies, because it is impossible to behave in a way which does not maximize 
utility. The impossibility of falsifying the maximization of utility assumption 
was indicated many years ago (Boland, 1981; Hodgson, 2012b; Sen, 1977).
(2) Instrumental rationality. Mainly due to the ‘formalist revolution’ (see (Blaug, 
2003)) neoclassical economics perceived people as hyper-rational agents that can 
compute an infinite amount of information and decide which behaviour will 
maximize their utility. However, perfect rationality was an object of criticism 
which has intensified since behavioural economics gained popularity in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Nowadays, neoclassical economists do not use perfect rationality but 
instrumental rationality. It is a less demanding version of rationality and it is 
used to protect hard cores of the economic approach. It is obvious that people do 
not always compute all the information and on this basis make the best choices. 
Often people behave in irrational way. Economists have two ways of dealing 
with these anomalies. 
Firstly, economists believe that people would make perfectly rational choices if 
it were not for various constraints like limited time or limited cognitive powers. 
Sometimes, economists argue that full rationality can be irrational. It is the case 
when the costs of acquisition and processing of information are too high. Then, 
as Knight noticed, “it is evident that the rational thing to do is to be irrational, 
where deliberation and estimation cost more than they are worth” (Knight, 
1921, p. 67). Hayek was the economist who was probably the most consistent in 
praising the gut feeling and hidden knowledge in the situations when someone 
made a prompt decision without hours of deliberation. He wrote that “if we 
stopped doing everything for which we do not know the reason or which we 
cannot provide a justification [...] we would probably soon be dead” (Hayek, 
1988, p. 68). Nowadays, heuristics3 – the simple and efficient rules which people 
often use to form the judgments and to make decisions – are not considered to 
be irrational, because people do not have enough time to digest every available 
information. If we had to think about our every move, we would not be able to 
live, because every day we must make thousands of different decisions. This 
is one of the conclusions of Kahneman (2011). He proves, among other things, 
that fast ‘system 1’ is more prone to errors than deliberate and related to homo 
economicus ‘system 2.’ However, these two systems are interrelated and people 
cannot only rely on system 2, because most of the time they need to make fast 
decisions (Kahneman, 2011). 
The most prominent scholar that challenged the neoclassical assumption of 
perfect rationality was Herbert A. Simon. He argued that people were satisficing, 
not maximizing “whereas economic man maximizes – selects the best alternative 
3 The term ‘heuristics’ was popularized by Tversky and Kahneman (1974).
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from among all those available to him, his cousin, administrative man, satisfices 
– looks for a course of action that is satisfactory or ‘good enough’” (Simon, 1957, 
p. XXV). People do not maximize their utility but make satisfactory decisions 
due to the bounded rationality. People have bounded rationality, because there 
is not enough time to process all important information and our cognitive 
power is limited. Nevertheless, Simon’s idea was only an attempt to adjust 
homo economicus to reality, not its rebuttal. Bounded rationality does not dismiss 
the hard core assumption (instrumental rationality), because in the economic 
approach rationality is bounded. In this approach people still want to maximize 
their utility. However, due to the complexity of the external world, they cannot 
always maximize it. 
The second way of dealing with irrational behaviours is a change in the 
understanding of the very term rationality. In the common view, rationality 
means wise and thoughtful choice. However, neoclassical economics is value-
-free and does not discuss goals. It assumes that it is impossible to rationally 
decide what people should want. This is why economists can only check if people 
satisfy their preferences effectively. Hume provides very famous description of 
an instrumental rationality. He writes that “reason alone can never be a motive 
to any action of the will;” and “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions” (Hume, 1896, pp. 282, 283). Value-free economists treat these words 
very seriously and rationality in economics is not about outputs but the process. 
It does not matter what people choose, but if the process of choice meets two 
conditions: transitivity and completeness. 
In the economic approach two lines of reasoning which explain anomalies 
are used: (a) full rationality is impossible, because of limited time and limited 
cognitive powers, (b) rationality is perceived as the process not output). 
However, especially the first one is crucial for Becker. He writes that “actions 
are constrained by income, time, imperfect memory and calculating capacities, 
and other limited resources, and also by the opportunities available” (Becker, 
1993, p. 386). These limitations (especially limited time) are negative heuristics 
which create a protective belt. Stupid and irrational decisions do not challenge 
hard core assumption of rationality, because rationality in value-free economics 
is always limited. 
2.3. Becker’s methodology
Although Becker did not have a consistent methodological position, it can be 
useful to try to understand his methodological views to see who influenced 
him and how. Thanks to this analysis, we can understand why the economic 
approach works as it works. Sometimes Becker is perceived as positivist and this 
is the result of his value-free approach. However, he did not assume that every 
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economic theory has to be falsifiable or testable. What is testable is a group of 
assumptions when they are applied to particular problems. Then, we can assess 
if our prediction is accurate or not. Predictive power is essential in the economic 
approach and this is why Becker can be perceived as an instrumentalist. He 
was profoundly influenced by Friedman who is perceived as methodological 
instrumentalist (see (Boland, 1979; Caldwell, 1980, 1982)).4 Becker dedicates 
his most important book to Friedman from whom he ‘learned the economic 
approach’ and he expressed his gratitude for his comments (Becker, 1976, p. 3). 
Instrumentalists do not care about unrealistic assumptions. For them, hard core 
assumptions are taken on faith but faith is based on functionality. What is more, 
frequently realistic assumptions are not good for the predictive power of a given 
theory. This view is identified with Friedman, who wrote that “in general, the 
more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions” (1953, p. 14). 
Friedman shows how he perceived the explanatory role of scientific theories 
when he writes: 
A hypothesis is important if it ‘explains’ much by little, that is, if it abstracts 
the common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed 
circumstances surrounding the phenomenon to be explained and permits 
valid predictions on the basis of them alone. To be important, therefore, 
a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions; it takes account 
of, and accounts for, none of the many other attendant circumstances, since its 
very success shows them to be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained. 
(Friedman, 1953, p. 14, 15)
For Friedman it is not important to understand all phenomena in a theory. 
He writes that “A meaningful scientific hypothesis or theory typically asserts 
that certain forces are, and other forces are not, important in understanding 
a particular class of phenomena” (Friedman, 1953, p. 40). To successfully predict 
human behaviour it is enough to assume that people behave as if. This idea was 
presented in the famous example of a billiard player (Friedman, 1953, p. 21). 
Becker uses this concept eagerly when the assumption that “participants […] 
maximize their utility” is transformed into the assumption that economic agents 
act ‘as if’ they maximize their utility (Becker, 1976, p. 14). 
Despite the appraisal of the economic approach as a “foundation for predicting” 
(Becker, 1976, p. 6), Becker also states that “the economic approach has numerous 
implications about behavior that could be falsified” (1976, p. 10). It means that 
Becker accepts the importance of falsification. His writings contain normative 
criteria of Popper’s doctrine. Becker writes approvingly of audacity, specificity, 
and falsifiability of predictions. Moreover, he denounces sweeping generality, 
4 However, Mäki argues that Friedman’s position is more complicated (2009b), see also 
(Hoyningen-Huene, 2017).
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ad hoc hypotheses, and unwillingness to specify grounds for refutation (Turner, 
2010). Falsificationism is consistent with instrumentalism, but it is possible, 
because instrumentalism does not provide any explicit method to assess the 
“testability” or “usefulness” of assumptions (Turner, 2010, p. 59). This is why 
Becker is more consistent with Lakatos who approves a “whiff of ‘inductivism’” 
(Lakatos, 1980 p. 159). However, Becker tried to adjust his economic approach 
to falsificationism and he even stated that the “implications” of the economic 
approach “all appear to be consistent with the available evidence” (Becker, 1976, 
p. 10). This need for testability of his theories will be used to show the internal 
inconsistency of Becker’s approach when it comes to choices over time. 
In addition to instrumentalism, Friedman taught Becker how comprehensive 
and powerful economics could be in comparison to the other social sciences. 
Becker writes “he [Friedman – A.O.] made me see that you can attack social 
problems with economics” (Becker as cited in Swedberg, 1990, p. 29). It was 
possible, because the objective of economics theory is to “‘explain’ much by 
little” (Friedman 1953, p. 14). Becker very often pointed out that the economic 
approach was “comprehensive” (Becker, 1976, p. 8) and a “unified framework” 
(Becker, 1976, p. 14) which enables “understanding all human behavior” (Becker, 
1976, p. 14). This bold assertion can be understood as the extension of the search 
for “novel facts” (Lakatos, 1980 p. 5). However, it is closer to be an attempt to 
even larger objective in science which is a unification of explanation (Mäki 2009a; 
Sen as cited in Swedberg, 1990, p. 264). Power to predict new facts comes from 
simplicity (minimum of assumptions) and fecundity (precision, magnitude) 
(Turner, 2010, p. 70). For Becker and value-free economics, in general, these 
assumptions are achieved by rational choice theory. Becker writes that “the 
rational choice model provides the most promising basis presently available for 
a unified approach to the analysis of the social world by scholars from different 
social sciences” (Becker, 1993, p. 403).
The economics’ primacy and its difference from the other social sciences come 
from the way in which economics looks at reality. Becker asserts that “what 
most distinguishes economics as a discipline from other disciplines in the social 
sciences is not its subject matter but its approach” (Becker, 1976, p. 5). This 
approach is simple and unified, because it does not need to deal with normative 
statements and have hard core assumptions. We can observe the ‘superiority’ of 
economic approach on the example of crime and punishment. Coleman points 
out that sociologists and criminologists analyse these issues from the normative 
preservice, whereas Becker analyses them from the “perspective of positive 
social science” (Coleman, 1993, p. 172). The normative view was that “no 
offenders should in principle be permitted, and all offenders should in principle 
be punished” (Coleman, 1993, p. 172). Becker transformed this into the positive 
question: “how many offenses should be permitted and how many offenses 
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should go unpunished?” (Becker, 1976, p. 40). Therefore, Becker discusses only 
positive notions such as efficiency, scarcity of resources in law enforcement, and 
minimization of the social losses resulting from crime. Whereas the dominant 
sociologists, as Coleman highlights, “saw crime as the simple product of external 
causes, the criminal as passive clay, and the goal of criminological policy as 
rehabilitation,” Beckerians have used a “rational choice orientation” to show 
“the deterrent effect of punishment and […] the effect of incentives on crime” 
(Coleman, 1993, p. 172). 
2.4. Problems with instrumental rationality
and utility maximization 
Due to the numerous anomalies, the protective belt had to be expanded to defend 
the hard cores of the economic approach. Although the protective belt makes 
the economic approach work, it causes substantial problems. First of them is 
connected with utility maximization. Value-free economics does not deal with 
human goals and it perceives utility ad libitum. This relativistic approach results 
in a situation where economics becomes insensitive to the difference in human 
motivations.
It is essential here to underline that preferences go beyond utilitarian 
measurement. Arrow defines them as “the values of individuals rather than 
to their tastes” (Arrow, 1951, p. 23). Values are the core of human preferences 
and they form people’s goals and preferences especially in the long run. 
Hechter describes them as “relatively general and durable internal criteria for 
evaluation” (Hechter, 1992, p. 215). Value-free economics wanted to save its 
utility maximization theory by putting all values into the ‘black box’ of utility. 
However, this way of thinking has led to tautology and it has made economics 
insensitive to differences in human motivations. Values are different from utility, 
because they are ex-ante reasons why people do something and they do not do 
something else. In this instance, we do not use consequential thinking, and we 
do not calculate our utility. Solving a chicken or egg dilemma is impossible. 
It means that we cannot prove that humans are solely motivated by values and 
that they are not influenced by utility. However, there is no need to prove that 
values are something that exists ex-ante. The author only wants to highlight 
that values vary from utility and we cannot compare them within the same 
framework. This difference is visible if we analyze people’s attitudes towards 
the concepts of values and utility. One can use a value-free line of argument 
that people give back a wallet which they had found on the street, because it is 
beneficial to them to give it back. Cherishing one’s self-respect, being a ‘good 
person’ can be more important than money in this economic way of thinking, 
because it gives one’s more utility. However, this reasoning looks only as an 
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attempt to defend the homo economicus model. People understand the difference 
between self-interest (maximization of utility) and values in an intuitive way. In 
the above-mentioned example, people improve their situation when they leave 
money for themselves. On the other hand, behaving according to the values 
(giving money back) seems to make their situation worse. This way of thinking 
is due to the fact that people do not want to be ‘good’ because this gives them 
some profit (utility). Moreover, they want to be ‘good’ because being ‘good’ has 
some intrinsic value independent of utility. In order to explain the difference 
between self-interest and values, it is useful to use the concepts of ‘sympathy’5
and ‘commitment’ which were proposed by Sen (1977, p. 326):
The former corresponds to the case in which the concern for others directly 
affects one’s own welfare. If the knowledge of torture of others makes you 
sick, it is a case of sympathy; if it does not make you feel personally worse off, 
but you think it is wrong and you are ready to do something to stop it, it is 
a case of commitment. 
Many economists have a problem to notice the above-discussed difference. It is 
visible when altruistic and self-interest motivations are put into the black box 
of utility. It means that economists do not have tools to notice the difference 
between these two distinctive motivations (both can maximize utility in 
value-free economics). It causes that economists look at human behaviour in 
a particular way. For almost 150 years (marginal revolution in 1870), economists 
have assumed that human beings are predominantly driven by self-interest. 
This assumption together with methodological individualism is one of the 
cornerstones of neoclassical economics. However, it has not always been like 
that. Adam Smith perceived people in a complex way. The majority of economists 
refers only to An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (1776) 
and they forget about Theory of moral sentiments (1759) which had been written 
16 years before the ‘economic bible.’ In this book, Smith wrote about the “altruistic 
side” of human beings. He wrote about an impartial spectator, social norms and 
sympathy.6 Smith considered himself as a moral philosopher (McCloskey, 2008; 
Wells, 2013), but because of different reasons his moral philosophy has been 
quite forgotten. One of these reasons was that Smith’s legacy was used by many 
economists for their own purposes (Sen, 2010). This leads to a situation in which 
nowadays the Scottish thinker is associated predominately with both concepts: 
self-interest and invisible hand (Ostapiuk, 2017b). 
5 Sympathy is one of the most important concepts in Theory of moral sentiments (Smith, 1759). 
It is worth noticing that Sen is a great admirer of Smith and he often uses insights of Scottish 
thinker
6 The differences between the two books befuddled many economists. The contradiction was 
called das adam smith problem (this contradiction is false, see more (Dixon, & Wilson, 2006; 
Ostapiuk, 2017b)).
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It is essential to understand how neoclassical economists treat Smith, because 
it tells us a lot about neoclassical economics. It assumes that people are self-
-interested, economics does not deal with people’s ends (value-free economics), 
and people always maximize their utility (which can mean everything). Etzioni 
(1988) wrote an extensive book where he criticized the simplification of these 
assumptions. The purpose of this subchapter is less extensive. A few examples 
will be presented, and they should convince the reader that it is impossible not 
to distinguish between human motivations. 
To begin with, it is essential to understand that value-free economics perceived 
self-interest very broadly. This understanding of self-interest is the result of 
the criticism of homo economics concept. Frequently the other social sciences 
treat homo economicus as a straw man (Dixon, & Wilson, 2012; Urbina & Ruiz-
-Villaverde, 2019). The most controversial assumption of economics is that 
people behave in accordance with their self-interest.7 Many opponents of homo 
economicus ask why people give their organs to those who they do not even 
know, why people give tips in a roadside restaurant or why people give presents. 
Value-free economics had to expand the notion of self-interest to its extremes in 
order to answer the above-mentioned questions. One anecdote about Hobbes 
can help us to understand how broadly self-interest is perceived by value-free 
economics.
Apparently, Hobbes was walking in London with a clergyman, and suddenly 
they spotted a beggar. Hobbes gave alms to the beggar and this astonished 
the clergyman. He said: ‘You helped this poor man, so, your theory about an 
egoistic man has fallen down.’ Hobbes responded: ‘No,’ and he added that 
‘It proves my point that I am an egoist because looking at this poor man makes 
me feel unhappy and when I gave him money I felt better’ (MacIntyre, 1990, 
p. 135). In philosophy this approach is called psychological egoism and it 
assumes that people always behave in accordance with their self-interest. Even 
if they help and call it altruism it is only a disguise for their self-interest. Value-
-free economics has used this reasoning for many years. It is possible to find 
an analogy in this context with utility maximization. In psychological egoism, 
every behaviour can be explained by an egoistic motivation. One just needs to 
look for it deep enough. The economic approach assumes that people always 
maximize their utility (perceived ad libitum) and ex-post it is possible to consider 
every behaviour as the result of utility maximization. Which implications does 
it have? For example, value-free economics cannot differentiate between the 
soldier who jumps on a grenade to save his comrades from the soldier who 
7 The criticism started with Mill and his conception of homo economicus, and it lasts to this 
day (Boulding, 1969; Chmielewski, 2011; Cohen, 2014; Etzioni, 1988.; Frey, & Oberholzer-
-Gee, 1997; Hausman, & McPherson, 2006; Hodgson, 2012a; Kahneman et al., 1986; Ostapiuk, 
2017b; Reiss, 2013; Sen, 1987; Thaler, 2015).
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pushes another soldier on a grenade to save himself. This relativistic approach 
(value-free) together with the assumption of a human being as a self-interest 
entity causes that economics looks at reality in a very particular way. 
Now, we can come back to the questions connected with donating organs to 
people that we do not know, giving tips in restaurants or giving presents. The 
answer is simple for value-free economics. People do it, because it gives them 
utility. What is more, people choose something, because it gives them the most 
utility. According to value-free economics, if one gives a kidney to the stranger, 
it is only because it gives utility to a person. Becker understood that people have 
different motivations (e.g., love, envy, brotherhood). However, his approach 
does not take this difference into consideration. People just maximize their 
utility. Thus, it means that if one gives a kidney to some stranger, one will do it, 
because it will give one utility (pleasure from being a good person). 
This broad perception of self-interest raised many questions. It was Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau who presented some arguments against psychological egoism, and 
his argumentation can be used against the wide perception of self-interest in 
economic approach as well. If people can take their own interest and the interest 
of the others into consideration (even if in the end they will behave in accordance 
with their self-interest), it means that people must be somehow connected with 
the other people. At least, to the extent when the interest of others is depicted as 
the alternative to their own self-interest (MacIntyre, 1990, p. 186). The problem 
with value-free economics is that it is solely focused on the consequences of 
people’s actions. In the end, the feelings of love, friendship and empathy give 
people pleasure (utility). However, the question arises whether they are just the 
motivations for our actions or the results of them. Do people want happiness 
for their children, because it gives happiness, or if this happiness is the result of 
their love for children? Do people give presents because giving presents makes 
them happy or is it the result of the bonds with the other people? We do not need 
to answer these questions, because as it was noticed by Rousseau, it is enough 
to incorporate others into our happiness to make the conception of egoism too 
broad (see also (Ostapiuk, 2017b)). 
This lack of interest in human motivations causes some problems which were 
not considered by Becker. He gives the example of a family where the wife’s 
behaviour is transformed into the altruistic one due to self-interest (Becker, 1974). 
In this example, the husband likes to read books in his bed before he falls asleep. 
His wife does not like this, because it disturbs her sleep. However, the wife does 
not forbid him to read, because she knows that a happy husband (in the higher 
level of utility) will compensate her ‘sacrifice’ with interest. Her behaviour is 
the same as the wife who really cares about her husband but their motivations 
are different. What is the most important here is this husband prefers to be 
loved rather than not to be loved. He wishes that his wife permits him to read, 
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because it gives utility him not her. It means that choice alone (consequence) is 
not enough and that motivations do matter for people.
Amartya Sen is the most recognizable authority who argues that economics 
cannot be only focused on the act of choice. The background is important as 
well. Sen gives the example of a hungry man to underline this fact (Sen, 1999, 
p. 75). In the first case he is hungry, because he does not have food, whereas 
in the second case he is hungry because of religious reasons (fast). Value-free 
economics cannot see the difference between these two behaviours, because it is 
not interested in human motivations. It is only interested in choice alone.
The next problem of economic approach is its understanding of rationality. We 
can realize how the protective belt of economic approach works on the example 
of A theory of rational addiction. There, Becker and Murphy (1988, p. 675) claim that: 
Yet, as the title of our paper indicates, we claim that addictions, even 
strong ones, are usually rational in the sense of involving forward-looking 
maximization with stable preferences. Our claim is even stronger: a rational 
framework permits new insights into addictive behavior. 
Drugs are the topic where Becker pushes rational choice theory to its logical 
extreme. He did it, because he wanted to know if his approach would work. The 
point of the article is that addicted people are not irrational and their behaviours 
are not anomalies at all. What is more, Becker and Murphy argue that taking 
drugs maximize addict’s utility. This is possible, because Becker and Murphy use 
the instrumental rationality: “this paper relies on a weak concept of rationality 
that does not rule out strong discounts of future events. The consumers in our 
model become more and more myopic as time preference for the present (a) gets 
larger” (Becker, & Murphy, 1988, p. 683). This means that taking drugs is rational, 
because pleasure from drugs now is so immense that it outweighs future costs. 
Therefore, taking drugs can maximize people’s utility. It looks strange that being 
addicted to heroin is rational if one looks at the results of addiction. However, 
it is not a problem, because, for Becker, economics does not assume what is good 
or bad for people. We just assume that individuals maximize their utility in the 
moment of choice. In the case of drugs, individuals make decisions between 
present and future utility. Becker assumes that weakness of will (akrasia) does 
not occur and people somehow compare their long-term goals (e.g., health) with 
the short-term pleasures (e.g., smoking). We (as economists) do not know how 
they do it (we are not interested in motivations). We simply assume that they 
can do this (as if assumption).
The belief that people maximize their utility is very strong in the economic 
approach. Even if people regret some decisions made on the spur of the moment, 
it does not mean that they do not choose what they want. Becker and Murphy 
(1988, p. 693) write that: 
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The claims of some heavy drinkers and smokers that they want to but cannot 
end their addictions seem to us no different from the claims of single persons 
that they want to but are unable to marry or from the claims of disorganized 
persons that they want to become better organized. What these claims mean is 
that a person will make certain changes-for example, marry or stop smoking 
– when he finds a way to raise long-term benefits sufficiently above the short-
-term costs of adjustment. 
For Becker people’s declarations do not mean anything. If abstinence from 
smoking gives one more utility than smoking, one will quit cigarettes. Ultimately, 
in the economic approach it is one’s deeds, not one’s words that matter most. 
The problem with this understanding of rationality is that there exist many 
examples when it is strange to assume that people do something, because they 
really want it. On some level when we look at how much pleasure can be obtained 
from using drugs, then we can agree with Becker that seemingly irrational 
behaviour as taking drugs can maximize utility. However, the question is if this 
understanding of rationality makes any sense. In the economic approach, ex-
-alcoholic who does not want to drink, because she knows where it can take 
her, is rational when she comes back to drinking. She does not want to drink 
and after going on a binge, she feels awful about her behaviour. Is it possible to 
decide if the temporary need to relapse to alcohol is more important than the 
goals and human motivations? Becker assumes that human beings can integrate 
these conflicting motivations and bring them down to a common denominator of 
utility. This understanding of rationality gives rise to some absurd conclusions: 
Imagine the situation where, owing to the shipwreck a man lies on a small 
boat in the middle of the ocean, and he thinks about drinking water from the 
sea. He knows that he should not drink this water and it can only make him 
feel bad. Despite this knowledge, he succumbs to the temptation and drinks 
it. He gets sick and dies afterwards. Is it reasonable to say that this person 
behaves rationally? Is impulse, second utility enough to call some behaviour 
rational? (Ostapiuk, 2019b, p. 643). 
The above-mentioned examples raise the question if we should not make 
a distinction between reason and biological needs. Instrumental rationality does 
not differentiate between individuals’ behaviours and it can mean anything 
which leads to a tautology. Obviously, the prior examples are extreme; but the 
questions that result from them concern the majority of human behaviours. 
Individuals frequently choose between now and later. Consume now or save 
for later: have fun now or work hard now and have much more fun later. Becker 
and neoclassical economists assume that people always choose what is good for 
them. However, after examination of hyperbolic discounting and findings of 
behavioural economics it will be difficult to agree with this assumption. 
Individuals’ behaviour is not always time consistent, which is assumed by 
neoclassical economics. Therefore, it is very problematic to compare present 
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choices with future ones. It is true that neoclassical economists are focused on 
human choices in a particular moment. However, they knew that choices now 
and choices in the future differ from each other quite significantly. More than 
100 years ago Jevons, one of the fathers of Marginal Revolution, wrote: 
To secure a maximum of benefit in life, all future events, all future pleasures 
or pains, should act upon us with the same force as if they were present, 
allowance being made for their uncertainty. The factor expressing the effect 
of remoteness should, in short, always be unity, so that time should have 
no influence. But no human mind is constituted in this perfect way: a future 
feeling is always less influential than a present one. (Jevons, 1911, pp. 72, 73)
Economists have tried to resolve the problem of different choices over time. They 
have, for instance, acknowledged that present choices are valued more highly 
than later choices and this is why they discount future utility. Samuelson (1937) 
introduced the discounted utility model. The reference to the financial market 
terminology (discount) is not accidental. In neoclassical economics individuals are 
presumed to assess and enumerate utility that they would receive in the future. In 
his short paper (seven pages long) Samuelson spends the two last pages to point 
out some possible problems with his model that he calls “serious limitations” 
(Samuelson, 1937, p. 159). One of his concerns is whether people discount future 
at rates that vary over time, for instance, they may change their minds as time 
moves forward. Therefore, it bothered Samuelson that people might display 
time-inconsistent preferences. He was aware that such behaviours existed. For 
example, he wrote about purchasing total life insurance as a compulsory savings 
measure. However, he did not investigate the problems regarding inconsistency 
further. Economists followed his suit and the discounted utility model became 
a standard model of intertemporal choice (Thaler, 2015, p. 101). Modigliani (1966) 
is the best example of implementing the discounted utility model. He based his 
model on an individual’s total income and his theory is called the ‘life-cycle 
hypothesis.’ In this theory, people are rational, and they are presumed to be able 
to make a plan when they are young about how to smooth their consumption 
over their lifetime. What is more, this life-cycle hypothesis does not only assume 
that people are able to make all calculations (with rational expectations) about 
how long they will live, how much they will make, etc., they also possess self-
-control which is required to achieve the optimal plan. It is not surprising that 
with time, economics dealt with the increasing number of cases which show 
that individuals cannot discount future utility according to an exponential rate 
which is a result of present bias. In fact, people try to discount future utility but 
frequently they fail to predict what will improve their well-being in the future 
(Gilbert, 2007). Moreover, the complications with discounting utility are not only 
the ordinary anomalies but they indicate a systematic problem which suggests 
that the foundations of economic man – stable preference – cannot be fulfilled.
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One of the problems with the evaluation of the future is called present bias, 
which is one of the main reasons for hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie, 1975, 
2001; Loewenstein, & Elster, 1992; O’Donoghue, & Rabin, 1999). To illustrate 
what present bias is, consider the following example. People can choose $ 100 
in 30 days or $ 105 in 31 days. The majority of them choose the second option. 
However, if they must choose between $ 100 today or $ 105 tomorrow, almost 
everyone will pick the first option. The difference between the choices is not 
a problem for economics, because the discounted utility model assumes that 
the future is less important than the present (Samuelson, 1937). Therefore, 
waiting one day after 30 days to get $ 5 is easier than waiting one day from 
today. However, as it turns out, people do not discount the future according to 
an exponential rate. They opt for $ 105 in 31 days but when the 30th passes and 
they have the choice between $ 100 now or $ 105 tomorrow, they will switch 
their preferences to $ 100 now. This behaviour is inconsistent with the long-term 
preferences and it means that individuals over-value present choices. All along, 
they want some choice more than the other but when selection arrives then their 
preferences will change. For Becker and neoclassical economics present bias is 
not a problem, because in the end individuals make choices and their cognitive 
biases are the reason why rationality is not perfect. The issue here is that Becker 
and neoclassical economists assume that people always make the best choices. 
In the context of present bias it means that economics opt for an agent who 
chooses simple pleasure over long term goals. 
People, however, know about the problems with decisions over time. Odysseus 
is depicted as an illustrative example of human’s conflict between the long-term 
goals and the short-term drives (see (Elster, 1987)). He was supposed to float over 
the rocky islands which were inhabited by sirens. Their singing ensnares many 
sailors and as a result, they hit the rocks. Ulysses knew about sirens’ appeal and 
he decided to protect himself. In order to do it, he commanded some deckhands 
to tie him to the mast and to put wax in their ears. Thanks to it, they would not 
hear the sirens’ singing. Due to these precautionary measures, the ship has floated 
luckily and after that Odysseus boasted that he heard the beautiful sirens’ singing. 
This behaviour of mythical hero is known as ‘precommitment strategy.’ People 
use this strategy of their own volition to remove options from which they choose, 
because they are afraid that they succumb to the temptations when the choice 
comes. For Schelling this behaviour was really disturbing when he referred it 
to the neoclassical economics and revealed preference theory. This is why he 
decided to inspect it (Schelling, 1978, 1980, 1984, 1985, 1996). For him choices 
between long-term goals and short-term pleasures are not anomalies but they 
are common to human reasoning and judgmental processes. Precommitment 
strategy is one of the reasons why Schelling believes that people are not 
homogenous agents. Therefore, it is impossible to indicate one self with well-
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-defined preferences but we need to indicate multiple selves with a different 
set of preferences which clash with each other. Due to these differences, it is 
impossible to compare utility over time: 
Each self is a set of values; and though the selves share most of those values, 
on the particular issues on which they differ fundamentally there doesn’t 
seem to be any way to compare their utility increments and to determine 
which behavior maximizes their collective utility. (Schelling, 1984, p. 8) 
We cannot use utility measurements, because human beings have two different 
selves and they have diverse preferences.8 Thus, economics should handle these 
selves separately. In Chapter 4 this topic will be examined more thoroughly. 
2.5. Becker’s unsuccessful escape from tautology 
The goal of the analysis of the economic approach was to indicate that thanks to 
the axiomatic assumptions, value-free economics could absorb every criticism 
from the other social sciences and paradigm remain unchanged. However, 
the extension of the protective belt leads to many problems. Because of the 
extension of perception of rationality and utility, Becker could defend hard core 
assumptions but at a price of becoming a tautology. 
Becker did not want his theory to be a tautology and this why he introduces 
stable preferences. In this book this assumption is not considered as the hard 
core but as the negative heuristic (the same understanding in Blaug 1992, p. 221). 
Becker had two main reasons for stable preferences. Firstly, he is the successor 
of the positivistic approach and value-free economics. Therefore, he believes 
that we cannot scientifically discuss tastes and preferences. The unwillingness 
to investigate human motives is visible when we look at the title of one of the 
most significant Becker’s articles De gustibus non est disputandum (there is no 
accounting for tastes). In this article, Becker underlines the meaning of stable 
preferences: “One does not argue over tastes for the same reason one does not 
argue over the Rocky Mountains – both are there, will be there the next year, too, 
and are the same to all men” (Stigler, & Becker, 1977, p. 76). Becker was aware 
that he simplified reality by assuming that stable preferences exist. However, 
this simplification was necessary, because he did not want to be entangled in 
the infeasible analysis of human motivation. For him the preferences cannot 
be empirically tested (see (Caplan, 2003)). Moreover, they provide “endless 
degrees of freedom” (Stigler, & Becker, 1977, p. 89). Becker makes even stronger 
statements about preferences. He writes that “no significant behavior has been 
illuminated by assumptions of differences in tastes” (Stigler, & Becker, 1977, 
8 More about multiple selves in: (Ainslie, 2001; Cowen, 1991; Davis, 2003, 2010; Elster, 1987; 
Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002; Fudenberg, & Levine, 2006; Heilman, 2010; 
Read, 2006; Strotz, 1955; Thaler, & Shefrin, 1981).
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p. 89). Becker did not only state that economics should not analyze preferences. 
He concluded that the economic approach does not need any information about 
tastes to work. 
The second reason behind stable preferences is the need for predictive power. 
Becker (1976, p. 5) writes that:
The assumption of stable preferences provides a stable foundation for 
generating predictions about responses to various changes, and prevents the 
analyst from succumbing to the temptation of simply postulating the required 
shift in preferences to ‘explain’ all apparent contradictions to his predictions.
To show why the assumption of stable preferences is so essential, Becker examines 
the opposite assumption – that tastes are variable and subject to change. Then, in 
the case of some anomalous behaviour the shift in taste would resolve the issues, 
leaving no other eventuality to be explored and no more to be done. Therefore, 
a shift in taste could explain any anomalous behaviour. This means that the 
assumption of changing tastes explains too much and “a theory that explains 
everything, explains nothing” (quote attributed to Popper). Becker did not want 
his economic approach to be pseudo-sciences like, in his opinion, theories of 
Adler, Freud, and Marx. Therefore, he had to assume stable preferences. For 
him this assumption resolves the previous problems of neoclassical economics: 
On the traditional view, an explanation of economic phenomena that reaches 
a difference in tastes between people or times is the terminus of the argument 
[...] On our preferred interpretation, one never reaches this impasse: the 
economist continues to search for differences in prices or incomes to explain 
any difference or changes in behaviour. (Stigler, & Becker, 1977, p. 76)
However, the assumption of stable preferences has one simple flaw. 
It contradicts observable facts. Preferences change over time and it makes the 
economic approach unable to deal with choices over time. Each time when 
people choose between now and future (which is a common dilemma of 
human behaviour), the economic approach will not be able to indicate what 
people should choose (what is the best for them ). Of course, it seems not to be 
a big issue for the value-free approach but this objectivity is only illusory. In 
the economic approach, it is normatively assumed that people do what gives 
them the most utility. Therefore, what people do is the best for them (revealed 
preference). The phenomena of present bias and hyperbolic discounting are 
so ubiquitous that they divide human being into multiple selves. These selves 
have absolutely different preferences. Having this in mind, it seems justified 
to make a distinction between ‘short-term human’ and ‘long-term human’ 
(Ostapiuk, 2019b).9 Value-free economics does not decide what people should 
9 The former is driven by emotions and temptations which are predominately connected with 
short-term pleasures. The latter has long-term values and goals. “Long-term human” can be 
identified with reason and self-reflection. 
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value and what gives them the most utility. However, this value-freeness is an 
illusion. When economists assume that people always maximize their utility in 
reality it means that economists unconsciously support the ‘short-term human.’ 
It happens due to hyperbolic discounting which demonstrates that people are 
too much (irrationally) focused on the present and choose short-term pleasures. 
The economic approach cannot admit that individuals’ preferences change 
over time, because without the assumption of stable preference, the economic 
approach will not have any predictive power. Value-freeness of the economic 
approach means that economists cannot say anything about human preferences 
before the choice is made. Before the choice it can only be stated that people 
will maximize their utility and they will behave in a rational way. However, 
due to the tautologicality of these statements it does not mean anything (or it 
does mean everything). It is just a more sophisticated way of saying: people 
do something, because they do something. Without the assumptions of stable 
preferences, the economic approach could only analyse choices post factum. For 
example, Mark decides to buy this car, because it maximizes his utility, but we 
could not predict what he will do. 
In the end, the escape from tautology did not work out and this problem is 
indicated by Blaug, who suggested that it is hard to find novel facts in Becker’s 
writings, or even that they do not exist. He pointed out that: “Becker’s writings 
lend themselves all too easily to caricature because they employ a cumbersome 
apparatus to produce implications that are sometimes obvious, if not banal” 
(Blaug, 1992, p. 223). For Blaug, Becker’s approach is mainly based on dressing 
up intuitive or well-known conjectures about human behaviour with fancy and 
unwieldy formal mathematics which are called predictions. Although these 
predictions are described as testable and falsifiable, the economic approach is often 
guilty of being so general that it is “compatible with almost any finding” (Blaug, 
1992, p. 224). Blaug noticed that Becker was always able to add some additional 
ad hoc assumption (like instrumental rationality and utility ad libitum) that would 
explain every anomaly. Blaug criticized this approach and called it “adhockery” 
(Blaug, 1992, p. 250). The previously mentioned problems demonstrate that we can 
perceive the economic approach as degenerative programme. The main reason 
for this is the fact that new auxiliary hypotheses are not proposed to deal with 
new facts better but only to defend hard core (similar conclusions we can find in 
(Blaug, 1992), but our analyses and reasoning differ significantly).10
10 The analysis of economic approach is only a part of Blaug’s book (1992, pp. 206–228). 
He analyses ‘new home economics’ (Becker, 1964), whereas the focus in this book is put on 
theory of rational addiction (Becker, & Murphy, 1988). We also identify different hard cores 
of economic approach (in this book rational behaviour is divided on maximisation of utility 
and instrumental rationality, whereas Blaug does not distinguish them). The analysis of 
economic approach conducted here is broader and it concerns economic imperialism is 
general, whereas Blaug is mainly focused on Becker’s theory of family. 
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Of course, the economic approach is not as bad as it looks when one is only 
looking at its flaws. Ultimately, Becker is perceived as a maverick to whom 
such terms as ‘originality’ and ‘creativity’ fit like a glove. He initiated a few 
new areas in economics and sociology. However, it does not change the fact 
that the economic approach looks more like degenerative than progressive 
scientific programme. The reason for this situation is the fact that the economic 
approach needs to add endless ad hoc adjustments which take care of every 
anomaly. There were so many anomalies which treat ‘hard cores’ that now it 
is assumed that every choice maximizes utility and is rational. The reason for 
the expansion of the protective belt to tautologies was not to explain new facts 
better, but only to defend the hard cores. Of course, the economic approach 
makes a prediction about the future, but the question is whether it is possible 
to make good predictions when the assumption on which the model is based 
(stable preferences) does not correspond with observable reality. Becker and 
Friedman argued that it is possible, but it is highly questionable if these kinds of 
predictions have some value (non-truistic predictions). 
2.6. Conclusions
Having in mind the section on Becker’s methodology, it seems justified to state 
that his economic approach is based in many ways on instrumentalism where 
Truth is not considered as a necessary ingredient. A scientific theory must be 
useful, and the ability to predict new fact is one of the criteria of usefulness. 
The essence of instrumentalism is presented by Boland who writes: 
When we take our television set to the repair man, we do not usually think it is 
necessary to quiz the repair man about his understanding of electromagnetics 
or quantum physics. For our purposes, it can be quite adequate for him to 
believe that, for example, there are little green men in those tubes or transistors 
and that the only problem is that one of the little green men is dead. As long 
as the tube or transistor with the dead little green man is replaced and our 
television set subsequently works, all is well. (Boland, 1997, p. 51)
Maybe we do not need to know the truth in the above-mentioned case but science 
is not like repairing of a TV set. For Becker what really matters is predictive 
power and explanatory power is not essential. Moreover, the economic 
approach works better without true (corresponding with reality) assumptions. 
Philosopher Ernest Gellner shows what happens when one is not interested in 
the real world: 
When I was a boy, I had a clock with a pendulum which could be lifted off. 
I found that the clock went very much faster without the pendulum. If the main 
purpose of a clock is to go, the clock was the better for losing its pendulum. 
True, it could no longer tell the time, but that did not matter if one could teach 
oneself to be indifferent to the passage of time. (Gellner, 1960, p. 15)
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Gellner’s part concerns linguistic philosophy but the moral of the story serve 
economics as well. In our story the economic approach, which cares only about 
prediction, and not about the world, “is like the boy who preferred the clock 
without the pendulum, because, although it no longer told the time, it went 
more easily than before and at a more exhilarating pace” (Gellner, 1960 p. 15).
It is true that Becker’s economic approach logically works, deals with every 
anomaly, and economists can use this approach in different fields with success 
(as in the case of economic imperialism; see (Lazear, 2000; Mäki; 2009a; Mäki 
et al., 2017)). However, the question is if the economic approach can be improved, 
or is there no need for a better theory? The economic approach looks perfect and 
it seems to persuade many economists that there is no need for some different 
approach. However, when one stops believing in one of its assumptions, then 
the whole theory falls down. This is why the economic approach is reluctant 
to methodological pluralism or any competitive theory. The winner takes all. 
Therefore, either one accepts every part of the economic approach, or one needs 
to look for something else. Many economists do not want to look for something 
different, because when they dismiss value-free economics, then Pandora’s box 
will open and they will need to study normative approaches. It would mean 
the necessity of analysing human goals and motivations as well as deciding 
normatively what is good for people. As one can imagine, it would diminish 
the actual effectiveness of economics which would be more similar to the other 
social sciences. Many economists also do not want change, because they believe 
in an unbridgeable normative/positive dichotomy. Therefore, they consider 
normative approaches as unscientific. On the other hand, they want to be as 
objective as it is possible and objectivity means for them an exclusively positive 
approach. Moreover, positivism has a huge influence on economics and positive 
approach started to be identified with scientific one (economists as engineers). 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that perceiving positive approach as 
scientific and normative one as the unscientific method is unjustified. However, 
still many economists believe in this unbridgeable dichotomy. This is the reason 
why economics of happiness which studies what gives people well-being is 
treated by many as a fad. However, as it was indicated before, neoclassical 
economics is not as objective as it is commonly thought. Pareto optimum 
and the assumption that maximization of utility is something desirable are 
normative statements. The problem here is that many economists consider 
these statements true without realizing that they only believe that they are true 
(Sedláček, 2011). Still, they assume that people maximize their utility and that 
effectiveness is something good per se. Moreover, they often do not realize that 
positive economic statements are theory-laden and they are not so different from 
normative statements. On the other hand, normative statements are stigmatized 
as unscientific and they are identified with ethical judgments. Therefore, 
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in accordance with a purely positive approach, we cannot discuss them. Of course, 
one will not find absolute truth and establish what improves human well-being in 
every situation but it should not be a problem. We know that project of finding the 
Truth in science did not work out (Feyerabend, 1993; Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1980; 
Rorty, 1979) but it does not mean that there is nothing to be done. For example, we 
can discuss and reason why some theories are better than the others. This process 
will be investigated in Chapter 5. This discussion is vital and indispensable for 
the development of economics as a science. There are no universal criteria for 
progress in social sciences. Following Kuhn (1962), a scientific community decides 
which theory is better. The economic approach is the dead end in this context, 
because it does not leave the room for discussion (you need to accept all premises) 
and without discussion the improvement is impossible. 
The goal of this chapter was to demonstrate that value-freeness does not work 
well for economics in terms of descriptive and predictive power when it comes 
to the intertemporal choices. The economic approach was used as an example 
of what happens when one pushes hard core assumptions as instrumental 
rationality and maximization of utility to the extreme. The economic approach 
can be perceived as the embodiment of value-freeness and we can observe what 
problems it creates. From the perspective of this book, choices over time are 
the most important ones. Neoclassical economics assumes that weakness of will 
does not occur, because people always choose the best option. This assumption 
is treated as positive one and it does not represent reality correctly. Due to 
present bias, we know that people follow short-term preferences; and they 
underestimate long-term ones even if they want to stick to the longer perspective 
(e.g., (Strotz, 1955)). Therefore, when economics assumes that what people do is 
the best for them, then it unconsciously supports ‘short-term human’ (Ostapiuk, 
2019b). If we agree that people have multiple selves with different preferences 
that are irreconcilable by utility measures, we will need to know what improves 
people well-being in order to choose one of the selves. It eventually implies 
that investigations on well-being can be the ultimate goal for economics. 
It would be very hard to reject the idea that the ultimate goal of life is well-being. 
The question that seems to be the most important is the question how to achieve 
well-being to which economists answer: you decide people. 
One of the goals of this chapter was to demonstrate on the example of Becker’s 
economic approach that axiomaticity of value-free economics result in the 
situation in which paradigm in economics has not changed despite being the 
subject of relentless criticism. It is the result of the extension of the protective 
belt in which the concepts of rationality and utility can mean everything. 
It results in tautologization of these terms. Despite its effectiveness and deductive 
consistency, value-free economics faces crucial problems (e.g., choices over time, 
well-being).
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It goes without saying that Becker’s economic approach and value-free economics 
have their advantages and they were used effectively by economists. It has not 
been the goal of the author to come up with a conclusion that there is the need 
to throw it away. The conclusions from this section are more modest. Due to the 
problems with value-free economics analysed in this and the previous chapter, 
we should consider economics of happiness, mostly focused on studying well-
-being, as a full-fledged scientific programme that deserves the attention of the 
economist’s community. The analysis of economics of happiness is one of the 
main goals of the next chapter.
Chapter 3
Economics of happiness
Every pitifulest whipster that walks within a skin
has had his head filled with the notion that he is, shall be, 
or by all human and divine laws ought to be, ‘happy’
(Carlyle, 1843, p. 192)
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter, the author will check whether economics of happiness is 
a progressive programme which can resolve the problems that value-free 
economics faces (well-being and choices over time). Moreover, the author will 
analyse objective well-being approaches which aim to establish goals which are 
independent of happiness and utility which are used in economics of happiness. 
However, objective well-being approaches will be analysed in the second part 
of this chapter. Now, our attention is focused on the economics of happiness. 
The author will not provide a summary of economics of happiness (it was done 
by (Bruni, & Porta, 2007; Frey, 2010, 2018; Frey, & Stutzer, 2002a, 2002b)). The 
goal of this chapter is to outline the differences between value-free economics 
(revealed preference theory) and economics of happiness (subjective well-
-being). The latter deals with human goals where happiness is the ultimate 
one. In order to know what gives individuals the most happiness, researchers 
measure happiness by SWB measures (subjective well-being). Although it 
can be a step in the right direction for economics in terms of explanatory and 
predictive power, we need to check whether subjective well-being can replace 
revealed preference theory, or we need to search for some objective approaches. 
Before answering these questions, some basic knowledge about the economics 
of happiness must be presented. 
Economics of happiness came to life in 1974 when Easterlin presented the 
paradox which later started to be called ‘Easterlin Paradox’ (Blanchflower, 
& Oswald, 2004; Diener, & Oishi, 2000; Easterlin, 1974, 1995, 2001; Kenny, 1999) 
or ‘Happiness Paradox’ (Pugno, 2004a, 2007). Easterlin noticed that in several 
countries real income had risen significantly since the Second World War, but 
the self-reported subjective well-being of these populations has not increased. 
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For example, in the United States, between 1946 and 1991, per capita income 
increased by a factor of 2.5 (from $ 11,000 to $ 27,000 in 1996 dollars). However, 
over the same period happiness lasted on the same level (Frey, 2010, pp. 11, 12). 
Easterlin pointed out that generally rich people are happier than poor people in 
the same country. However, on average people in more affluent countries are 
not necessarily happier than people in poorer ones. Moreover, rises in income 
over time do not increase happiness beyond a certain level. Easterlin’s seminal 
paper (1974) started a big discussion on happiness and income that lasts to this 
day. In general, there is a consensus that income has a positive correlation with 
happiness, but after some level of income the correlation is weak (Hagerty, 
& Veenhoven, 2003; Stevenson, & Wolfers, 2008).1 There are a few theories 
that explain why income after some level does not have a significant impact 
on human happiness (1 – hedonic treadmill theory, 2 – law of diminishing 
returns, 3 – happiness set point theory), but they will not be scrutinized here. 
Now it is important only to underline the relativism of happiness and the 
fact that people are not able to make absolute judgments about happiness. 
Individuals constantly make comparisons with an environment (‘keep up with 
the Joneses’), with the past, or with the expectations of the future. This is why 
Frey (2010, p. 30) indicates aspiration levels as the cause of Easterlin paradox.2
This relativity is essential, because later this phenomenon will be presented as 
one of the main reasons for dismissing subjective well-being measurements. 
The topic of income and happiness is not the only one in the economics of 
happiness. However, this issue attracts the most attention. This topic is so 
interesting, because the statement ‘more money more happiness’ is widely 
accepted among mainstream economists (Frey, & Stutzer, 2002b, p. 428). 
A higher income expands people’s opportunity set which means that more 
services and goods can be consumed. The bizarre (in economic theory) 
people who are not interested in more goods do not need to consume them. 
The unwanted surplus of goods can be managed without any additional costs. 
Therefore, economics takes for granted that happiness and income go together 
(Frey, & Stutzer, 2002b, p. 428). Some economists did not like this assumption 
and they openly criticized not only economic theory but a capitalistic system 
as well. Besides Easterlin, two other economists have had a huge influence 
on the economics of happiness. The first of them was Galbraith (1998). He 
criticized the capitalistic system in the book (among many others) entitled 
Affluent society. In his opinion, capitalism creates new needs which are limitless. 
1 Some scientists have been trying to establish the level of income after which people are not 
more happy, but there is no agreement about the exact number, because there is too many 
factors other than money which influence human happiness.
2 For evidence from laboratory experiments about importance of aspiration levels, see (Mellers, 
2000; Smith, Diener, & Wedell, 1989; Tversky, & Griffin, 1991).
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Moreover, even if they are met, it does not necessarily give people satisfaction. 
The second economist Scitovsky (1976) showed that the increase in GDP does 
make people happy. Therefore, economists need to be interested in philosophy 
and psychology, if they want to learn what brings happiness to people. More 
recently, Frank (1999) underlines that ever-increasing consumption and income 
do not guarantee people happiness and can even diminish it. This paradox is 
possible, because people measure their happiness in comparison with others 
(this phenomenon is known as ‘arms race’). So, if you get a new car, but your 
friends buy the same one, you will not be happier, because the social status is 
a zero-sum game. 
Of course, economics of happiness cannot be simplified only to the search for 
a correlation between income and happiness. This approach measures what 
effects on happiness have things such as marriage, unemployment, freedom, 
democratic rights, watching TV, self-employment, inflation, and much more. 
Over the last years the research in happiness has attracted a lot of attention from 
the interdisciplinary community. Obviously, philosophers have been interested 
in happiness from the very beginning (e.g., Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Epicure). 
However, the rest of the social scientists started to be interested in happiness 
very recently. Psychology started to deal with human happiness in the 1990s. 
Before that psychologists had been mainly focused on mental illness and the 
other problems which diminish human happiness. In the 1990s new approach 
occurred and was called positive psychology. The name was not accidental, 
because from that time psychologists have tried to found out what brings people 
happiness (Argyle, 1987; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Diener, 1984; Michalos, 1991; 
Myers, 1992; Nettle, 2005; Ryan, & Deci, 2001). 
Economists earlier than psychologists started to investigate human happiness 
(Easterlin, 1974; Scitovsky, 1976). Although many economists noticed their 
work, they did not have many followers at the time. General interest among 
economists in the determinants and measurement of reported well-being started 
at the symposium in London in 1993. Later the proceedings from this meeting 
were published in The Economic Journal (e.g., (Frank, 1997; Ng, 1997; Oswald, 
1997)) and other sources (e.g., (Clark, & Oswald, 1994, 1996)). In the late 1990s, 
economists started to publish numerous large-scale empirical analyses of the 
determinants of happiness in various countries and periods (Frey, 2010, p. 13). 
This interest in happiness is not an absolute novelty for economics. Before value-
-free economics and ordialistic revolution happiness was one of the most critical 
issues for economists. Smith analyses the connection between wealth and 
happiness (see (Ashraf, Camerer, & Loewenstein, 2005)). For him the conviction 
that wealth can give happiness was false. However, he understands that in the 
end it is a good thing that people have this false conviction, because it is a fuel 
for the economy: 
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The pleasures of wealth and greatness, when considered in this complex 
view, strike the imagination as something grand and beautiful and noble, of 
which the attainment is well worth all the toil and anxiety which we are so apt 
to bestow upon it. And it is well that nature imposes upon us in this manner. 
It is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry 
of mankind. It is this which first prompted them to cultivate the ground, to 
build houses, to found cities and commonwealths, and to invent and improve 
all the sciences and arts, which ennoble and embellish human life; which have 
entirely changed the whole face of the globe, have turned the rude forests of 
nature into agreeable and fertile plains, and made the trackless and barren 
ocean a new fund of subsistence, and the great high road of communication 
to the different nations of the earth. (Smith, 1759, IV.I.9–10)
He stated many times in Theory of moral sentiments that people find real happiness 
not when they meet self-interest motivations but when they behave morally 
and when they live in harmony with the others (Ostapiuk, 2017b). Smith (1759, 
VI.II.22) famously writes that: 
No benevolent man ever lost altogether the fruits of his benevolence. If he 
does not always gather them from the persons from whom he ought to have 
gathered them, he seldom fails to gather them, and with a tenfold increase, 
from other people. Kindness is the parent of kindness; and if to be beloved by 
our brethren be the great object of our ambition, the surest way of obtaining it 
is, by our conduct to show that we really love them.
However, this guidance came rather from philosophy. The goal of economics 
at that time was to give people the possibility to accumulate more wealth. This 
approach was essential for the other classical economists. J.S. Mill established 
the subject of economics (at least for some time) when he wrote: 
What is now commonly understood by the term ‘Political Economy’ is not the 
science of speculative politics, but a branch of that science. It does not treat 
of the whole of man’s nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole 
conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him solely as a being who 
desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of the comparative 
efficiency of means for obtaining that end. It predicts only such of the 
phenomena of the social state as take place in consequence of the pursuit of 
wealth. (Mill, 1874, p. 137)
Also Marshall (1920) perceived the goal of economics as the pursuit of wealth 
but he was more specific, because he wrote about material wealth.
This subject matter of economics has changed due to the processes connected 
with Pareto, Robbins, and Samuelson, which were presented in Chapter 1. It was 
indicated that value-free economics moved from assessing utility (cardinal 
approach) towards axiomatic assumptions in which people do what is the 
best for them (revealed preference theory). These seemingly ‘objective’ 
assumptions created a vacuum, because value-free economists did not deal with 
happiness, and now different researchers try to fulfil this vacuum. Moreover, 
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the assumptions that people make the best decisions and maximize their utility 
attracted much criticism. Economics of happiness tries to show that due to the 
bounded rationality people do not make best choices. These attempts to establish 
and measure utility are not something revolutionary in economics. Before 
Pareto revolution economists had tried to measure utility and they took human 
goals into consideration. Due to methodological weaknesses, it was not possible. 
Nowadays economics of happiness tries to present a coherent and scientific 
theory which will give economics the tools to deal with elusive happiness. 
3.2. Subjective well-being 
The main interest of economics of happiness is in measuring happiness. There 
exist many techniques for inquiring about individuals’ well-being. They all give 
an indication of individuals’ affective state (mood and emotions) or individual’s 
evaluation of their life satisfaction and happiness. The umbrella term for all these 
measures is subjective well-being (Frey, 2010, p. 17). The most popular method 
which is used to measure human happiness relies on asking a representative 
sample of individuals about their general satisfaction with life. There exist many 
variants of this method. The example of a single-item question on a three-point 
scale came from the General Social Surveys (Davis, Smith, & Marsden, 2001): 
“Taken all together, how would you say things are these days – would you 
say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” In the World 
Values Survey (Inglehart, Basanez, Diez-Medrano, Halman, & Luijkx, 2000), 
life satisfaction is assessed on a scale from 1 (dissatisfied) to 10 (satisfied). 
People are asked: ‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life 
as a whole these days?’ The Euro-Barometer Surveys, covering all members of 
the European Union, ask an analogous question: “On the whole, are you very 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you 
lead?” (Frey, 2010, p. 18). Among the multiple-item approaches, the most known 
one is the Satisfaction With Life Scale (Pavot, & Diener, 1993), which contains 
five questions rated on a scale from 1 to 7.3
The next method is called Experience Sampling Method (ESM). In this approach 
information on individual’s experiences are collected in real time in people’s 
natural environment (Csikszentmihalyi, & Hunter, 2003; Scollon, Prieto, & Die-
ner, 2003). Moreover, a representative group of individuals gets a beeper or 
a hand-held computer. They are asked at random times to assess how happy 
they are and what are they doing. Thanks to this it is possible to assess what 
activities are pleasant/unpleasant for people, and at the end of the day we can 
calculate happiness by the aggregation of these instant statements or affects. 
3 For a survey of various measures of subjective well-being, see (Andrews, & Robinson, 1991).
64 	 3. Economics of happiness
The next method is called Day Reconstruction Method (DRM). Questioners are 
asked to reconstruct the previous day by filling out a questionnaire. Firstly, they 
recall the activities undertaken the previous day by producing a sequence of 
episodes. Secondly, they describe each episode in detail. They identify what, 
when, where, and with whom the episode took place. Then, the respondents are 
asked to rate these episodes in terms of positive affect (warm/friendly, happy, 
enjoying myself) or negative affect (depressed/blue, frustrated/annoyed, 
hassled/pushed around, angry/hostile, criticized/put down, worried/anxious) 
(Frey, 2010, pp. 20, 21). In Table 1 the Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) is 
presented on the well-known example in the happiness literature of the women 
from Texas: 
Table 1. The Day Reconstruction Method
Happiness in different activities Happiness (index) Average hours per day
Sex 4.7 0.2






Socialising at work 3.8 1.1
Watching TV 3.6 2.2




Computer at home 3.1 0.5
Housework 3.0 1.1
Childcare 3.0 1.1
Evening commute 2.8 0.6
Working 2.7 6.9
Morning commute 2.0 0.4
Source: based on (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004, p. 1777). 
The new method connected with the development of technology is brain 
imaging. This method relies on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
which tracks blood flow in the brain, using changes in magnetic properties due 
to blood oxygenation (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005; Fehr, Fischbacher, 
3.2. Subjective well-being 	 65
& Kosfeld, 2005; Zak, 2004). Happy people reveal a characteristic pattern of 
electrocortical activity. They manifest greater activity in the left prefrontal cortex 
than in the right (Davidson, 2003; Pugno, 2004b; Urry et al., 2004). However,
at least for now this method is not very widespread among researchers. We 
need to wait for new experiments if we want to draw any significant conclusions 
from neuroeconomics in general (Braeutigam, 2005; Harrison, 2008; Marchionni, 
& Vromen, 2014; Rubinstein, 2008). 
It goes without saying that subjective well-being (SWB) attracts much criticism. 
Especially surveys about general satisfaction with life have raised many questions 
but these questions relate to other methods as well. The skeptics ask if it is possible 
to believe in people’s answers about subjective well-being if we know that 
emotions influence these answers. For example, someone who had a car accident 
before taking the survey can declare a lower level of happiness. Moreover, people 
are influenced by framing effect which means that those who see a documentary 
film about starvation in Zimbabwe would be more prone to declare a higher level 
of happiness, because they will compare their lives with poor lives of people 
inflicted by a starvation. The skeptics also ask if we can be sure that people tell the 
truth when they fill in a survey or they try to look happy if not in the eyes of others 
(anonymity of surveys), at least, in their own eyes. The questions also concern the 
possibility of assessing happiness on the simple numerical scale. 
The researchers who analyse happiness have answers to all the above-mentioned 
questions. Although people are affected by positive or negative emotions caused 
by different experiences which had occurred before the survey, so many surveys 
were conducted that these emotions counterpoise each other. Moreover, there 
exists a strong correlation between the different surveys and their results. Most 
people like the same things, for example, spending time with friends and do 
not like things as commuting. Also, it was proven that different measures of 
subjective well-being correlate significantly with one another (Fordyce, 1988). 
The factor analyses of self-reports and non-self-reports of well-being revealed 
a single unitary framework underlying the measures suggesting their scientific 
validity (Sandvik, Diener, & Seidlitz, 1993). Despite the validity of subjective 
well-being measures, it is easy to disturb the results of some survey. In one 
experiment (Strack et al., 1988) people have to answer the analogous question. 
The first group was asked “How happy are you?” and later “How many dates 
did you have last month?” There was not any significant correlation between 
answers (0.12). The second group was asked first about dates, then if they are 
happy, and the correlation was significant (0.66). As it turned out, thinking about 
dates was an anchor which overwhelmingly influenced reports of subjective 
well-being. This experiment proves that it is easy to influence the results of 
an SWB survey. However, it does not diminish the validity of SWB surveys, 
because they are not designed to manipulate people’s answers. 
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Probably the most substantial criticism of SWB measures concerns their 
simplicity. The assumptions that one simple question can provide a general 
assessment of emotional, social and mental health in comparison to hours of 
tests where the most respected clinical instruments in the field were used seems 
unrealistic (Fordyce, 1988). However, it works and the different surveys give the 
same results. Fordyce who was a pioneer in positive psychology considered this 
situation to be most fortuitous, ‘since if great inconsistency in resultant findings 
occurred in the field, happiness studies would be in a thoroughly confused and 
confounded state’ (Fordyce, 1986, p. 27). Apparently, “no matter how you decide 
to ask people how happy they are, the results are the same” (Fordyce, 1986, 
p. 27). When it comes to the validity of people’s declaration about happiness, 
their answers correlate with the opinions of people closest to them. So, happy 
people are rated as happy by their family members and friends (Lepper, 1998; 
Sandvik et al., 1993) and by their spouses (Costa, & McCrae, 1988). 
The last and most significant problem with SBW is its relativism. The first 
question that came to mind is how to measure different results. Is the difference 
between 4–5 the same as in 8–9, and if we can compare the level of happiness 
among individuals? So, if Mark declares that he feels eight on the 10 points scale, 
it means that he is happier than Tom who declared seven? Before admitting that 
this criticism is valid it must be stated that relativism of subjective well-being 
measures is inevitable. In the end, only people can decide how well they feel. 
However, due to many biases, people’s declaration or even their belief that they 
feel happy does not necessarily mean that it is true. This point will be explained 
a few pages later when some arguments for objective goals are analysed. 
It is true that subjective well-being data are based on individuals’ judgments 
that are prone to a multitude of biases. Reported subjective well-being depends 
on the order of questions, the wording of questions, the scales applied or actual 
mood. However, the importance of these errors depends on how data is used. 
Frey (2010, p. 19) concludes: 
Often, the main use of happiness measures is not to compare levels in an 
absolute sense but rather to seek to identify the determinants of happiness. 
For that purpose, it is not necessary to assume that reported subjective well-
-being is cardinally measurable or that it is interpersonally comparable. 
This means that we should not expect from the economics of happiness to decide 
if Mark who declared eight in the survey is happier than Tom who declared 
seven. Economics of happiness has more humble goals such as an identification 
of the determinants of happiness. Of course, this means that economics of 
happiness has not given an ironclad argument on how to make interpersonal 
comparisons or assess cardinal utility. However, at least it gives a valuable 
scientific theory which draws us closer to the answer. Even though economics 
of happiness has not proven yet to be the only game in town when it came to 
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happiness, it seems better (in terms of explanation and accuracy) than value-
-free economics with its axiomatic assumptions about happiness. However, to 
state that with confidence, we need to analyse more thoroughly the revealed 
preference theory in the context of happiness.
3.3. The criticism of revealed preference theory
The theory of revealed preferences was analysed in Chapter 1. In this chapter, 
it is investigated in the context of happiness. Value-free economics assumes that 
choice tells us enough about preferences. This assumption is the result of an 
impossibility to test preferences empirically. Therefore, we need to wait and see 
what people choose to know their preferences. The problem with this idea is that 
neoclassical economics assumes that people satisfy their preferences (maximize 
utility) when they make a choice. Many economists do not treat this assumption 
as a normative one, see (Thaler, 1980, 2015). Many of them believe that in spite of 
the problems people are the best judges when it comes to preference satisfaction, 
e.g., (Friedman, 1962; Friedman, M., & Friedman R., 1980; Hayek, 1978) and 
most economists associated with Austrian school (Sugden, 2008b, 2010, 2018). 
Therefore, from this perspective, the only thing that economists can state is 
that people do something, because it satisfies their preferences. However, the 
implications of these assumptions have far-reaching consequences. Value-free 
economics assumes that what people do is the best for them. Therefore, what 
people do gives them happiness. These assumptions cause that value-free 
economics does not need to discuss happiness and human goals as it has a place 
in the other social sciences. This approach has consequences when it comes to 
knowing the reasons why people do something.
In a typical model of motivations a person has a desire Y, and if one believes 
that by doing act X, one can achieve Y, then one will choose X. Rational 
choice theory prescribes only the most effective ways to achieve given desires 
(Sugden, 1991). The only constraint is that desires must be consistent. Many 
philosophers are dissatisfied with such a structural definition of rationality. 
They want to know what desires are the best. So, in this context, the rational 
choice theory should answer questions such as: is it rational for a smoker to 
smoke, for an obese person to overeat, or for an employee to undersave (Read 
2007)? Not answering these questions does not make value-free economics 
more scientific, because defining: 
well-being or welfare exclusively in terms of subjective preference satisfaction, 
requires making a significant (and questionable) value-judgment, since well-
-being or welfare is also commonly defined in terms of a host of additional 
normative matters that the theory suppresses, such as justice, fairness, rights, 
liberty, and dignity. (Davis, 2005, p. 590)
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Suppressing these values in the context of value-free economics means that 
all of them are put in the black box of utility where they lost their meaning. 
Moreover, a choice depends on opportunity set. Screpanti and Zamagni observe 
that it is epistemologically inconsistent to assume the compatibility between an 
individual’s revealed preferences and the choices one can make: 
preferences can be made operational [only] by means of a definition in terms 
of choice: the assertion ‘the state x will be chosen by a subject if only x and 
y are available.’ The doubt did not even cross the minds of Robbins and the 
other authors who followed this orientation that the definiens, as a conditional 
proposition, can perform its function only after the concept of preference has 
been defined. I may well prefer health to illness, but I certainly cannot choose 
to be well or ill. (Screpanti, & Zamagni 1993, p. 271)
The opportunity set has an enormous influence on choices that people made. 
Sen (2002, p. 171) writes that “We do not live in a world of a ‘one-shot’ choice”. 
He indicates that without deeper knowledge about human motivations and 
goals sometimes people’s preferences look inconsistent. The assumption of 
transitivity (x > y and y > z then x > z) is the foundation of rational choice 
theory. Sen gives an example to demonstrate that transitivity does not work in 
some situations:
Suppose the person faces a choice at a dinner table between having the last 
remaining apple in the fruit basket (y) and having nothing instead (x), forgoing 
the nice-looking apple. She decides to behave decently and picks nothing (x),
rather than the one apple (y). If, instead, the basket had contained two apples, 
and she had encountered the choice between having nothing (x), having one 
nice apple (y) and having another nice one (z), she could reasonably enough 
choose one (y), without violating any rule of good behavior. The presence 
of another apple (z) make one of the two apples decently choosable, but this 
combination of choices would violate the standard consistency conditions, 
including Property α, even though there is nothing particularly inconsistent 
in the pair of choices. (Sen, 1993a, p. 501)
Sen’s condition α is also known as Chernoff’s Axiom and in general it is 
connected with axiom called ‘the independence of irrelevant alternatives.’ 
This axiom states that the unchosen alternative is unimportant. In the above-
-mentioned example with apples it means that a new alternative of another 
apple in the basket (z) should not change the choice from having nothing (x)
to having one apple (y). Without consistency (transitivity) of preferences, 
the whole rational choice theory falls apart. To illustrate the importance of 
transitivity of preferences the anecdote which is attributed to philosopher 
Sidney Morgenbesser can be presented. After finishing dinner, Morgenbesser 
decides to order dessert. The waitress tells him he has two choices: apple pie 
and blueberry pie. Morgenbesser orders the apple pie. After a few minutes 
the waitress returns and says that they also have cherry pie at which point 
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Morgenbesser says “in that case I’ll have the blueberry pie” (Poundstone, 2008, 
p. 50).4 The unchosen option (cherry pie) causes that Morgenbesser changes his 
decision which does not make any sense, because in this case his preferences 
are inconsistent. 
In Sen’s example a person is not inconsistent, because she follows the etiquette 
(does not want to look greedy) the whole time. Sen argues that we cannot know 
if some behaviour is inconsistent until we learn about one’s reason behind the 
choices. He writes that “we cannot determine whether the person is failing in 
any way without knowing what he is trying to do, that is, without knowing 
something external to the choice itself” (Sen, 2002, p. 130). Sen calls this something 
external “menu dependence” (Sen, 1997, p. 752). We would know that a person 
in the example with the apples is not inconsistent with her preferences if we 
knew about her motivations (not being greedy). Her preferences did not change, 
because of the z option. In the new environment (two apples) her preferences 
manifest themselves in a different choice. 
Menu dependence causes that actual choice of the agent depends on the content 
of available alternatives. This makes internal consistency conditions meaningless, 
because choice alone does not take menu dependence into consideration. Sen 
writes that “I would argue that the philosophy of the revealed preference 
approach essentially underestimates the fact that man is a social animal and his 
choices are not rigidly bound to his own preferences only” (Sen, 1973, pp. 252, 
253). The distinction between preference and choice is at the core of Sen’s critique 
of the revealed preference theory. This means that we need to know people’s 
motivation if we want to know about their preferences. 
The next problem with revealed preferences is also connected with the 
opportunity set. In this case, however, the problem lies not in negligence of 
human motivations or preferences, but in the available options. Value-free 
economics assumes that people make the best choices for themselves. If they had 
not satisfied their preferences, they would not have chosen them in the first place. 
However, sometimes it is impossible to claim that some choices meet somebody’s 
preferences if we look at the available options. The example of Sophie’s choice 
proves this point. Sophie is the main character in William Styron’s Sophie’ choice
(1992). She was a Polish woman who was relegated with her two small children 
(10-year boy and 7-year girl) to Auschwitz. For children being in concentration 
camp meant sure death. Therefore, Sophie tried to save their lives by seducing 
4 Intransitivity of preferences is also known as ‘money-pump’. Hausman explains how it works: 
“Suppose for example I prefer x to y and y to z and z to x, and I start out possessing z. Then 
I should, in principle, be willing to pay fee for each of the following exchanges: trade z away 
for y, trade y away for x, and trade x away for z. I am then back when I started, except that 
I am poorer by the expense of the three fess. I have become a ‘money pump’” (Hausman, 
1992, p. 16).
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the commandant of camp for whom she worked as a translator. The plan did 
not work out and she was presented with the agonizing choice between saving 
only one child, whereas the second one would die being gassed. Of her two 
children, Sophie chose to sacrifice her seven-year-old daughter Eva, but the guilt 
haunted her for the rest of her life. Now the term ‘Sophie’s choice’ is used in 
reference to a difficult situation in which a person must choose between two 
equally deserving alternatives (Sophie’s choice, n.d.). In the context of revealed 
preferences it means that choice alone does tell everything about someone’s 
preferences (of course, she did not want any of her children to die). 
Another problem with revealed preferences is pointed out by the theory called 
‘second-order desires’ (Frankfurt, 1971). This theory shows that the conception 
of revealed preferences is a simplification. Frankfurt (1971, p. 7) writes: 
Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may 
also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. We are capable of 
wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. 
The easiest way to explain this concept is through the example of cigarettes. 
Having the choice to take or not to take cigarettes, the people who are addicted 
will choose cigarettes and this is their first-preference. However, if people had 
the choice, they would rather rank their preferences as no cigarettes > cigarettes 
than cigarettes > no cigarettes. This ability is called second-order desires. We 
should not perceive ‘second-order desires’ as the instability of preferences. It is 
rather individuals’ preference ranking. We can also see the attempts to broaden 
the understanding of individuals’ preferences by meta-rankings (Sen, 1977). 
The conception of second-order theory does not oppose Hume’s thought that 
individuals cannot determine their preferences by reason (“reason is, and ought 
only to be the slave of the passions” (Hume, 1896, p. 283)). In the conception of 
second-order desires, people have defined preferences. However, due to reason 
they can change their preferences. The condition when people are tossed by their 
desires Frankfurt (1971) called “wanton”. For Frankfurt wanton is the feature of 
young children and animals. In the second-order desires, consequences are not 
sufficient to show what preferences people really have. Therefore, it is crucial to 
analyse human’s motivations and goals deeper.
The above-mentioned problems mainly concern philosophical issues. However, 
the revealed preference theory has even more problems with practical concerns. 
Some economists (e.g., (Friedman, 1953)) hold that economics is entirely 
descriptive and positive.5 Its only purpose is to predict human behaviour and 
nothing else. Neoclassical economists believe that the primary goal of the 
rational choice theory is to describe some regularities in human behaviour. 
5 However, as was indicated before, Mäki (2009b) argues that position of Friedman is more 
complicated.
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A theory works if it generates predictions that are consistent with observations. 
The problem of rational choice theory is that people are not always rational and 
they do not always behave in accordance with the economic theory. Moreover, 
irrational choices are not simple anomalies. People make constant mistakes due 
to cognitive biases (Thaler, 2015, 2016). Therefore, rational choice theory fails to 
predict human behaviour in some specific situations. Economics of happiness 
indicates that due to the bounded rationality, people do not choose the best 
options and they do not always choose things that will bring them happiness.6
The main mechanisms will be analysed below. They make revealed preference 
theory limited in cognitive terms.
Let us start with Kahneman’s distinction between ‘experienced utility’ (cardinal 
utility) and ‘decision utility’, which is reflected in choices (revealed preferences) 
(Kahneman, 2011, p. 368). The experienced utility is connected with Bentham’s 
idea to perceive utility as the feature of an object or an action in order to increase 
or decrease the overall happiness. Bentham’s utility is logically separated from 
choices that are actually made. It means that nothing in the theory indicates 
that people will choose the best options for themselves. For example, smoking 
(decision utility) can give less total utility (experienced utility) than not smoking 
but be chosen anyway (Read, 2007). The definition of utility has changed over time. 
In value-free economics the separation between utility and choice disappeared. 
Decision utility does not say anything about hedonic experiences- what people 
do is the best for them and there is the end of a discussion. A choice needs only 
to be in accordance with the technical assumptions of instrumental rationality 
(consistency and completeness). The differences between experienced utility 
and decision utility do not mean that these concepts cannot coincide with each 
other. It is possible “if people want what they will enjoy, and enjoy what they 
chose for themselves” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 368). In general, revealed preference 
theory is based on the assumption that economic agents are rational. They are 
expected to know their preferences (tastes), both present and future. In other 
word, these preferences are well-informed. This enables them to make the best 
decisions which will maximize their utility (happiness). The problem is that 
individuals often do not choose the option which maximizes their experienced 
utility, and this makes them less happy. 
Kahneman (2011, pp. 368, 369) formulates a puzzle in order to show the conflict 
between decision and experienced utility. In his puzzle individual receives one 
painful injection every day. There is no adaptation; the pain is the same every 
day. Kahneman asks, if people will attach the same value to reducing the number 
6 Sometimes economics of happiness is mistaken for behavioural economics, because of the 
interest in bounded rationality. However, the goal of economics of happiness is different 
than the goal of behavioural economics. Happiness researchers focus on the fact that due to 
the bounded rationality people do not choose the options which bring them happiness. 
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of planned injections from 20 to 18 as from 6 to 4. He does not have doubts 
that people will pay more to reduce the number of injections by a third (from 
6 to 4) than by one-tenth (from 20 to 18).7 The decision utility of avoiding two 
injections is higher in the first case than in the second. However, this difference is 
absurd, because two injections give the same amount of pain, and the number of 
previous injections does not matter at all. The example presented by Kahneman 
leads to two conclusions. Firstly, the experienced utility could be measured 
by the number of injections. Secondly, in some cases, experienced utility is the 
criterion by which a decision should be assessed, because an individual who 
pays different amounts to achieve the same gain of experienced utility is making 
a mistake (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 368, 369).
These conclusions lead to the question how to measure experienced utility? 
How should we answer questions such as: “How much pain did Helen suffer 
during the medical procedure?” or “How much enjoyment did she get from her 
20 minutes on the beach?” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 369). Many economists tried 
to measure utility, but one of them created a coherent theory which was used 
by Kahneman to measure experienced utility. It was British economist Francis 
Edgeworth who in the 19th century proposed the idea of a ‘hedonometer.’ It was 
an imaginary instrument analogous to the devices used in weather-recording 
stations. But instead of measuring temperature, it measures the level of pleasure 
or pain that individual experiences at any moment (see (Edgeworth, 1879)). 
Experienced utility varies, as daily temperature does, and the results were 
presented as a function of time. Therefore, the answer to the question how much 
pain or pleasure Helen experienced during her medical procedure or vacation 
would be the “area under the curve” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 369). In Edgeworth’s 
conception times plays an essential role. If Helen stays on the beach for 60 
minutes instead of 20 and her enjoyment remains as intense, then the total 
experienced utility of that episode triples. 
Kahneman and Redelmerier designed the experiment to see how hedonometer 
would work in reality. Figure 1 shows profiles of the experiences of two patients 
undergoing a painful colonoscopy.8 The patients were prompted every 60 
seconds to assess the level of pain they experienced at the moment. The data 
shown are on a scale where zero is ‘no pain at all’ and 10 is ‘intolerable pain.’
If people were asked which of these patients suffered more, everyone would 
answer that patient B had the worse time. Patient B spent at least as much time 
as patient A at any level of pain, so the ‘area under the curve’ is evidently larger
7 The fact that people look at relative not absolute outputs is also one of the conclusions from 
‘prospect theory’ (Kahneman, & Tversky, 1979). 
8 This procedure is now routinely administered with an anaesthetic as well as an amnesic 
drug, but these drugs were not as widespread when Kahneman collected his data. 
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Figure 1. Pain intensity 
Source: (Kahneman, 2011, p. 370).
for B than for A. Of course, the most important factor here is that patient 
B’s procedure lasted much longer. However, this simple answer was not in 
accordance with the results of the participants’ surveys. After the procedure, all 
participants were asked to rate “the total amount of pain” they had experienced 
during the procedure. The wording was designed to encourage them to think 
of the whole of the pain they had reported, reproducing the hedonometer. 
Surprisingly, the patients did nothing perceive pain in the hedonometer scale. 
The statistical analysis revealed two findings which illustrate a pattern that was 
observed in the other experiments: 
Peak-end rule: The global retrospective rating was well predicted by the 
average of the level of pain reported at the worst moment of the experience 
and at its end.
Duration neglect: The duration of the procedure had no effect whatsoever on 
the ratings of total pain. (Kahneman, 2011, p. 370)
As it turned out, patient B perceived colonoscopy as less painful than patient 
A. It was possible, because people do not perceive pain in the hedonometer 
scale, but they use ‘peak-end rule’. The worst ratio (8) was the same for both 
patients, but the last rating before the end of the procedure was 7 for patient 
A and only 1 for patient B. The peak-end average was therefore 7.5 [(8 + 7)/2] for 
patient A and 4.5 for patient B [(8 + 1)/2]. In the result, patient A retained a much 
worse memory of the episode than patient B. This experiment shows that two 
systematically different measures of experienced utility exist – the hedonometer 
total and the retrospective assessment. The hedonometer total is computed by 
an observer from an individual’s report of the experience of moments. The equal 
weight is assigned to all moments: three minutes of pain at level 8 is three times 
as bad as one minute at the same level of pain. On the other hand, the findings 
of this experiment point out that the retrospective assessments are insensitive to 
duration. What matters are two singular moments – the peak and the end. They 
indicate how good or bad are people’s memories of something. 
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These findings mean that people may have two different selves which perceive 
reality differently. The experiencing self answers the question: “Does it hurt 
now?” The remembering self answers the question: “How was it, on the 
whole?” Depending on the particular self we will get a different answer about 
an experience. Kahneman carried the experiment to show the conflict between 
experiencing self and remembering self. The participants were asked to hold 
their hands in painfully cold water and afterward they were offered a warm 
towel. The experiment goes like this:
Each participant endured two cold-hand episodes: The short episode consisted 
of 60 seconds of immersion in water at 14° Celsius, which is experienced 
as painfully cold, but not intolerable. At the end of the 60 seconds, the 
experimenter instructed the participant to remove his hand from the water 
and offered a warm towel. 
The long episode lasted 90 seconds. Its first 60 seconds were identical to the 
short episode. The experimenter said nothing at all at the end of the 60 seconds. 
Instead he opened a valve that allowed slightly warmer water to flow into the 
tub. During the additional 30 seconds, the temperature of the water rose by 
roughly 1°, just enough for most subjects to detect a slight decrease in the 
intensity of pain. (Kahneman, 2011, pp. 372, 373)
After the second trial, the participants were given a choice about the third (last) 
trial. They could decide which of the previous trials they want to repeat. This 
choice causes not only a conflict between experiencing and remembering self, but 
also between experienced utility and decision utility. From the perspective of the 
experiencing self, the long trial is clearly worse. The situation is different when we 
refer to the remembering self. Due to the peak-end rule, people will have a worse 
memory of the short than of the long trial. Moreover, the duration neglect indicates 
that the difference between 90 second and 60 seconds will not matter at all. 
Eighty percent of participants behaved in accordance with remembering self. 
They chose to repeat the longer episode, which means that they willingly agreed 
to suffer 30 seconds of needless pain. What is crucial here is that these people 
were not masochists and they did not intentionally choose to suffer more. They 
just made a mistake. If we had asked them “Would you prefer a 90-second 
immersion or only the first part of it?” they would certainly have selected the 
short option (Kahneman, 2011, p. 373). Kahneman did not use these words, 
because he wanted to get natural responses. In the experiment, people chose 
to repeat the trial about which they had a better (less painful) memory. Their 
decision was governed by a simple rule of intuitive choice – pick the option 
which you like the most or dislike the least. In the end, it is a memory which 
determined what people would choose. Kahneman (2011, p. 375) explains why 
the implications of the above-mentioned experiment are so vital for neoclassical 
economics:
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Decisions that do not produce the best possible experience and erroneous 
forecasts of future feelings – both are bad news for believers in the 
rationality of choice. The cold-hand study showed that we cannot fully trust 
our preferences to reflect our interests, even if they are based on personal 
experience, and even if the memory of that experience was laid down within 
the last quarter of an hour! Tastes and decisions are shaped by memories, 
and the memories can be wrong. The evidence presents a profound challenge 
to the idea that humans have consistent preferences and know how to 
maximize them, a cornerstone of the rational-agent model. An inconsistency 
is built into the design of our minds. We have strong preferences about the 
duration of our experiences of pain and pleasure. We want pain to be brief 
and pleasure to last. But our memory, a function of System 1, has evolved 
to represent the most intense moment of an episode of pain or pleasure (the 
peak) and the feelings when the episode was at its end. A memory that 
neglects duration will not serve our preference for long pleasure and short 
pains. 
Moreover, the existence of two distinct selves such as remember self and 
experiencing self, is one of the arguments for multiple self conception which 
will be scrutinized more in Chapter 4. The knowledge that people experience 
things differently and that experience depends on a self to which we refer imply 
that we need to discuss each self separately. 
The next important problem with preferences is that people do not know what 
preferences they will have in the future. People are not good, and they are 
not perfect for sure, at foreseeing how much utility they will gain from future 
consumption. One of the most significant psychologists of our time dedicated 
the whole book to show that people have enormous problems to assess the 
future flow of happiness ((Gilbert, 2007), see also (Loewenstein, & Schkade, 
1999)). The most significant mechanism that makes people unable to know what 
they will want in the future was presented earlier in the case of present bias. 
Now, the two supplement phenomena will be analysed. First of them is called 
‘focus illusion’ and it was introduced by Schkade and Kahneman (1998). It can 
be summarized by the moral and warning “Nothing that you focus on will make 
as much difference as you think” (Schkade, & Kahneman 1998, p. 353). It means 
that individuals tend to exaggerate the importance of any aspect of their lives 
when they focus their attention on it. Schkade and Kahneman (1998) carried out 
the experiment in which many students from Midwest and Southern California 
rated their overall life satisfaction as well as various aspects of life, for either 
themselves or someone similar to them in one of these two regions. It can be 
concluded that this self-reported life satisfaction was the same in these two 
regions but these participants who rated another group expected Californians to 
be more satisfied than Midwesterners. It means that people intuitively (wrongly) 
assume that life in California must be better, because they focus their attention 
on one factor (weather). It is wrong, because people forget that weather is not 
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the only thing that influences our life satisfaction. What is also important is job, 
family, social connections and many other factors. 
Another problem with preferences over time is when people make a decision 
in a ‘hot state’, e.g., buying automobiles when the dealer makes them excited, 
getting married in the heat of passion, or committing suicide in the depth of 
depression (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003). ‘Hot state’ results from 
present bias. What is more, it is difficult for people to realize that the state of 
arousal will pass quickly and their decisions will be seen as irrational.
As we can see, the revealed preferences theory is not always a good indicator of 
what gives people happiness. People often do not know what they want due to 
various cognitive biases. Therefore, choice alone does not indicate what makes 
people happy. Moreover, it does not always represent human preferences 
correctly. This is why economics of happiness has a role in analysing human 
happiness.
It is a cliché to say that people want to be happy and that happiness has a crucial 
role in people’s life. However, it ceased to be so obvious when one looks at 
value-free economics and its reluctance towards happiness. Therefore, some 
sentences are necessary if we want to understand the importance of happiness. 
In the end, happiness is treated by economics of happiness as the ultimate goal 
which should be maximized. Measuring happiness is only a secondary issue 
which is intended to help people to establish what gives them happiness. 
The importance of happiness was indicated more than two millennia ago by 
the famous sentence which is attributed to Aristotle “happiness is the meaning 
and purpose of life, the whole aim and end of human existence.” For him 
happiness was an ultimate goal to which other things were only the means. 
Aristotle ascribed to wealth much less importance: “The life of money-making 
is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we 
are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else” (Aristotle, 
2000, I, 1096a. 5). The importance of searching for happiness was generally 
recognized in ancient moral philosophy. However, there was not any consensus 
about how to achieve happiness – in those times there was a lot of various 
schools with different approaches towards happiness (e.g., Cynicism, Stoicism, 
Epicureanism, Aristotelianism). Despite their disagreements about ways to 
achieve happiness, they agreed that happiness was a crucial part of human life. 
Aristotle (2000, I, 4, 1095a) expressed this belief: 
Most people, I should think, agree about what [...] is called [the highest 
good], since both the masses and sophisticated people call it happiness, 
understanding being happy as equivalent to living well and acting well. They 
disagree about substantive conceptions of happiness. 
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This perception of happiness as the ultimate end in life is absolutely different 
from the economics point of view in which happiness is interpreted within the 
framework of a means-ends relationship (value-free economics). 
3.4. Economics of happiness – general insights
Economics of happiness has produced numerous interesting insights into the 
determinants and the nature of happiness. Frey, one of the most prominent 
supporters of this new approach, presented some of the major results:
 Most people, during most periods, in most countries, are satisfied with 
their lives.
 Economic conditions – income, employment, price stability, fair income 
distribution – are important determinants of happiness.
 Non-material aspects – family, friendships, other social ties – matter 
greatly for happiness.
 People tend to adjust to their basic level of happiness after positive and 
negative life events, but the speed and the extent of such adjustment differ 
depending on whether it relates to income, employment or other areas.
 People are status seekers and always compare themselves to others.
 Marriage makes people happy – but not for long.
 Children lower parents’ life satisfaction, but make them happy once they 
leave the household.
 Extensive television viewing makes active people less happy.
 Helping others by volunteering and by giving financial support increases 
happiness.
 People make systematic errors about their happiness with respect to both 
the past and the future (misprediction); they are subject to weakness of 
will.
 Procedural utility matters to happiness above and beyond outcome util-
ity.9
 Culture has little effect on the marginal effect of the various determinants 
of happiness.
 Political institutions – in particular, opportunities for citizens to partici-
pate via democracy and federalism – are significant determinants of life 
satisfaction. (Frey, 2010, p. 154)
From the perspective of value-free economics, two theoretical points made by 
economics of happiness are much more significant (Frey, 2010, p. 200). First of 
them states that it is possible to use the measures of subjective well-being as 
9 Procedural utility means that people do not only value actual outcomes, i.e., the what, but 
also the conditions and processes that lead to these outcomes (Frey, Benz, & Stutzer, 2004). 
We can find analogy here with Aristotle’s virtue ethics. In general, economics of happiness 
frequently refers to Aristotle, see (Angner, 2010; Bruni, Comim, & Pugno, 2008; Bruni, 
& Porta, 2007). 
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a (reasonably) good proxy for the theoretical concept of utility as preference 
satisfaction. Earlier a few methods of measuring subjective well-being were 
presented. Each of them has its problems and can be easily criticized. However, 
these methods are improving all the time and now they seem developed enough 
to use them as a guide for economic theory and policy. The second claim is that 
the measurement of utility is necessary to cope with some issues which economics 
has to face. Utility should be measured in the cases when revealed preferences 
do not faithfully reflect the individual’s utility. Due to cognitive biases, people 
make systematic errors in the decision making, which are especially visible 
when people make choices over time. 
These two claims that utility should be measured and can be measured stand 
in opposition to the foundation of value-free economics. This is why economics 
of happiness is perceived as a counter-revolution to standard microeconomics 
(Frey, 2010, p. 200). However, due to the weaknesses of subjective well-being, 
there is a need for a different approach to happiness. Objective well-being 
approaches criticize subjective well-being and they try to introduce some 
ultimate goals that can give people happiness.10 Subjective well-being seems as 
a step in the right direction in terms of explanatory and predictive power, but it 
is not enough, because of the problems that this concept generates. 
3.5. Objective well-being approaches 
Before objective well-being approaches are going to be examined, it is necessary to 
highlight the problems with the ambiguity of the term happiness. This ambiguity 
leads to the situation in which it is difficult to distinguish between subjective 
(economics of happiness) and objective approaches towards well-being (e.g., the 
capability approach). Happiness can mean literally everything. Easterlin (2001, 
p. 465) illustrates this problem: “I use the terms happiness, subjective well-
-being, satisfaction, utility, wellbeing, and welfare interchangeably.” As was in-
dicated earlier in this book, economists do not even like the question ‘what is 
happiness?’ For many of them, it is an elusive term which cannot be scientifically 
analysed. Unlike economists, psychologists deal with happiness, but they also 
acknowledge the ambiguity of the term happiness: 
10 The different approaches to happiness (1 – subjective well-being, 2 – revealed preferences, 
3 – human flourishing) presented in this chapter are similar to the approaches indicated by 
Parfit: “What would be best for someone, or would be most in this person’s interests, or 
would make this person’s life go, for him, as well as possible? Answers to this question 
I call theories about self-interest. There are three kinds of theory. On Hedonistic Theories, 
what would be best for someone is what would make his life happiest. On Desire-Fulfilment 
Theories, what would be best for someone is what, throughout his life, would best fulfil his 
desires. On Objective List Theories, certain things are good or bad for us, whether or not we 
want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things” (Parfit, 1984, p. 493).
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A widely presumed component of the good life is happiness. Unfortunately, 
the nature of happiness has not been defined in a uniform way. Happiness 
can mean pleasure, life satisfaction, positive emotions, a meaningful life, or 
a feeling of contentment, among other concepts. (Diener, Scollon, & Lucas, 
2004, p. 188)
The ambiguity of happiness is a problem when it comes to defining well-being. 
Therefore, it is necessary to differentiate between the hedonic and eudaimonic 
perspectives.
Hedonic approach is equivalent to economics of happiness. It is based on 
utilitaristic tradition (Bentham),11 where pleasure and pain are people’s sovereign 
masters and they guide the individual’s decision-making. Nowadays, hedonic 
approach has a stronger foundation than utilitarianism, because pleasures and 
pains (SWB) can be measured objectively at least this is what its supporters claim 
(e.g., (Kahneman et al., 1999)). In his book, Kahneman declared the existence of 
a new field of psychology. Its title, Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology,
evidently suggests that, within this paradigm, the terms ‘hedonism’ and ‘well-
being’ are equivalent. In this approach, well-being is perceived as vaguely as the 
term ‘happiness.’ Deci and Ryan (2001, p. 144) indicate this broadness: “hedonism, 
as a view of well-being, has thus been expressed in many forms and has varied 
from a relatively narrow focus on bodily pleasures to a broad focus on appetites 
and self-interests”. It is essential to understand that in hedonic approach ‘higher’ 
feelings such as altruism, love or sacrifice are assessed, because in general opinion 
hedonism is simplified to physical pleasures. This criticism started with Epicure 
and his system which was named “the philosophy of swine” (Weijers, 2011). 
The opponents did not understand that pleasures do not necessarily need to 
come from physical, ‘lowest’ activities. The same criticism fell on Bentham who 
writes that “prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts 
and sciences of music and poetry” (Bentham, 1825, p. 206). In his opinion, both 
activities are equally good if they give the same amount of utility. However, it 
does not mean that people cannot get more pleasure from reading Joyce’s Ulysses
than from watching a soap opera. What is important in hedonic approach are 
mental states (subjective well-being), but what gives us happiness is relative. 
The alternative variant of hedonic approach has been developed in the Aristotelian 
tradition and it is labeled as eudaimonic approach. In this approach, decision 
making is governed by the assessment of what constitutes a good life. Nowadays, 
eudaimonism and hedonism are the two major approaches in the field of happiness 
research in economics. In eudaimonic approach well-being is something more 
than only hedonic or subjective happiness. Ryan and Deci (2001, p. 145) point 
11 One of the main supporter of hedonic approach is Kahneman who wrote the article which has 
a symptomatic title: Back to Bentham? Explorations of experienced utility (Kahneman, Wakker, 
& Sarin, 1997).
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out that “despite the currency of the hedonic view, many philosophers, religious 
masters, and visionaries, from both the East and West, have denigrated happiness 
per se as a principal criterion of well-being”. In eudaimonic approach well-being 
is understood as the realization of human potential which is perceived as one’s 
daimon – true nature. Eudaimonia cannot be identified with pleasure. Bruni points 
out that “neo-Aristotelian philosophers in the Anglo-Saxon world preferred to 
translate eudaimonia as ‘human flourishing’ rather than happiness, because in 
common language today happiness also indicates momentary euphoria, carefree 
content, a pleasurable sensation or tout court pleasure” (Bruni, 2008, p. 124). 
Philosopher Martha Nussbaum defines eudaimonia as general state, not as the 
output of some activities: “Happiness is something like flourishing human living, 
a kind of living that is active, inclusive of all that has intrinsic value, and complete, 
meaning lacking in nothing that would make it richer or better” (Nussbaum, 
2005, p. 171). Therefore, in objective well-being approaches (human flourishing, 
eudaimonia) happiness is only a part of well-being. It is still a significant part, but 
happiness is not the only goal which is worth achieving. 
Sometimes, even, pursuing happiness can be a bad idea. Eudaimonia cannot be 
achieved only through instrumental means. It is the indirect result of actions 
that are carried out because of their intrinsic value. If we treat happiness as 
something that can be achieved, then the result can be opposite to our intentions. 
This phenomenon is called ‘paradox of happiness’ and J.S. Mill was one of the 
thinkers who described it. He writes in his autobiography: 
But I now thought that this end [one’s happiness] was only to be attained 
by not making it the direct end. Those only are happy (I thought) who have 
their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness [...]. Aiming 
thus at something else, they find happiness along the way [...]. Ask yourself 
whether you are happy, and you cease to be so. (Mill, 1909, p. 94)
An illustration of this paradox was offered by Schooler, who studied the 
“costs of trying to have a good time” on New Year’s Eve (Schooler, Ariely, 
& Loewenstein, 2003, p. 59). Before this big event researchers sent an e-mail 
which contained a questionnaire to 475 people. The questions referred to things 
such as how large celebration they were planning, how much they expected 
to enjoy it, and how much money and time they were expecting to spend on 
it. After the event, people were asked the same questions with regard to their 
actual experiences. The researchers found that those people who expected 
a great party were more likely to be disappointed than those who expected 
only a small celebration or none at all. The difference between expected and 
experienced enjoyment was negatively correlated with people’s anticipation 
and with the time they expected to spend on preparations. It means that people 
who really want and try to have a good time ended more unhappy than people 
who did not try so much. 
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In objective well-being approaches happiness is not everything that matters. 
There are two reasons why the advocates of well-being approaches are not 
fully convinced to hedonic approach. Firstly, they claim that an individuals’ 
preferences are too malleable. Social environment strongly influences 
individuals’ preferences and this made them unreliable as the indicator of well-
-being. Secondly, the concept of well-being contains many aspects and 
preferences do not provide satisfactory information to assess some of these 
aspects (e.g., freedom, autonomy) (Sugden, 2008a).
The most important psychological mechanism that makes an individual’s 
preferences malleable is a process called ‘hedonic adaptation’ or ‘hedonic 
treadmill.’ The seminal paper which described this phenomenon was published 
by Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978). The researchers interviewed 
people who had won the lottery over the last year (average $ 479,545) and 
the control group. The researchers had not found any difference in reported 
happiness between the winners and non-winners. A more striking example 
of hedonic adaptation is that people who won big lotteries after a year were 
at similar level of happiness as people who had an accident and had to use 
a wheelchair till the end of their lives (Brickman et al., 1978). Hedonic adaptation 
demonstrates that people adjust to a new situation. At the beginning a new 
situation influences people’s subjective well-being (winning a lottery – happy; 
being on a wheelchair – unhappy) but with time people adapt to a situation and 
they return to the previous level of happiness. One of the reasons for hedonic 
adaptation is that it can protect people from situations which diametrically 
diminish their well-being (e.g., death of loved ones, accident). It would be tough 
for people to function well in despair and this is why with time we feel better. 
Hedonic adaptation is expressed in one of the most known proverbs “time is 
a great healer.” The phenomenon of hedonic adaptation (Brickman et al., 1978) 
immediately gained popularity and acceptance and has even been called the 
first principle of happiness research (Myers, 1992). Although hedonic adaptation 
greatly influences people’s behaviour, it does not mean that people can adjust 
to everything. The psychological studies on hedonic adaptation have also 
shown that some things are more prone to habituation than others (Frederick, 
& Loewenstein, 1999, p. 311). People do not get used to the persistent stress of 
commuting, pollution, noise, or loneliness. 
Directly connected with hedonic adaptation is ‘set-point theory.’ In this theory, 
the major life events like the birth of a child, the death of a spouse or a debilitating 
disease affect people’s happiness only temporarily. After some time, however, 
a person’s happiness level returns to a default level which is determined by 
personality and genetic traits. This theory explains why some people who had 
a hard life are happy and peaceful when people who have achieved everything 
both in their careers and family lives are unhappy and dissatisfied. 
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Hedonic adaptation is interchangeably called ‘hedonic treadmill.’ Here, the 
focus goes to a situation which improves people’s life. It is called hedonic 
treadmill, because it is impossible for people to be satisfied with what they 
have, because they will always want more. For example, if one buys a new car 
for a few weeks one will be very happy but after a few months this car will 
not be a new exciting car but a regular, boring one. If one gets a promotion at 
work at first, one will feel very happy but after a few months a new position 
will be something normal. This mechanism is very powerful, because people 
easily adjusted to a new, better situation and treat it as something normal. This 
situation is connected with aspiration level theory where a person’s happiness is 
based not only on one’s attainment but also on one’s aspiration level. Therefore, 
if one gets a promotion, for a while one is happy, but after some time one seeks 
for a next better position, and one’s current situation in comparison does not 
look so good. This is why people with higher aspiration are associated with 
lower happiness (Frey, & Stutzer, 2002b; Stutzer, 2004). Thus, the paradox of 
“happy peasants and frustrated achievers” which was introduced by Graham 
(2009, p. 19). One’s aspirations came mainly from comparisons with others. 
Marx famously writes about the relativity of comparisons: 
A house may be large or small; as long as the neighboring houses are likewise 
small, it satisfies all social requirement for a residence. But let there arise next to 
the little house a palace, and the little house shrinks to a hut. (Marx, 2006, p. 33)
The influence of comparisons is so significant that they can even make people 
irrational. The well-known example of this mechanism is the case of Olympic 
winners. When psychologists were watching the Olympic winners’ photos, one 
thing immediately draws the eye. Silver medallists were often visibly less happy 
than contestants who won the bronze medal. The research carried on by Medvec 
found that people who won the Olympic bronze medals reported being happier 
than silver medallists (Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995). The reason for this is 
‘aspiration theory.’ Silver medallists imagine themselves as the winners of the 
gold medal, and they feel disappointed, because they could be the best in the 
world. On the other hand, bronze medallists were very happy, because they 
imagined themselves in the 4th place which is the worst place for the Olympic 
contestants (so close to medal). From this perspective, the third place looks 
really attractive. 
The next problem with preferences and their malleability is connected with the 
‘experience-stretching hypothesis.’ This hypothesis can answer to the problem 
which was presented earlier in the context of the relativity of subjective well-
-being. The question was if we can tell that Mark who declared to feel eight on 
the 10 points scale is happier than Tom who declared seven. The experience-
-stretching hypothesis convinces us how important is the context within which 
people make their decisions. For example, a scuba diver who experienced Great 
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Barrier Reef would say about the excited beginner who has immersed in the 
lake for the first, that “he is excited because he does not know what is really 
beautiful.” It is the case, because their experiences are different. A beginner is 
excited, because for him a submersion in the lake is 10/10. For the experienced 
scuba diver, Great Barrier Reef was 10/10, and he does not find anything exciting 
in short immersion in a lake (1/10) (Michoń, 2010, pp. 77, 78). This means that 
it is very problematic to compare their level of subjective well-being, because 
the scale which is used depends on personal experience. Gilbert writes that 
it is impossible to decide which scale of subjective well-being is better (being 
a happy beginner or more experienced): 
So which hypothesis is correct? We can’t say. What we can say is that all claims 
of happiness are claims from someone’s point of view-from the perspective of 
a single human being whose unique collection of past experiences serves as 
a context, a lens, a background for her evaluation of her current experience. As 
much as the scientist might wish for it, there isn’t a view from nowhere. Once 
we have an experience, we are thereafter unable to see the world as we did 
before. Our innocence is lost and we cannot go home again. (Gilbert, 2007, p. 57)
These mechanisms (hedonic adaptation/treadmill, set point theory, aspiration 
theory, experience stretching) demonstrate that preferences and subjective 
well-being are malleable and that they are not good indicators of well-being. 
These mechanisms also explain ‘Easterlin paradox.’ People from very poor 
countries have a similar level of subjective well-being to people from highly 
developed countries. The main reason for this situation is that people from 
wealthy countries are not so much satisfied with their lives because of hedonic 
adaptation and higher aspirations, whereas people from poor countries do not 
know how much better their life could be (experience stretching).
Sen has been dealing with the underdeveloped countries for most of his scientific 
career. He used the example of people who are poor and deprived of freedom, 
but they consider themselves happy. He wrote: 
Consider a very deprived person who is poor, exploited, overworked and 
ill, but who has been made satisfied with his lot by social conditioning (t[h]
rough, say, religion, political propaganda, or cultural pressure). Can we 
possibly believe that he is doing well just because is happy and satisfied? Can 
the living standard of a person be high if the life that he or she leads is full of 
deprivation? The standard of life cannot be so detached from the nature of the 
life the person leads. (Sen, 1985b, p. 12)
By this example, Sen wants to point out that self-reported happiness is not 
sufficient to be the only indicator of well-being and it must be based on a more 
objective basis. Sen originated such a movement which is called the ‘capability 
approach,’ but this topic will be scrutinized in Chapter 4. Let us get back to 
the example with deprived people. The above-mentioned illustration is not 
as extreme as it looks. For example, many women from the Arabic countries 
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considered themselves as happy even though they cannot vote, drive a car, 
go outside the house without a male member of the family and they must be 
absolutely obedient to the husband (see (Nussbaum, 2000)). Of course, a cultural 
or religion pressure can be considered as a specific case. However, the point 
made by Sen is much broader. He uses the hedonic adaptation to explain why 
some people adjust to awful lives and why they perceived themselves as happy 
or at least not unhappy people. As Sen (1985a, pp. 14, 15) puts it: 
A person who is ill-fed, undernourished, unsheltered and ill can still be high 
up in the scale of happiness or desire-fulfilment if he or she has learned to 
have ‘realistic’ desires and to take pleasure in small mercies. The destitute 
thrown into beggary, the vulnerable landless labourer precariously surviving 
at the edge of subsistence, the overworked domestic servant working round 
the clock, the subdued and subjugated housewife reconciled to her role 
and fate, all tend to come to terms with their respective predicaments. The 
deprivations are suppressed and muffled in the scale of utilities (reflected by 
desire-fulfilment and happiness) by the necessity of endurance in uneventful 
survival.
Sen uses hedonic adaptation to criticize both subjective well-being (economics of 
happiness) and desire-fulfilment theory (neoclassical economics). For him being 
happy or being able to satisfy one’s preferences does not mean that these people 
lead a good life. Happiness and preferences are too malleable, because people 
can adjust even to the dire life condition. However, if one wants to state that 
the lives of people in the above-mentioned examples are not good, one needs to 
have some goals and values which are independent from subjective well-being 
and revealed preferences. The attempt to find these goals will be presented in 
Chapter 6. 
We have just established that preferences are malleable but it is not the end of the 
problems. The proponents of objective well-being argue that well-being contains 
many aspects which cannot be adequately assessed by preferences or happiness 
(Bruni et al., 2008). The most critical aspect is freedom, because often it stands 
in opposition to happiness and people need to decide which of them they want 
to have. Of course, everyone wants to be happy. However, people also perceive 
liberty as an intrinsic value (deontological perspective). This fact is demonstrated 
in the Declaration of Independence where it is stated that “we hold these Truths 
to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and 
the Pursuit of Happiness” (The Declaration of Independence, 1776).
Now, let us move into a few examples which demonstrate the dichotomy between 
happiness and freedom. This dichotomy is the reason for the differences between 
hedonic and capability approach. The example created by Griffin (1986, 8 ff.), 
which was later expanded by Barrotta (2008, pp. 8, 9), is presented to highlight 
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that the conception of happiness in hedonic approach is too narrow and it does 
not contain different matters that people have reason to value. The example is 
about Freud who was very sick at the end of his life. He refused to take any drugs, 
because he wanted to think clearly even though it meant to live in very painful 
conditions. In hedonic approach, thinking freely is nothing more than a possible 
source of happiness. However, it seems plausible to presume that neuroscientists 
would figure out that not taking drugs causes a decrease in Freud’s happiness. 
The significant question that should be answered here is: if Freud made a wrong 
choice to refuse to take the drugs since his decision lowers his level of happiness? 
Barrotta (2008, p. 151) emphasizes that this problem is not empirical: 
I really do not know what neuroscientists would say about my example, 
though I find it plausible that they would measure a decrease in pleasurable 
feelings. I am only assuming that it is conceptually possible that a subject 
deliberately makes a decision that reduces his or her hedonic payoff, as 
measured by neuroscience. 
However, this conceptual possibility is the puzzle for hedonism. If people had 
knowledge, they should choose to be happier than less happy. Therefore, if we 
know that the decision of Freud diminishes his happiness, then we are forced to 
conclude that Freud made the wrong choice. However, Freud to show that he is 
not wrong could reply: 
You should not consider only the level of my pleasurable feelings, but also 
my concern for such feelings. Namely, you should also consider how much 
I value them and how important they are in my life. As a matter of fact, I did 
not make the wrong choice. Rather you employ too narrow a definition of 
happiness. (Barrotta, 2008, p. 152)
Barrotta argues that Freud is right. Thinking freely is not solely a source 
of happiness. If it were, then we would be able to compare its consequences with 
the consequences of the decision to take drugs. Thinking clearly is something 
independent of happiness and it has value per se which can be the goal as 
important as happiness. In this way, consequences (happiness) are not the only 
important factor in the process of choice. Individuals have freedom to make their 
own evaluations about their feelings of their mental states. It means that they 
can decide what a happy life is. If one wants to make sense of Freud’s answer, 
one needs to include ‘thinking freely’ in Freud’s idea of a happy life. Therefore, 
as Barrotta (2008, p. 152) points out “happiness is an intrinsically pluralistic 
concept”. There is no single objective idea of utility or happiness which can be 
assessed by scientists. People have the freedom to choose things that they value 
even if these things do not give people the most ‘objective’ happiness. The ability 
to assess one’s mental states and not being a slave of hedonic conception 
of happiness is one of the most critical issues in the capabilitity approach which 
will be analyzed in Chapter 6. 
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The next example which shows that people can choose some other things than 
pleasure was presented by Nozick (1974, pp. 42–45). He created a thought 
experiment which is known as ‘The Experience Machine’ where the person’s 
brain is connected to some machine. As a result, the subjects of simulation fall 
asleep and they have a virtual and extremely pleasant experience. Moreover, 
the subjects of the simulation would think that these pleasant experiences are 
a reality. Many people do not want this kind of life even if it would be delightful.12
The rejection of an extremely pleasant life is an argument against hedonism, 
because it demonstrates that people value other things more than pleasure. 
The reluctance to use only utilitarian measurement justifies the acknowledgment 
of a possibility that there are other values than pleasantness or unpleasantness. 
The next example also indicates that happiness is not the only important thing 
in life. We can go back to the criticism of utilitarianism to see that living in fool’s 
paradise is not the best option. One of the arguments against Bentham and his 
idea of happiness was that the very happy oyster which lives a very long time 
could have a better life than an average human. J.S. Mill answered this criticism 
towards utilitarianism (swine philosophy) when he wrote: 
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to 
be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are 
a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. 
(Mill, 1863, p. 14)
Mill argues that there are better (intellectual) and worse (connected with physical 
sensation) pleasures and if a person has experienced both pleasures, she will 
choose the better. In the next chapter, it will be argued that this argument is 
not a utilitarian one. Now, this example is used to demonstrate that people 
want some other things that simple pleasures, and that the fool’s paradise is not 
a good option if one knows the very nature of it. This is why Mill in some way 
forestalled Gilbert who wrote about experience stretching and where he argued 
that “once we have an experience, we are thereafter unable to see the world as 
we did before. Our innocence is lost and we cannot go home again” (Gilbert, 
2007, p. 57).
The dichotomy between happiness and freedom is a topic which is very 
interesting for social thinkers who wrote many books about the dystopias in 
which people are happy but for the price of freedom. Probably the most known 
book about this topic is New brave world written by Aldous Huxley (2006). People 
12 Recently, however, some researchers challenged Nozick’s assumption that most people 
choose reality not an artificial and blissful life. One of them is De Brigard who carried the 
empirical studies which show that “people’s intuitions about the experience machine in 
fact are highly divergent” (De Brigard, 2010, p. 55) and some people choose happy life over 
reality.
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in this book besotted themselves with happiness pills called ‘soma.’ These pills 
desensitize people to the pain of the existence (Weltschmerz) but transform people 
to the ‘happy pigs.’ The conclusion from this book is presented as a warning to 
artificial happiness which causes that people do not look like people anymore. 
The last problem with the hedonic approach concerns reality. A lot of researchers 
who investigate happiness believe that it is possible to measure happiness 
objectively (e.g., (Harris, 2011; Kahneman et al., 1999; Layard, 2003, 2005). This 
belief is not a problem itself, but its implications are. Many happiness researchers 
think that state, in various forms and to different degrees, should decide on behalf 
of people (for their own good). This approach comes as no surprise when one 
has in mind that in hedonic approach happiness is the ultimate goal. Therefore, 
subjective well-being is considered to be the only criterion of the progress of 
society and other values like freedom are only elements of well-being. In the 
case of Freud, the supporters of hedonic approach (Layard, 2003, 2005)13 would 
argue that if ‘thinking freely’ diminish happiness, it is irrational for Freud to 
choose this option. If happiness is an objective goal for everyone, then it is 
not so peculiar to propose the idea that the state should coerce Freud to take 
the drugs (for his own good). These conclusions are disturbing and they were 
acknowledged by the happiness approach supporters. Frey and Stutzer (2010, 
p. 567) argue that the state orientation on a happiness index reduces citizens to 
“metric stations” and people are not treated as autonomous, sovereign agents. 
In Chapter 7, however, the author will check if it is possible to have both 
happiness and freedom on the example of libertarian paternalism.
3.6. Conclusions 
In this chapter, the most significant insights from economics of happiness were 
analysed to check whether the axiomatic assumption of value-free economics 
(people do what is the best for them) reflects reality and serve people in the 
context of happiness. The conclusion is that this assumption is not correct and 
people frequently do not make the best choices (Bruni et al., 2008; Bruni, & Porta, 
2005, 2007; Frey, 2010, 2018; Frey, & Stutzer, 2002b; Kahneman, et. al., 1999). It is 
the result of many cognitive biases that people have which were indicated by 
behavioural economics (Frank, 1988; Kahneman, 2003a, 2003b, 2011; Kahneman, 
& Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1980, 2000, 2015; Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein, 
& Elster, 1992; Loewenstein et al., 2003; O’Donoghue, & Rabin, 1999, 2001; Rabin, 
1998; Simon, 1957). Both economics of happiness and behavioural economics 
indicate the importance of the environment within which individuals make 
13 Layard (2005, p. 113) writes that “we naturally look for one ultimate goal that enables us 
to judge other goals by how they contribute to it. Happiness is that ultimate goal, because, 
unlike all other goals, it is self-evidently good.”
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their choices. Thanks to that, we learn that one of the essential assumptions of 
revealed preference theory – consistency – cannot be fulfilled and that people 
always choose from some “menu dependence” (Sen, 1997, p. 752). 
Economics of happiness, even for being able to indicate that people fail to 
maximize their utility/happiness, needs some measurement of happiness that 
is not axiomatic and where it is not assumed that what people do is the best 
for them. The primary measurement that economics of happiness uses is SWB 
(subjective well-being). It is a method of measurement which is independent of 
the revealed preference theory which means that maximization of happiness is 
not identified with revealed choices as it takes place in value-free economics. 
However, subjective well-being measure has its own problems which in some 
way resemble the obstacles that were encountered by value-free economics 
many years ago. The most significant complication is the relativity of happiness 
and utility. Relativity is an inherent feature of SWB (Alexandrova, 2005; Angner, 
2010). On the one hand, it can be perceived as an advantage, because who be better 
to judge how people feel than people themselves. On the other hand, people are 
not experts in predicting what will give them happiness and frequently they do 
not choose what is best for them.14
Due to its relativity, SWB measures face very similar problems as value-free 
economics. Happiness in hedonistic approaches is also the ‘black box’ that 
contains all categories such as happiness, freedom, love, justice, etc. Therefore, 
economics of happiness does not distinguish other values from happiness. 
The next problem that concerns relativity in hedonistic approaches is the 
psychological fact that people’s preferences are malleable. Thus, people can 
adjust even to horrible conditions (Sen, 1985a, pp. 14, 15). 
Because of these problems, it is necessary to examine the approaches that indicate 
objective goals/values and are focused on human flourishing. Objectivity here 
does not mean objectivity in the sense of the absolute Truth but it is rather an 
indication of goals which are independent of individuals’ subjective perception 
of happiness and from individuals’ choices (revealed preferences). The euda-
imonic approach was presented shortly to point out the main differences 
between objective approaches and hedonistic approaches. In Chapter 6, one of 
the objective approaches (capability approach) is analysed in depth to decide 
whether this conception can resolve the problems of hedonistic approaches 
(1 – malleability of preferences, 2 – other values than happiness). 
It should be noticed that objective approaches towards happiness as well as 
value-free economics in the 1930s tried to react to the relativity of both happiness 
14 Sometimes people know that they do not choose the best option, but do this nonetheless. 
To explain this paradox, the phenomenon of weakness of will is analysed in the next chapter. 
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and utility. Value-free economists abandoned cardinal utility and created the 
axiomatic approach in which everything is logically consistent. The proponents 
of objective approaches reacted differently. They have been trying to find 
objective goals independent of people’s choice.
To sum up. Despite criticism, economics of happiness (hedonic approach) is 
a step in the right direction for economics in terms of explanatory and predictive 
power. It gives answers to the questions that value-free economists were not even 
willing to ask. Economists need to analyse happiness, measure it and investigate 
which things give people happiness. From this perspective revealed preference 
theory has limited cognitive value. It is in particular in the case of bounded 
rationality which demonstrates that people do not make the best decisions. 
However, subjective well-being approach has some problems which can only 
be resolved by the introduction of goals and values independent of happiness/
utility and revealed preferences. This is crucial if one looks at the choices over 
time and the conception of multiple self. In the next chapter, the author will 
check whether it is possible to compare utility over time. If the answer is no, 
then we will need to choose normatively between different selves (“short-time 
human” and “long-time human” (Ostapiuk, 2019b)). In order to choose between 
selves, one needs to know which self is superior and for this purpose we need 
to justify the existence of values which are independent of revealed preferences. 
Some normative approaches are examined to check what people should do to 
achieve both happiness and freedom (multiple self, capability approach, and 
libertarian paternalism).
Chapter 4
The conception of multiple self.
Reason versus emotions
The only way in which the economist can keep his studies from duplicating the psychologist’s work
is by taking his psychology from those who have specialized in that field. [...] 
The economist may attempt to ignore psychology, but it is a sheer impossibility
 for him to ignore human nature, for his science is a science of human behavior 
(Clark, 1918, p. 4)
4.1. Introduction
This chapter has a number of goals. The first of them is to demonstrate that 
neoclassical/value-free economics has a simplified image of the individual. 
The philosophical discussion on personal identity is presented to indiacte this. 
After this discussion it will be possible to introduce and argue for the conception 
of multiple self. The main focus is on choices over time which cannot be compared 
by utility measurements. Because of hyperbolic discounting, we need to decide 
which self should be in control. Ind the end, the phenomenon of weakness of 
will is analysed to see if we can decide between selves. 
4.2. Personal identity and economics 
Before going to the philosophical discussion on personal identity, it is vital 
to analyse how economics perceive the topic of personal identity. In general, 
it is assumed that neoclassical economics deals with individual agents. Many 
economists think that they do not even need to discuss personal identity, 
because the axioms of neoclassical economics guarantee the existence of 
individuals (Davis, 1995). Two main features make it possible. Firstly, 
neoclassical economics is based on methodological individualism, which 
means that the whole analysis starts with individual agents. Secondly, 
neoclassical economists assume that people do not change but circumstances. 
The static character of the analysis enables economists to easily re-identify 
individuals over time. It is possible, because a static analysis investigates how 
people make choices in response to changes in incomes and prices (Davis, 
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1995). Moreover, economic agents are represented in terms of their preferences. 
This assumption seems to support the claim that economists’ theory does not 
need to be involved in a discussion on personal identity, because preferences 
always belong to a given individual. Having a preference always presupposes 
some individual who does the preferring in question (Martin, 1987). This 
perspective was used by Becker when he claimed that preferences are stable 
and unchanging. For Davis, this assumption is the basis for individual identity 
in neoclassical theory, because it differentiates people from each other and 
makes them consistent over time (Davis, 1995). 
It goes without saying that individuals’ preferences cannot be willy-nilly. As 
it was indicated in the first chapter, they must be transitive and complete to be 
called rational. Thanks to these assumptions, it is possible to construct a complete, 
transitive, and continuous revealed-preference ordering from choices. The 
consistency of choice means that a rational agent (individual) will never make 
choices that undermine her own self-interest. In this way, economists can define 
self in terms of its own interests which can be represented by a utility function 
which is derived from well-formed preferences (Davis, 1995).
Of course, there is a lot of problems with rational choice theory, and we know 
that it is often the case that the assumptions of transitivity and completeness 
are violated. Behavioural economics is probably best known for indicating 
problems with these assumptions. Some of them were presented in Chapter 1 
(menu-dependence, money pump, prospect theory). Therefore, in this chapter, 
the focus is on the economic assumptions about self. Mostly, on the very 
assumption that an economic agent has one self which is stable over time. 
To answer the question whether we can isolate self which is the same over 
time, we need to look at one of the most important debates in philosophy. 
The discussion on personal identity. Of course, the debate is extremely 
sophisticated and because of the book’s scope and size limits, only some 
central concepts of this discussion are analysed. 
To begin with, it is important to understand that there is no single problem 
of personal identity but a wide range of question connected with this issue 
(Olson, 2017). 
Who am I? In general, personal identity refers to particular properties to which 
a person feels ownership or attachment. In this sense personal identity consists 
of those features that somebody takes to define her/him as a person.
Personhood. Answer the question what is it to be a person? What is necessary, 
and what suffices, for somebody to count as a person, as opposed to a nonperson? 
Persistence. What does it take for a person to persist from one time to another to 
continue existence than cease to exist? 
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The main problem in the context of this chapter is personal identity over time.1 It is 
especially important, because in neoclassical economics it is assumed that people 
have one self which is consistent over time. Thanks to this assumption, people 
can assess and compare their present and future preferences (the discounted 
utility model (Samuelson, 1937)). When we talk about personal identity over 
time it is necessary to address one common confusion. The persistence is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for personal identity over time. So, 
sometimes because of the accident, Alzheimer disease, or a dramatic change in 
character we would be no longer the same person we were before. However, we 
would still exist (persist). Personal identity answers question like ‘What makes 
it true that a person at one time is the same thing as a person at another time?’ 
Personal identity is the unique numerical identity of a person in the course of 
time, viz., the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a person at one 
time and a person at another time can be said to be the same person, persisting 
through time (Korfmacher, 2018). The most illustrative example of the question 
about personal identity over time is the situation when one points to a child in 
an old class photograph and say ‘that’s me’. To claim that we need to answer 
numerous questions such as: 
What makes you that one, rather than one of the others? What is it about 
the way she relates then to you as you are now that makes her you? For that 
matter, what makes it the case that anyone at all who existed back then is you? 
(Olson, 2017)
The simplest theory that explains personal persistence over time is continuous 
bodily existence. It assumes that the person is the same if it has the same physical 
body. However, the thought experiment known as the ‘ship of Theseus’ shows 
the problems in determining whether one physical body at one time is the same 
thing as a physical body at another time. Theseus took a long journey and with 
time parts of the ship worn out and they had been replaced. The question is 
how many parts of the ship must be replaced to conclude that the ship is no 
longer the ‘Theseus ship.’ It is a paradox, because one cannot point the exact 
moment in which it happens. Some can argue that even if all the parts of the 
original ship were replaced, it would still be a Theseus ship. Hobbes (1655, 
ch. 11.7) introduces the problem with this kind of reasoning. Imagine that 
someone gathers up all the original worn out parts of Theseus ship, restores 
them and builds the exact ship like the Theseus ship. Hobbes asked which ship, 
if either, would be the original ship of Theseus. 
As has been pointed out, the concept of bodily continuity is very problematic in 
the case of material things. It is even worse when it comes to people. Over time 
1 It is a highly debated topic in philosophy, for more see (Kolak, & Martin, 1991; Noonan, 2004; 
Olson, 2017). Classic anthologies include Perry (1975), Rorty (1976), and Martin and Barresi 
(2003).
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our bodies age and grow, gaining and losing matter. Each touch destroys part of 
our skin. In seven years all our cells are replaced by the new ones. Moreover, we 
can change our hairstyle, grow a beard or go to the gym to build some muscles. 
Some can argue, as in the case of Theseus ship, that we are still the same person, 
because we have the characteristic body features which sustain some continuity 
(you do not have a new body after one day in the gym). However, it is very 
problematic to base the persistence of personal identity on bodily features, 
because they are vague. As in the case of Theseus ship, we cannot exactly 
indicate a point where the SHIP is no longer the Theseus ship. This problem 
is called ‘continuum fallacy’ and is connected with ‘Sorites paradox.’ Imagine 
a bold man. If he had one piece of hair he would still be bald, the same goes for 
a second and third piece of hair. If he had 1000 hairs, he would be no longer 
bold. However, the problem is that we do not know the exact point in which 
he ceased to be bold (999 hairs means he is bold?). Because of these problems, 
it seems very problematic to ground the persistence of personal identity over 
time in the continuous existence of our bodies.
The second view on personal identity, which was very popular, is mental 
substance. This view is associated with Plato, Descartes, and also with many 
religious beliefs. In this approach, persons are immaterial souls. Thanks to 
this concept, people can survive their bodily death. Secondly, because our 
souls are immaterial and independent of the body, personal identity over time 
can be grounded on the persistence of non-physical substance, in spite of the 
continuous change of the body. Although this view is prevalent among religious 
people, it is strongly criticized by many philosophers of mind. In general, the 
mind-body distinction which was created by Descartes is perceived to be wrong 
and counterproductive (Dennett, 1969, 1991). The main objection towards mind-
-body theory is that it cannot explain how a non-material mind can influence 
the material body and vice versa. So, how the nonmaterial desire for food can 
cause a person to move and act to obtain this food? The biggest problem with 
an immortal soul is not lack of the connection between mind and body, but 
its undetectability. Even if we assume that immortal soul exists, we will have 
a problem to say anything about it. Therefore, we do not have any possibility 
to know, e.g., whether God destroys and replaces our souls every five minutes. 
Because of the undetectability of immortal soul, any discussion about personal 
identity is impossible.
The third main conception of personal identity was presented by John Locke 
and it is the most intuitive one. Locke (1689) considers personal identity (self) to 
be founded on consciousness (memory). We are the same person to the extent 
that we are conscious of the past and future thoughts and actions in the same 
way as we are conscious of present thoughts and actions. If consciousness is 
this ‘thought’ which “goes along with the substance [...] which makes the same 
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person,” then personal identity is founded on the repeated act of consciousness: 
“This may show us wherein personal identity consists: not in the identity of 
substance, but [...] in the identity of consciousness” (Locke, 1689, pp. 242, 243). 
Locke criticizes both mental and bodily concepts of personal identity. In the 
first case, somebody can say to be the reincarnation of Plato (having the same 
soul). However, for Locke one would be the same person as Plato exclusively 
if one had the same consciousness of Plato’s thoughts and actions. Locke was 
against bodily criterion of personal identity, because the body can change, but 
the person remains the same. Locke’s conception based on consciousness is also 
called psychological continuity and it is very intuitive for people. In the case 
of personal identity, philosophers very often use thought experiments to see 
what people think. Locke was not an exception and he proposed one of the first 
mind swamps thought experiment (Locke, 1689, p. 241). Imagine that the mind 
of the Prince enters the body of the sleeping Cobbler (whose own mind departs). 
The individual who later wakes up has the same body as the Cobbler but is 
a different Person (the Prince). In general, people think that if their brain had 
been transplanted into a new body, they would have got a new body rather than 
somebody else would have got a new brain. The intuition is that psychological 
continuity is the criterion for personal identity. Most people in Western countries 
feel drawn to psychological-continuity views (Nichols and Bruno (2010) give 
experimental evidence for this). Moreover, many philosophers are the supporters 
of psychological-continuity approaches (Garrett, 1998; Hudson, 2001; Johnston, 
1987; Lewis, 1976; Nagel, 1986; Noonan, 2004; Nozick, 1981; Parfit, 1971, 1984; 
Perry, 1972; Shoemaker, 1970, 1984, 1997, 1999; Unger, 1990, 2000).
Although memory criterion is popular and intuitive, it is widely criticized. The 
first problem is connected with discontinuities in consciousness. Thomas Reid 
(b. 1710, d. 1796) presented the example of the Old General who remembers 
nothing of his boyhood (Reid, 1850, p. 235, 236). For Locke, this old general is not 
the same person as the boy. It does not make sense, because we know that they 
are the same person. For Locke, the old general is not the same as the boy since 
there are no direct psychological connections between them. It is true that the 
young boy has a connection with the young officer and that officer is connected 
with the old general. However, the old general has no memory of being a young 
child. Because this conclusion violates the transitivity of identity (young boy 
≠ old general), personal identity relations cannot consist in direct memory 
connections. However, it is possible to resolve this problem. Instead of direct 
connection, we can refer to indirect chains of psychological connections. In this 
case, the old general is identical with the young boy, because the old general 
remembers being the officer and the officer remembers being the young boy. 
The next problem connected with discontinuities in consciousness is that we 
lack memory of periods of sleep or that we do not remember what we ate for 
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breakfast a few days ago. It would be insane if it did mean that we ceased to exist 
because of this. To solve this problem, one needs to appeal not only to memory 
but to psychological aspects as well. Therefore, we do not remember what we 
ate a few days ago at breakfast, but we remember what kind of person we were 
there.
The next considerable problem with Locke’s theory is that we cannot know if 
our memories are genuine rather than false.2 To assume that these memories 
are ours, we need to presuppose that there is a YOU. It was Butler who spotted 
that Locke made a “wonderful mistake,” because he failed to recognize that 
consciousness presupposes identity, and thus cannot constitute it (Butler, 1975, 
p. 100). I can remember only my own experiences, but it is not my memory 
of an experience that makes it mine; rather, I remember it only because it is 
already mine. Therefore, while memory can reveal my identity with some 
past experiences, it does not necessarily make that experiencer me. What I am 
remembering, argues Butler, are the experiences of a substance. The same 
substance that constitutes me now (Shoemaker, 2016). 
Probably the biggest problem with psychological continuity approaches is 
visible in the cases where we are presented with the possibility of two (or more) 
future persons that are psychologically continuous with a presently existing 
person. Can one really become two? The most famous example of this problem 
was investigated by Parfit on the example of teleportation (Parfit, 1984, pp. 178–
–190). In sci-fi movies functioning of ‘teletransporter’ is simple. The person copy 
is created atom by atom and then teleport to another place with ‘teletranspoter’ 
while the original person is destroyed. Some argue that teleportation is a way 
of transportation, whereas others argue that we die in the process. Parfit 
gives the example of teleportation from Earth to Mars. Imagine that you go to 
‘teletransporter,’ push the button and nothing happens. The service stuff tells 
you that some technical problem occurred. Yours exact copy is on Mars, but 
your Earth version has not been destroyed. However, you should not worry, 
because you on Earth will be destroyed in five minutes and your copy on Mars 
will exist. 
The example of transportation demonstrates that both bodily and psychological 
criteria are not enough for personal identity. For five minutes we have two same 
bodies with the same memories and personalities. You on Earth are the same 
person as you on Mars. However, it is impossible for you two to be the same 
person (have the same identity) because of the transitivity criterion which states 
that for two things to be identical they must have the same properties. In the 
case of transportation, this criterion is not fulfilled, because two copies are in 
2 It is not as hypothetical example. Often people remember some things that did not happen. 
This psychological phenomenon is called ‘false memory’ (Brainerd, & Reyna, 2005). 
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different places in space. This example shows that personal continuity is not 
a sufficient criterion for personal identity. Moreover, in the case of teleportation 
there is no right or wrong answer to the question whether somebody has ceased 
to exist. Which of these two copies is me? Me on Earth or me on Mars? If my 
copy on Earth dies, will I exist as the same person on Mars? 
Psychological continuity is not sufficient for the criterion of personal identity, 
because one can at least imagine the situation in which two or more people have 
the same psychological features and memories. Despite this fact, Parfit thinks 
that the existence of a person consists in nothing over and above the existence 
of a brain and body and the occurrence of the interrelated series of mental and 
physical events. However, persons themselves are distinct from their bodies 
and psychologies. To understand this seemingly inconsistency we can use the 
analogy. Cellini’s Venus is made of bronze. Although the lump of bronze and the 
statue itself exist, these objects have different persistence conditions. If melted 
down, Venus ceases to exist, while the lump of bronze does not. On the other 
hand, a lump of bronze alone is not Venus. Therefore, they are not identical. 
The lump of bronze constitutes the statue. The same is true of persons, who are 
constituted by, but not identical with body and brain (Korfmacher, 2018).
What Parfit takes from the teleportation paradox is that we should dismiss 
the concept of personal identity altogether. For Parfit personal identity is all 
or nothing approach in which there is no place for the intermediate cases like 
teleportation in which the concept of personal identity does not work (the 
problem of transitivity). In conclusion, what matters is the survival of the person, 
which is connected with psychological continuity and not absolute persistence of 
personal identity. Therefore, in the end, Parfit dismisses the traditional concept 
of self and he argues for the conception of survival, which is connected with 
psychological continuity in which different degrees of personhood are possible. 
The fourth main conception of personal identity is the illusion of self. Hume was 
the influential supporter of this approach.3 He attacks the idea that there is some 
spiritual substance which each person can detect in oneself. Hume argues that 
he was unable to detect this substance in himself. Because there is no spiritual 
substance, Hume concludes that “man is a bundle or collection of different 
perceptions which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are 
in perpetual flux and movement” (Hume, 1896, p. 174), where perception is 
a way of designating items of consciousness (Davis, 1995, p. 43). Hume thinks 
that we do not have self, because we change all the time. Every experience 
makes us different. Despite the constant changes in themselves, people think 
3 It is necessary to notice that more than 2000 years before Hume, Buddhism indicated the 
same thing. Budda argues that self is an illusion, because we are built on many different and 
constantly changing elements (see (Siderits, 2019)). 
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that they are the same person they were three years ago. People understand that 
their features change, but they think that they change without changing the self. 
For Hume, however, there is no distinction between the different features of 
a person and the self. If features change, the self changes as well. This is why he 
argues that people do not have a distinct and unique self.
Hume understood that people mistakenly assumed that they “possessed of an 
invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our lives” 
(Hume, 1896, p. 174). One of his goals was to explain this mistake. For him 
people misunderstand personal identity, because they confuse two ideas that 
must be treated separately. One is an object that endures change and the second 
is a succession of closely related objects. Hume argues that people are mentally 
lazy and they conflate the latter idea with the former. They perceive a collection 
of closely related objects as one thing. This generates a habit of thinking where 
people overlook small differences and gradual changes in things. Thus, people 
see a connection between themselves now and three years ago, because they do 
not see thousands of various small changes, but one pattern of change. 
Hume accused the other philosophers of starting speculation about personal 
identity. He argued that they knew that people mistakenly perceived themselves 
as one self, but instead of destroying this illusion they invented a metaphysical 
ground for self (Davis, 1995). Hume’s criticism of self, however, has problems 
of its own. He argues that he could not detect the spiritual substance in himself, 
and because of that we are only bundles of perception. However, one can ask, 
how did Hume know that he was looking into himself and not that he was 
looking into the minds of others when surveying his perceptions? Hume’s 
approach seems to presuppose that one possesses some means of distinguishing 
oneself for another person. Moreover, to see that the different processes and 
states of mind are unfitted, there has to be something which perceives their unity 
(a perceiver). The existence of this would be no less mysterious than a personal 
identity (Davis, 1995).
Nowadays, many neuroscientists follow the steps of Hume and Buddha and 
argue that self is an illusion (e.g., (Harris 2012; Wegner, 2002)). Much of the 
research is devoted to non-consciousness. For example, Wilson (2002, p. 24) 
observed that the brain of an individual receives through the five senses more 
than 11,000,000 pieces of information every second, whereas it is capable of 
processing consciously about 40 pieces of information. What happens to the 
other 10,999,960 is the most crucial question here. This research poses a threat 
to our perception of humans who are governed by rational consciousness. 
Over the years it was the feature that has differentiated people from animals 
with their visceral motives. Nowadays, both psychology and neuroscience 
demonstrate that also for humans ‘most of moment-to-moment psychological 
life must occur through nonconscious means’ (Bargh, & Chartrand, 1999, p. 462). 
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Bargh and Chartrand (1999, p. 462) identify “an automatic effect of perception 
on action, automatic goal pursuit, and a continual automatic evaluation of 
one’s experience”. Although people are characterized by consciousness and 
rationality, they acquire information, choose, and evaluate it in non-conscious 
ways (Zajonc, 1980, 2000).
In the end, it is necessary to underline shortly how huge influence society has 
on constituting individual selves. In value-free economics, society does not play 
a significant role. People have their own preferences and even if they take other 
people into consideration they do it only because it impacts their own utility. 
Baumeister (1998) goes deeper into the analysis of the individual by considering 
three roots of selfhood: the agentic self, the reflexive self, and the social self. 
Especially the last one is important. Nowadays, in the individualistic culture, 
we tend to forget how vital society was for people. The philosopher Boethius 
(b. 480, d. 524) was the first to trace the genealogy of the concept of the person. 
The word persona was originally used in Latin to designate the mask worn by 
actors in the theatre. Moreover, Romans used the term ‘person’ for every person 
who they recognized from her or his face (Ballet, Bazin, Dubois, & Mahieu, 2013, 
p. 44). Over the last years, Sen was the economist who argued that what people 
do may depend on their social identity which is constituted by their membership 
in different social groups. Sen (1990, pp. 125, 126) points to data suggesting that 
Indian women perceive themselves more as members of their families rather than 
as individual selves and it has an influence on their choices.4 People may also 
identify with the firm where they work, different associations and clubs, nation, 
caste, religion, and so forth. We tend to forget that the concept of individualism 
is something relatively new in our history and even now it is highly praised 
mainly in the Western World. Goffman (1959) presents comprehensively that 
the birth of individualism started with a Renaissance in the 14th century. Before 
that, people had identified themselves with tribal group and family.5 It must be 
underlined that other people still may enormously influence our identity and 
behaviour (Fiedor, & Ostapiuk, 2017). Barkley’s sentence esse est percipi can be 
used to argue that to be a person, we need to be perceived by other people and 
to conclude that “no man is an island” (Donne, 1624). We are social animals 
(Aristotle) and in general our self-awareness comes from the fact that we know 
that we can be observed by other people, which was also underlined by Smith 
(1759). Of course, economics many years ago demonstrated how important 
society was (institutional economics). Unfortunately, neoclassical economics did 
4 In these situations, social values can be perceived as metapreferences.
5 Elias (1991, p. 101) draws a connection between changes in books and people’s perception of 
individuality. Until the second half of the 19th century writers mainly described what people 
did or what happened in general. Later the focus has shifted on what people experience, 
which the extreme case is the ‘stream of consciousness.’
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not seem to take these insights into serious consideration. Thankfully, over the 
last years, the awareness of social influence on people has risen in economics 
mainly thanks to new institutional economics (Godłów-Legiędź, 2003, 2010; 
Hodgson, 1998, 2000, 2007; Ratajczak, 2005, 2011; Wilkin, 2016).
The discussion on personal identity and the problems connected with the 
perception of one self over time obviously does not exhaust the topic in any way. 
The discussion was presented to highlight a few points. Firstly, the discussion 
on self is significant in the context of people’s responsibility for their actions. In 
neoclassical economics, it is assumed that people have discerned self and free 
will which makes them responsible for the choices they make. (This assumption 
will be especially important from the perspective of the last chapter of this 
book.) The next goal was to show that neoclassical economics’ assumption that 
a person has one self with stable preferences is false and one’s self is changing all 
the time. This goal is crucial, because it can be argued that the concept of multiple 
self, which is examined in this book, should not be treated seriously, because it is 
only a metaphor. The discussion on personal identity should demonstrate that 
the concept of multiple self is much closer to reality than the concept of one, 
unchanging self that is used in neoclassical economics. This discussion should 
serve as a justification for further discourse on different preferences that people 
can have. The last goal of the analysis of personal identity was to indicate that 
preferences do not establish a conception of individual as a distinct being as 
it is assumed in neoclassical economics. Hume’s argument was used to show 
the problems with this conception. It was presented that we can never detect 
anything resembling the self in our own preferences (Davis, 1995). The only thing 
that we can detect are the contents of consciousness or preferences. One’s self 
is not a content of consciousness as well as preferences. To see that point more 
clearly we can get back to Locke’s argument for the connection between memory 
and self. In the case of economics, we can also observe an inherent circularity 
when we assume that preferences pick out their owner. Davis concludes that 
“rather than constitute a basis for personal identity, claiming preferences are 
own preferences seems to presuppose it” (Davis, 1995, p. 43). 
As Davis (1995, 2003) argues, the axiomatization of preferences creates 
a sophisticated but artificial construction which only organizes preferences to 
allow economists to pick out and identify individuals. In the end, however, 
this axiomatization has to presuppose rather than demonstrate that there are 
enduring and unique individuals to whom well-formed preferences are attached. 
Neoclassical economics lacks a coherent theory of the individual because it fails 
to do this. 
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 4.3. The conception of multiple self
Two souls, alas, are dwelling in my breast,
And one is striving to forsake its brother
(Goethe, 1961, p. 145)
In the second chapter, the conception of multiple self was shortly presented in 
the context of the discounted utility model (Samuelson, 1937). Because of the 
hyperbolic discounting, we know that people’s preferences are not always 
time consistent and that people are too much focused on the present (present 
bias). This idea undermines revealed preference and rational choice theory. 
In this chapter, the concept of multiple self is developed. It is presented that 
there are many multiple self conceptions with different assumptions. Moreover, 
the idea of precommitment (presented briefly in Chapter 2) is used to justify 
the phenomenon of weakness of will, which undermines revealed preference 
theory. However, the most crucial task of this chapter is to demonstrate that 
comparing decisions over time by utility measurements is very problematic. 
Therefore, economists will need to decide normatively which values are more 
important.
Firstly, it is essential to underline the fact that over the last years the conception 
of hyperbolic discounting has been gaining influence predominately in 
psychology but also in economics and philosophy. However, the problems with 
intertemporal choices are not something new. Plato quoted Socrates to present 
what can go wrong when people assess the future: 
Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your sight when near, and 
smaller when at a distance? [...] Is not [the power of appearance] that deceiving 
art which makes us wander up and down and take the things at one time of 
which we repent at another? [...] Men are in their choice of pleasures and 
pains, that is, in their choice of good and evil, from defect of [...] that particular 
knowledge that is called measuring. (as cited in Ainslie, 2001, p. 4)
Aristotle called this behaviour akrasia which is also known as weakness of will.6
Also, Freud (1956a, 1956b) underlined the differences in preferences which 
depend on time. He made a distinction on processes that serve the long-range 
goals (reality principle) and those which serve the short-range goals (pleasure 
principle).
What is important here is that having different, even contradictory, preferences 
is not an anomaly. Frequently people do things that they did not want to do 
6 For now, both terms are used interchangeably even though some philosophers make 
distinction between these two terms (e.g., (Holton 1999)). The reason for this simplification 
is clarity for a reader who does not need to be entangled in philosophical discussion at this 
point.
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(Jeffrey, 1974). Often, we hear after such choice “I know it’s irrational, but...” 
It poses a problem for neoclassical economics which assumes that people have 
consistent and well-defined preferences and that they choose what they want 
to choose. However, it looks more like individuals often have contradictory 
preferences. This violates the essential, from neoclassical economics perspective, 
assumptions of transitivity and completeness of preferences (WARP). However, 
in real life it is not always a problem. Sen (1974, pp. 378, 379) writes that “there is 
nothing particularly schizophrenic in saying: ‘I wish I had a vegetarian’s tastes, 
for I disapprove of the killing of animals, but I find vegetarian food so revolting 
that I can’t bear to eat it, so I eat meat.’”
These differences in human preferences and motivations have been fascinating 
intellectuals for ages. There are many explanations and concepts concerning 
multiple selves. However, not many of them have been particularly important 
from the perspective of economics. This is the reason why only a few conceptions 
are presented here. Moreover, many of multiple self conceptions have not been 
formalized. Elster (1987) presents a summary of multiple selves conceptions. 
The loosely integrated self. Elster (1987, p. 3) suggests that multiple selves often 
‘turn out to be little more than failures of coordination and integration,’ such as 
an individual who has motivations and beliefs that contradict each other. In this 
conception people can realize these contradictions and they try to revise their 
beliefs to be consistent with motivation. 
Faustian selves. They refer to famous ‘two souls’ within Faust. One part of the 
person has higher order preferences, whereas the other part has desires that 
clash with them. The conflicts between Faustian selves can be cursory (can be 
resolved by deliberation) or deeply ingrained and last for years. 
Hierarchical selves. Elster (1987, p. 11) argues that Faustian selves can be 
expanded. We can have more than two selves which also can be hierarchical. 
For example, metapreferences and second-order desires that were presented in 
Chapter 2. 
The Freudian legacy. Freud’s theory presents a famous distinction on the ‘id’, 
‘ego’, and ‘superego’ (Freud, 1956b). Elster (1987, p. 20) identifies these three 
concepts as ‘agents’ that have different tasks in the person. These agents work 
in a different framework (conscious, preconscious and unconscious). What is 
important about this concept is that it helps to understand some inner processes 
and conflicts that can exist in a person for years. 
Split brain – split mind. This concept is connected with the finding that two 
hemispheres of the human brain can operate independently from each other. 
It gives rise to many thought experiments which were used in various theories 
of personal identity over time. Elster (1987, p. 23 ff.) argues that it is not the best 
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concept to describe multiple self theory. It is beyond this book’s scope to develop 
this idea further because the nature of this discussion is purely biological. 
However, a compelling argument against split brain – split mind is a fact that 
different hemispheres are responsible for different cognitive tasks but they do 
not have different preferences. 
Psychologists are the most interested party in the discussion about multiple 
self. Nowadays, it is commonly assumed that there are two completely different 
processes that influence human mind. The first type has been variously named 
“controlled” (Schneider, & Shiffrin, 1977), “reflective” (Lieberman, 2003; Strack, 
& Deutsch, 2004), “rational” (Epstein, 1994) or just “system 2” (Kahneman, 2011). 
This process is characterized as conscious, deliberative, effortful and can be 
identified with homo economicus (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008). The second type of the 
decision process is called “automatic” (Schneider, & Shiffrin, 1977), “impulsive” 
(Strack, & Deutsch, 2004), “reflexive” (Lieberman, 2003), “experiential” (Epstein, 
1994) or just “system 1” (Kahneman, 2011). The processes in this category are 
fast, unconscious, effortless, and automatized. 
What differentiates psychologists models from some multiple self theories is that 
in the former, two different psychological processes work together. For instance, 
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001), and Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) state that 
preferences are both influenced by deliberative valuation by calculation and an 
affective valuation by feeling. Both economists (Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 
2004) and psychologists (Metcalfe, & Mischel, 1999) propose the models where 
people’s behaviours are co-determined by an automatic, ‘hot’ affective system 
and an effortful, deliberative ‘cold’ cognitive system (see (Alós-Ferrer & Strack, 
2014)). It is important to keep in mind that in spite of the fact that human brains 
have completely different cognitive processes, they are interconnected. Thanks 
to this fact we can agree with Loewenstein and his claim that we “do not believe 
that there are little selves in people with independent motives, cognitive systems, 
and so on” (Loewenstein, 1996, p. 288). When we discuss the multiple self concept 
we do not have in mind two homunculi that are in people’s heads and have 
different personalities. However, it is literally possible to have more than one 
personality and this affliction is called ‘dissociative personality disorder.’ When 
the concept of multiple self is used in this book, it is used in a metaphorical sense. 
It is presented to signify that people have contradictory preferences that cannot 
be easily compared with each other within one unified utilitarian framework. 
In this chapter, the main focus is put on the conception of multiple self from 
the perspective of choices over time, and the fact that hyperbolic discounting 
indicates that there are different selves which make different choices depending 
on the time horizon. This concept of multiple self is fundamental in the context 
of neoclassical economics because it undermines the discounted utility model 
(Samuelson, 1937). Moreover, it shows that the revealed preference theory does 
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not work perfectly because people’s choices do not always reveal their real 
preferences. Hyperbolic discounting undermines the rational choice theory 
because it demonstrates that individuals’ preferences are time inconsistent. 
The discussion on the concept of multiple self will also be investigated in the 
context of weakness of will in which agents behave irrationally and act against 
their best interest, especially when choices are made over time.
4.4. The conception of multiple self over time
Economists were not much interested in the problem of time inconsistency 
until the 1980s, with the exception of Strotz (1955). It was psychologist Ainslie 
who introduced the idea of hyperbolic discounting (1975). Thaler and Shefrin 
(1981) implemented this idea in economics. It gained appreciation with time 
and economist had to admit that hyperbolic discounting is a common feature 
of human behaviour. However, economists dealt with inconsistent time 
preferences in a specific way. They created the models where choices over 
time are compared by utility measurements by taking into account hyperbolic 
discounting among other manifestations of bounded rationality like self-control, 
temptation, dual-self, etc. (Andreoni, & Sprenger, 2012; Brocas, & Cartillo, 2008; 
Cohen, Ericson, Laibson, & White, 2020; Dasgupta, 2008; Fudenberg, & Levinge, 
2006, 2012; Gul, & Pesendorfer, 2001, 2004; Hoch, & Loewenstein, 1991; Laibson, 
1997; Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2004; O’Donoghue, & Rabin, 1999, 2001). 
Survey of the intemporal models can be found in (Ericson, & Laibson, 2019). 
How these models work will not be elaborated separately, because they face the 
same problems as the static models (the discounted utility model (Samuelson, 
1937)) which will be analysed below. Namely, it is impossible to compare 
decisions over time exclusively by means of utility measurements.
Schelling was one of the economists who noticed this problem. In 
Chapter 2, Schelling was mentioned in the context of precommitment strategies 
(the example of Odysseus) which are used by people because of the contradictory 
preferences over time. As it has been indicated before, people use these strategies 
of their own volition to remove future options from which they choose because 
they are afraid that they succumb to the temptations when the choice comes. For 
Schelling this behaviour was really disturbing when he referred it to neoclassical 
theory of rational choice and revealed preferences. He indicates that people 
frequently choose between the long-term goals and the short-term pleasures 
and sometimes they curb their freedom to achieve long-term goals. Schelling 
(1984, pp. 1, 2) enumerates examples of this behaviour:
Please do not give me a cigarette when I ask for it, or dessert, or a second 
drink. Do not give me my car keys. Do not lend me money. Do not lend me 
a gun. Besides denial there are interventions. Do not let me go back to sleep. 
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Interrupt me if I get in an argument. Push me out of the plane when it’s my 
turn to parachute. Don’t let me go home drunk unless you can remove my 
children to a safe place. Blow the fuse if you catch me watching television. 
Make me get up and do my back exercises every morning. Keep me moving 
if I am exhausted in the wilderness. Pump my stomach if you catch me 
overdosed with sleeping pills. 
For Schelling the fact that people use precommitment strategies was 
a demonstration that multiple selves exist. Thanks to the multiple self 
conception, Schelling was able to explain precommitment strategies and their 
existence was not a problem for him as it was for value-free economics. What 
was important for him was a question which self should be in control. The self 
which has long-term preferences or that which falls into the temptation? To 
answer this question, Schelling (1984, p. 9) analyses the example of captain 
Ahab from Moby Dick, who lost his leg because of a bad wound:
The blacksmith enters with a hot iron to cauterize the stump. Ahab begs not 
to be burned. The crewmen hold him down as he spews out the apple in 
a scream, and steam rises where the iron is tormenting his leg. The movie 
resumes with Ahab out of pain and apparently glad to be alive. 
At first, Schelling treats this example as an easy situation. We get a lot of utility 
in exchange for our limited freedom. Life in exchange for short but a very 
intensified moment of pain. Later, however, he notes that even if Ahab asked 
the smith to cauterize his wound and even if felt grateful for the operation 
which was performed upon him, it would not mean that this was the best 
decision which gave him the greatest utility. Schelling (1984, p. 9) writes: “If 
you burn me so that I may live I’ll thank you, afterward, but that is because I’ll 
be feeling no pain and not anticipating any when I thank you”. He concludes 
by saying:
How do we know whether an hour of extreme pain is more than life is worth? 
Alternatively, how do we know whether an hour of extreme pain is more than 
death is worth? The conclusion that I reach is that I do not know, not for you 
and not for me. (Schelling 1984, p. 9)
Schelling stated that it is impossible to assess which choice is better if we only 
take utility into an account. He claims that every moment is different, and it 
is impossible to compare different periods of time. Thus, Schelling reached 
a similar conclusion to neoclassical economics and Becker. It is impossible to 
compare choices in terms of utility, because utility is absolutely relative. As far as 
neoclassical economics is concerned, it is thought that if we cannot assess whether 
some actions give more utility than other, we assume that people are rational and 
always do things that maximize their utility. If we did not assume that, the theory 
of revealed preference would not work. Consequently, we would be back to the 
situation when neoclassical economics had no reliable methodology.
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Schelling comes to another conclusion. He thought that it is impossible to 
compare utility over time, because: 
Each self is a set of values; and though the selves share most of those values, 
on the particular issues on which they differ fundamentally there doesn’t 
seem to be any way to compare their utility increments and to determine 
which behavior maximizes their collective utility. (Schelling, 1984, p. 8)
We cannot use utility measurements because human beings have two different 
selves and they have different preferences. Thus, economics should handle these 
selves separately. Schelling did not want to decide which of these two selves is 
more important because we are not able to compare their utilities. However, this 
relativity is not a problem for Schelling, because: 
Sometimes, but not always, it is easy to know which is Dr Jekyll and which 
is Mr Hyde. The person who drinks and becomes vicious, or a bore, and is 
morose about it for days afterwards; the person who continually resolves 
to demand that increase in pay and never musters the courage; and the 
person who walks into a casino for a little sociable gambling, loses more 
than he intended, commits more to recover it, and emerges traumatized after 
blowing his bankroll, all seem to present an unequal pair, a ‘straight’ ego and 
a wayward alter. (Schelling, 1980, p. 98)
However, Schelling was aware that he did not have a framework to decide which 
self is more important. He wrote that “anyone who is happily addicted to nicotine, 
benzedrine, valium, chocolate, heroin, or horse racing, and anyone unhappily 
addicted who would not elect the pains and deprivations of withdrawal, are not 
my subject” (Schelling, 1984, p. 4). However, he made a subtle distinction which 
helped him to justify a choice: 
I am not concerned with whether cigarettes or rich desserts are bad for you, 
only with the fact that there are people who wish so badly to avoid them that, 
if they could, they would put those commodities beyond their own reach. 
(Schelling, 1984, pp. 4, 5)
Even though he did not want to choose, the last quotation shows that in the end, 
he chooses reason and the ‘long-term human’ over a man focused at present 
moment. His slight emphasis on people who succumb to temptations against 
their better judgment is known as akrasia or weakness of will. Economists do 
not recognize akrasia, because it is assumed that people do what is best for them 
(in accordance with revealed preference theory). Thaler presents why neoclassi-
cal economics resists that the phenomenon of akrasia exists. 
In the 1970s he organized the supper for his co-workers from Chicago who 
were known for their orthodox approach and who assumed that people are 
fully rational. Thaler was a good host and he prepared a bowl of cashews for 
his guests to whet their appetite before the supper. In a short time, it occurred 
that guests too often reached for the snack and Thaler took away a bowl of 
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cashews, because he did not want the guests to overeat before the supper. 
His decision was met with guests’ approval. They wanted to eat only a few 
cashews, but they gave in to the temptation and ate more than they thought 
was prudent. The guests’ approval does not make sense from the perspective 
of neoclassical economics because people are rational agents and know what is 
best for them. Therefore, having more choices is better, because individuals can 
find a more preferable option. Thaler (2015, pp. 94, 95) presents a hypothetical 
discussion between rational homo economicus (econ) with a human being about 
this very topic: 
ECON: Why did you remove the cashews?
HUMAN: Because I did not want to eat any more of them.
ECON: If you did not want to eat any more nuts, then why go to the trouble 
of removing them? You could have simply acted on your preferences and 
stopped eating.
HUMAN: I removed the bowl because if the nuts were still available, I would 
have eaten more.
ECON: In that case, you prefer to eat more cashews, so removing them was 
stupid.
This discussion leads nowhere. Neoclassical economics cannot admit that weak-
ness of will exists, because it would imply the dismissal of revealed preference 
theory.
4.5. Weakness of will
To answer the question whether weakness of will (akrasia) exists, we need to 
investigate the philosophical discussion. In general, akrasia is perceived as doing 
something against one’s better judgment. So, we do something and we know 
it is not the best course of actions for us to take. Not only were the economists 
perplexed about this possibility, but from the very beginning, philosophers 
have discussed this problem as well. In Plato’s Protagoras, Socrates denied the 
possibility of weakness of will: “No one,” he declared, “who either knows or 
believes that there is another possible course of action, better than the one he 
is following, will ever continue on his present course” (Plato, 1961, p. 348). 
In the 20th century Hare agreed with Socrates. He argues that if one evaluates 
something to be the best action for one, then one must do it. This is a case 
because evaluative judgments are connected with a prescription (Hare, 1952, 
1963). Therefore, when one judges that the best action for one is to quit smoking 
then one must quit smoking. 
Often people say that they know that quitting smoking would be the best 
action for them to take but they cannot do it. For Hare (1952, 1963) as well as for 
Socrates it does not mean that weakness of will exists. In this case, one cannot 
quit smoking, because deep down one still wants to smoke and this is one’s 
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strongest desire, not desire to quit smoking. We can see how similar this line of 
reasoning is to value-free economics. In Chapter 2, Becker’s approach towards 
this issue was presented: 
The claims of some heavy drinkers and smokers that they want to but cannot 
end their addictions seem to us no different from the claims of single persons 
that they want to but are unable to marry or from the claims of disorganized 
persons that they want to become better organized. What these claims mean is 
that a person will make certain changes, for example, marry or stop smoking 
– when he finds a way to raise long-term benefits sufficiently above the short-
term costs of adjustment. (Becker, & Murphy 1988, p. 693)
As has been indicated before, for Becker declarations do not mean anything. 
They are only a cheap talk. If you really want to quit smoking, you will do it. 
Thanks to this line of reasoning, present bias is not a problem in the economic 
approach. It is not an irrational feature of human behaviour that indicates that 
people do not do what they really want to do. They are just overpowered by 
present desires and deep down they want them. The tautological (axiomatic) 
construction of the economic approach in which rationality is perceived 
instrumentally enables economists to deny the possibility of weakness of will 
and still be consistent. Despite the approaches in philosophy and economics, 
where the weakness of will is impossible by definition, for many people it is 
a real feeling. If people always do what they want deep down how it is possible 
that so many of them feel regret after choice? The contemporary debate about 
this phenomenon started anew thanks to Davidson (1980).
Davidson thinks that weakness of will is possible and he is mostly known for 
providing the definition of akratic action which is commonly used. In doing 
x an agent acts akratic if and only if: (1) the agent does x intentionally, (2) the 
agent believes there is an alternative action y open to him, and this guarantees 
that the action is free, (3) the agent judges that, all things considered, it would be 
better to do y than to do x (Davidson, 1980, p. 22). It is important to underline the 
phrase ‘all things considered.’ It does not mean that if one thinks that an apple is 
more healthy than chips, this is one’s evaluation. Here one only sticks to one set 
of values (health) versus another (taste). ‘All things considered’ means that one 
compares a different set of values and then makes a decision. 
Nowadays, most philosophers interested in the weakness of will agree with 
Davidson that akratic action is not only possible but actual, and it is a common 
feature of people’s lives. Moreover, most philosophers agree that akrasia, if 
possible, must be irrational (Stroud, & Tappolet 2003, p. 5). Here it is important 
to underline the distinction between economics and philosophy in the case of 
rationality. As was indicated before, neoclassical economics treats rationality in 
an instrumental way, whereas many philosophers tend to treat it as something 
which is worth investigating and striving for. Therefore, most neoclassical 
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economists do not assess whether some desires are rational or not, whereas 
philosophers ask these questions. Moreover, neoclassical economists analyse 
only human actions and they do not ask questions about people’s motivations, 
whereas philosophers use a distinction between belief and choice in which belief 
is beyond observation (revealed choice). This different perception of rationality 
results in the situation where philosophers attempt to define what the rational 
behaviour might consist in, and economists do not.7
Thanks to this short introduction we can analyse whether akrasia is rational or 
not. As was stated before, akrasia refers to behaviour in which one chooses to 
do something that one believes not to be the best option for one. The belief that 
a certain option is not a good thing to do is either a rational belief for one to hold 
or not. When it is not rational belief to hold, then one is irrational in one’s belief. 
For example, Martha is dissatisfied with her vacation in Spain and she believes 
that she should have gone to Italy instead. However, she is mistaken and the 
vacation in Italy would be much worse. Then, on the one hand, her belief in Italy 
as a better place for a vacation is false and it is irrational to hold it. On the other 
hand, if her belief that Italy is a better place for a vacation than Spain is true, then 
she has a rational belief to hold. However, in this case, it cannot be rational for 
her to go to Spain. Therefore, akrasia necessarily involves irrationality, either in 
her beliefs or in her choices (Wedgwood, 2003, p. 216). 
Although many philosophers agree that akrasia must be irrational,8 they argue 
whether it is possible intentionally and freely to act against one’s better judgment. 
For example, Watson (1977) argues that akratic action does not exist because acting 
against one’s better judgment is not free. It is so because there is no clear difference 
between akrasia and compulsion in situations when the agent is motivated by 
emotion or desires that one is unable to resist. Watson considers two possible 
explanations of why people fail to resist a desire that they do not want to have and 
he rejects both of them. People’s failure cannot be explained in terms of what they 
choose to do, because a choice must follow better judgment (Hare, 1952, 1963). 
It cannot be also explained by an insufficient attempt to resist. If action is free, we 
must assume that an agent is able to control oneself and here the question why 
one did not try hard enough arises. Watson concludes that the agent was unable 
to resist the rebellious desire and in both cases one’s action was unfree. However, 
many philosophers argue that it is possible to distinguish between weak-willed 
and compelled action and Watson’s conclusion is controversial.9
7  Some economists define rationality (e.g., ecological rationality by V. Smith, procedural 
rationality by H. Simon). However, they are treated as heterodox (Berg, & Gigerenzer, 2010) 
and instrumental rationality dominates in economics.
8 However, not everyone agrees that akrasia must be irrational, see (Audi, 1990; McIntyre, 1990).
9 For more discussion see (Bermúdez, 2018; Kennett, 2001; Mele, 1987, 2010; Tenenbaum, 1999; 
Wallace, 1999).
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After setting the stage for weakness of will, we move to the most important 
goal of this chapter – providing a framework to decide between selves. Holton 
(1999) argues for the position similar to Schelling’s precommitment. For Holton 
weakness of will means that certain kind of intention – a resolution –was violated. 
The term ‘resolution’ refers to a plan or intention one has to hold in the face 
of potential temptations. So, we can identify resolution with precommitment 
strategies. Holton (1999, p. 52) thinks that “central to the idea of weakness of 
will is an overreadiness to abandon one’s resolutions”. Therefore, we can know 
that people are weak-willed when they try to fight with some unwanted desires 
by sticking to resolutions. For example, Janet needs to study for the forthcoming 
exam. She dismissed the proposal of her friends to go to the pub in the evening, 
because she wants to study (resolution). However, after 30 minutes of studying, 
she was tired and watched a movie instead. In the end, she failed to study but 
at least she tried to do so and she was able to dismiss her friends’ invitation. For 
Holton, this kind of behaviour indicates weakness of will. 
Moreover, he makes a distinction between weakness of will (overriding one’s 
resolution) and akratic action (overriding one’s judgment). This distinction 
was criticized by some philosophers (see (Mele, 2010)) but it is a very useful 
distinction for the purpose of this chapter. Holton (2003, p. 52) writes:
Imagine someone who is convinced that all the arguments point the same way: 
he should give up meat. Yet suppose he does not. He is, therefore, akratic. 
But is he weak-willed? That, I contend, depends on other factors. Has he 
repeatedly vowed to give up, only to find himself succumbing time and again 
in the face of rare steaks and slow-cooked offal? Or does he unblushingly 
affirm while conceding practical inconsistency – that he has never had any 
intention of giving up, and never will? In the first case we surely would accuse 
him of weakness of will; in the second I think we would not. 
This distinction is the same distinction which was made by Schelling when he 
argued that we should help only people who act against desires they do not 
want to have (by precommitment). For Holton and Schelling it is not enough to 
say that one does not want to smoke, one needs try to quit smoking. Otherwise, 
it can be only a cheap talk. The distinction between akrasia and weakness of will 
is useful because in the case of akrasia we do not know whether somebody really 
wants to quit smoking or one only says so. When one acts against unwanted 
desires and form a resolution, it is signal that this person really wants something 
else. It also provides a better framework than a vague framework used by many 
behavioural economists who rely on ‘New Year’s resolution test’ (Rizzo, 2016; 
Sugden, 2018). 
Holton uses the idea of resolution to explain why it is impossible for some 
philosophers to accept the existence of weakness of will. They cannot accept 
it because they use the ‘Humean account’ (belief-desire account) where all 
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intentional actions are explained in terms of an agent’s beliefs and desires. 
The agent simply acts on the desire that is the strongest. In this approach, 
resolutions are reducible to beliefs and desires (Holton, 2003, p. 51). Therefore, 
when someone tries to quit smoking but fails to do so, it means that deep down 
one still wants to smoke. Intentions have the same value as desires because 
in the end “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (Hume, 
1896, p. 213). This reasoning is very close to neoclassical economics because of 
instrumental rationality. Holton is a supporter of The ‘Augmented Humean 
account’ (belief-desire-intention account) in which beliefs and desires are not 
enough. He writes that “intentions, of which resolutions are a species, should 
be seen as a third mental kind, irreducible to the other two” (Holton, 2003, 
p. 51). This approach works similarly to the Humean account in respect of the 
end result. Therefore, “if a resolution is stronger than any contrary desires, the 
agent will stick to it; if the contrary desires are stronger, then the agent will act on 
them instead” (Holton, 2003, p. 51). However, the qualitative difference between 
desires and intentions makes weakness of will possible and it also explains why 
people feel regret after following unwanted desires. In the context of economics, 
intentions can be perceived as people’s real preferences.10
The qualitative distinction between desires and intentions is necessary in the 
context of intertemporal choices when we need to choose normatively which 
self should decide. It cannot be done by utilitarian measurement which is used 
by contemporary economists where desires and values are compared within the 
same framework as in the Humean account. The limitations of the utilitarian 
framework are visible on the example of Mill who tried to answer criticism of 
utilitarianism which in his times was called ‘pig philosophy.’11 Mill differentiated 
higher pleasures from the lower ones with regard to quality, not using only 
quantity or intensity. He argued that “some kinds of pleasure are more desirable 
and more valuable than others” (Mill, 1863, p. 11). However, very often, we 
choose lower pleasures. Sometimes we prefer lying on the couch and watching 
comedy to reading Shakespeare. We crave for undemanding activities even if 
we do not place great importance on them. At first sight, it looks contradictory 
to Mill’s theory when people want higher pleasures which are connected with 
intellect, not with the trivial thrills. However, Mill answers this criticism and 
explains the difference between human choosing in the short-term and the 
long-term perspective. It is true that we prefer lying on the couch and watching 
a comedy to reading Shakespeare, because this less demanding activity can give 
us more pleasure. However, people value Shakespeare more and it is not only 
10 However, the idea that we can analyse people’s preferences, which are beyond the revealed 
choices, is very controversial and is the matter under discussion in economics (Caplin, 
& Schotter, 2008).
11 This term was famously used by Carlyle (1850, p. 260).
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because they are taught to have respect to the classic. As far as Mill is concerned, 
the true choice is in the long-term perspective when individuals’ preferences 
are changed and people look for things which are more valuable than simple 
pleasures. Despite wanting to lie on the couch and watch a comedy, if somebody 
asks people what they want to do in their whole life, the majority will choose 
Shakespeare or the other kind of high culture. Mill explains that we choose the 
lower pleasures even if we want the higher ones, because “occasionally, under 
the influence of temptation, postpone them to the lower” (Mill, 1863, p. 14). 
In other words, it means that we know the difference between comedy and 
Shakespeare but sometimes we succumb to our weaknesses. We find Hamlet
a great play not because we like it more than the other pleasures, but because it 
challenges us and makes us better people. 
In this context, Mill unknowingly departed from utilitarianism in which 
everything can be compared by one all-encompassing notion of utility because 
he assumed that there exist more ‘worthy’ deeds. However, Mill’s credit for 
human’s higher needs created the problem. Economists do not like human 
declarations, because very often they do not coincide with the real choices 
(Beshears, Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2008). For example, Americans ranked 
highest “talking with children” and 17th “watching television” while it seems 
clear that in practice most Americans spend much more time watching TV than 
they ever do talking to their children (Juster, 1985). When people are asked 
which programs they want to watch on TV, they point out performances, theatre 
or opera but when it comes to choice, they watch soap operas. However, these 
results do not mean that people are hypocrites and that their declarations are 
only the way to look better in the eyes of others. The majority of them do want to 
have ‘worthy’ life, not the life that is only based on simple pleasures. However, 
the existence of weakness of will results in the situations when they do not 
achieve what they really want.
4.6. Conclusions 
The philosophical discussion on weakness of will was necessary to demonstrate 
a distinction between desires and intentions. Thanks to precommitment 
strategies, we can explore what people’s real preferences are. This knowledge 
is essential in the context of choices over time because they cannot be compared 
only by utility measurements. This is why we need to have values that are 
independent of utility and intentions can indicate what these values are. We 
need to know what values, independent of choice, individuals have to decide 
which self should be in control. 
Switching into the new approach can be problematic for many economists 
because economic approach with instrumental rationality and ad libitum utility 
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work perfectly because its assumptions are always fulfilled (tautological 
system). The weaknesses and controversies connected with this approach were 
indicated in Chapter 2 in the reference to Becker. In this section, some of these 
problems were developed from the perspective of choices over time. Moreover, 
in the context of the weakness of will, one could see how similar some positions 
in philosophy can be to economics. As it was indicated before, many economists 
believe in tautological assumptions of their theory (Thaler, 2015) and because 
of that, they judge values as something unscientific. However, this logical 
positivistic view of science does not stop there. Many economists believe that 
economics with axiomatic assumptions is a positive, hard science that creates 
universal rules (Blaug, 1992; Caldwell, 1982; Fiedor, & Ostapiuk, 2017; Hands, 
2001; Hardt, 2013, 2017; Hausman, & McPherson, 2006; Lawson, 1997, 2003; 
McCloskey, 1983, 1985; Ostapiuk, 2019a; Reiss, 2013). Thus, before introducing 
values independent of choice it is necessary to have an epistemological discussion 
and show that neoclassical economists’ methodological confidence is unfounded. 
It will be indicated that ironclad methodologies do not exist anymore, which 
was demonstrated by the philosophers of science in the second half of the 20th
century. However, it will be argued that scientists (economists especially) should 
not be afraid of relativism, because it is possible to have a discussion on values, 
and science can thrive in the relativistic world. The acceptance of methodological 
pluralism and the relativistic nature of science will be used to justify the existence 
of normative values in economics. Thanks to that, deontological system can be 
presented as an alternative to the consequentialist system used in economics. 
Chapter 5
Philosophy of science  
and value-free economics
All epistemology begins in fear – fear that the world 
is too labyrinthine to be threaded by reason; 
fear that the senses are too feeble and the intellect too frail; 
fear that memory fades, even between adjacent steps 
of a mathematical demonstration; fear that authority and convention blind; 
fear that God may keep secrets or demons deceive 
(Daston, & Galison, 2007, p. 372)
5.1. Introduction
It is neither possible nor necessary from the perspective of the main goals of this 
book and specifically of this chapter to present the main ideas which have been 
developed over centuries in the philosophy of science. The concepts highlighted 
in this section are very selective. They do not reflect the sophistication and depths 
of debate in the philosophy of science. The purpose of the introduction is to 
point out that the goal of enlightenment endeavor of science (finding universal 
laws and ultimate Truth) has not been achieved, and everything indicates that 
it will not be achieved in the future. Although this statement is well known 
in philosophy, many economists still believe in the positivistic foundation of 
objective science. What is more, it seems that many economists agree with 
the statement that ‘economics is what economists do’1 and they dismiss the 
methodological discussion about their field. This situation is not exclusive 
to economists. Also, representatives of the other scientific disciplines treat 
philosophy of science as something unnecessary. This attitude is attributed to 
Feynman who wrote that “philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists 
as ornithology is to birds.” The analysis of the insights from contemporary 
philosophy of science should show that economists’ belief in logical positivism 
and Truth is unjustified. The rules of the scientific game have changed and 
economists cannot work as they used to.
1 The phrase ‘economics is what economists do’ has long been attributed to Jacob Viner 
(e.g, (Spiegel, 1987, p. 814)) but its origin has not been established to this day (Backhouse, 
Middleton, & Tribe, 1997).
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The quotation which opens this chapter indicates that all epistemology started 
with the fear of relativism. People want to know what is the Truth, what is right 
and what is wrong. It is visible in the case of small children who ask questions 
about (literally) everything. They want to establish some rules by which the 
world and society are governed. Even our language is constructed to create 
the dichotomy between truth and false. When one makes a statement ‘I eat 
scrambled eggs for breakfast’ it can be only true or false which assumes that 
something as the Truth exists. Human brain is constructed to find causation of 
some events and to find patterns everywhere. Therefore, it comes to people as 
something natural that the goal of science should be finding patterns and the 
Truth about reality. However, we do not want just to know something. We want 
to know for sure. We want to have knowledge (justified true belief). Consider the 
situation when someone points out a few numbers that one believes guarantee 
winning the lottery and one will win. Then, one has the belief that occurs to be 
true. However, the last ingredient of knowledge, namely justification, is lacking. 
In science, we do not want to have just accidental laws (true by accident), but 
scientific laws (we know why they occurred, or at least we can predict future). 
One of the main purposes of philosophy was to find knowledge. This endeavor 
started to be essential in the Enlightenment. To this day, people who are not 
familiar with the philosophy of science perceive knowledge as something 
objective which is independent of subjective perception. Moreover, they believe 
in universal laws and truths which are waiting to be discovered. This strong 
belief in science is now pejoratively called scientism and after the 1960s, not 
many (if any) philosophers share this view. 
Until the 1960s logical positivism with a belief in objective science was very 
popular among scientists. However, from the 1970s on it started to be not 
only obsolete but something that philosophers sneer at. The term ‘positivism’ 
is now exclusively a “philosophical Booadjective” (Hutchison, 1981, p. 204). 
Despite the criticism, later in this section it is demonstrated that some ideas of 
this movement are still alive in economics. Popper was one of the philosophers 
who make logical positivism obsolete to some degree. He is admired by many 
scientists, which is an exception, because philosophers generally are not 
praised by scientists. Popper is especially respected by economists, but for 
the wrong reasons (it will be explained later). Why Poppers is so appreciated? 
He was a critic of logical positivism, because he believed that science is based 
on deduction, not induction. First comes hypothesis and later we check it 
empirically. Not the other way around. For example, if we flip a coin to see what 
falls out and if we want to repeat this experiment and make it comparable, we 
will need to assume that we will use the same type of a coin or that the weather 
conditions will be the same. Popper gives the example of his students to show 
why theory precedes observation. During the lecture, he asks them to observe 
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and write down the observation. The students immediately ask “Observe. But 
what?” Popper points out that our observations are theory-laden to show that 
it is essential for scientists to have a critical attitude towards their theories. As 
human beings, we tend to look for patterns and theories. It is very easy for 
scientists to confirm any theory. The pieces of evidence are all over the place 
and smart people can find many of them to justify their theories. Popper thinks 
that the fact that scientists can find proofs for their theories does not mean that 
their theories are true. Scientists need to embrace the idea of fallibilism2 and 
keep in mind that their theories or they can be wrong. What Popper demands 
from scientists is always to be critical in spirit. The problem of confirmation is 
not only a psychological tendency. The very method of confirmation is not valid. 
The problem is called raven’s paradox (see (Hempel, 1945)). In this example 
observing black raven confirms our hypothesis that all ravens are black. The 
paradox works as follows: 1) assume that any observations of an F (our raven) 
that is also G (black) confirm ‘all F’s are G’s,’ 2) my shoes are neither black nor 
a raven, 3) premise (2) confirm the general claim ‘all non-black thing are non-
-ravens,’ 4) this is logically equivalent to ‘all ravens are black,’ 5) thus observing 
my shoes confirms ‘all ravens are black,’ 6) this is absurd, 7) premise (1) is false 
by reductio ad absurdum.
Popper proposes falsificationism to resolve this problem. For him a theory is 
scientific not when we can confirm it, but when we can find empirical proof 
that dismisses our theory (Popper, 1959). So, in the case of the hypothesis ‘all 
ravens are black’ one should look for white ravens that can falsify one’s theory. 
Falsificationism has two purposes: 1) demarcation (distinguish science from 
non-science), 2) methodological (how science should be practiced) (Hands, 
1993). It is essential to underline that the demarcation criterion only demands 
that it is logically possible to falsify the theory. It does not imply that we conduct 
such a falsification (we do not need to find a white raven). Popper thought that 
a demarcation line between science and non-science is essential, because he 
observed how different theories could be. Freudism and Marxism were utterly 
different from Einstein’s theory of relativity. In Freudism and Marxism, it was 
possible to explain two opposite pieces of evidence by the same theory. In the first 
case, having a strict father could explain that the child grew up to be introvert 
as well as extrovert. In the second case, the lack of predicted revolution could be 
explained by changes in means of production. For Popper, theory that explains 
everything explains nothing. However, it does not mean that these theories 
are meaningless.3 They can be insightful and true, but they are not scientific. 
2  In a sense that no beliefs (theory, view, thesis, etc.) can be conclusively supported or justified 
(Hetherington, n.d.). This is why scientists always should be critical in spirit.
3 Because of this view Popper restored in some way metaphysics which was abandoned by 
logical positivism. 
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For Popper, Einstein’s theory of relativity is the best example of a scientific 
theory. Einstein proposed the bold hypothesis which could be easily falsified 
because of the risky prediction (very specific). What is most important for 
Popper is that even if a theory is not falsified, it does not mean that it is true. 
Acceptance of some theory is always only provisional and can be falsified in the 
future by a new experiment. 
Falsification is right in spirit, but it has its own problems. Because every theory 
can occur to be wrong in the future, none of them is absolutely true. If a theory 
successfully passes falsification, the only thing that can be said is that this theory 
is closer to the truth. This is why Popper proposes the concept of ‘verisimilitude’ 
which should indicate which theory is closer to the truth. Thanks to verisimilitude 
it should be possible to decide which theory is better (that which was falsified 
1000 times or that was falsified only one time). However, this method had 
never worked and the comparisons could not be made. The criticism started 
with Tichý (1974) and Miller (1974). Oddie (1986, p. 164) claims that Popperian 
literature has produced “embarrassing results”. Many Popperians were also 
critical. Agassi (1988, p. 473) named it “a boo boo”. Although Popper has never 
given up on the concept verisimilitude, he did ultimately describe his attempt as 
“admitted failure” (Popper, 1983, p. xxxv).
Quine is the next philosopher in the story. He is considered to be one of the 
most influential philosophers of the 20th century. He is crucial in our story, 
because he criticized both logical positivism and falsificationism. Quine 
(1951) famously rejects the analytic/synthetic dichotomy used by the logical 
positivists. For Quine due to the ‘web of belief,’ there is no epistemological 
way to make a thick distinction between logical and empirical dimension. 
His argumentation involves language and it is too large topic to be covered 
here. From the perspective of this chapter, a more important contribution of 
Quine is theory of underdetermination. In a nutshell, this means that even if 
we refute some scientific theory by empirical evidence, these tests are not 
definitive, because no theory is ever tested in isolation (Duhem-Quine thesis, 
see (Harding, 1975)). To conduct the empirical test many auxiliary hypotheses 
must be assumed. For example, the testing technique, the boundary conditions, 
the values of constants, the role of ceteris paribus and many others (Hands, 2001, 
p. 108). Let us get back to the raven example. Before we make the test we need 
to know what kind of a bird a raven is because there can exist some white birds 
similar to raven or that “in the process of spray-painting the local bridge the 
painters accidentally sprayed a raven nest, as to suggest that there really are 
nonblack ravens” (Hands, 2001, p. 108). Because of underdetermination when 
contradictory evidence is discovered, there is no way to know whether auxiliary 
hypothesis or theory itself is wrong. Sometimes it is easy to find out what is the 
problem with theory. For example, if one conducts an experiment that shows 
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that copper does not conduct electricity, it does not mean that one falsified the 
well know theory. Rather it means that someone messed the test up. However, 
often it is impossible to know where lies the problem with some theory. The 
discovery of the planet Neptune is the example of this problem. When it was 
found that the motion of Uran did not match the predictions of Newton’s law, 
the scientists did not reject Newton’s laws, but the theory about seven planets 
in solar system. They found the eighth planet (Pluto). In the end, it means that 
scientists need to choose one option without a conclusive argument. 
So, if we do not have any rational rules to compare different theories, how we 
should decide which is better? Kuhn has the answer to this question, but his 
answer generally undermines the rational view of science. His book The structure 
of scientific revolutions (1962) is probably the most known book in the philosophy 
of science. In addition to philosophers, it draws the attention of psychologists 
and sociologists.4 Kuhn underlines that every theory is theory-laden and he 
introduces the idea of ‘scientific paradigm’ which can be explained as the lens 
by which scientists look at reality. Kuhn argues that scientists cannot rationally 
decide which theory is better and they choose, as a community, between 
paradigms. For example, in the 16th century scientists supported the Copernican 
system and the Ptolemaic system started to be obsolete even though at that time 
the evidence did not support the Copernican theory. Kuhn as a historian of 
science observed that scientists do not treat anomalies as counterexamples of 
their theories. In the 19th century, scientists did not dismiss Newton laws, because 
the predictions did not match. Instead, they changed the auxiliary hypothesis 
and they searched for a new planet. This example shows that scientists do not 
always follow falsificationism and it can be beneficial for science (discovering 
Neptune). Therefore, paradigm means that scientists just trust in some theory 
and they look at reality through the lens that some theory provides. Often 
paradigms are explained as ‘gestalt shift’ when one can observe the pictures of 
rabbit/duck or old women/young lady. It is only possible to see one character 
at a time and it depends on the perspective from which we look at these pictures. 
Kuhn argues that the different paradigms are incommensurable with each other. 
We cannot rationally compare them, because they have completely different 
languages by which they describe reality. So-called facts will not help scientists 
4 Many ideas displayed in his book had been presented before by Fleck in Genesis and 
development of scientific fact (2012) which had been published 30 years before Kuhn in German 
(1935). From the sociological perspective one can see why it were the ideas of Kuhn that have 
gained popularity. After the Second World War people were reluctant toward science. They 
had in mind totalitarian systems, ecologic disasters and atomic bomb. People discredited 
the idea that science could provide well-being for everyone. The 1960s were the times of 
counterculture which looked for the alternative ways of living in opposition to science. 
It created the demand for philosophy that could dethrone science from the epistemological 
pedestal (Sady, 2013, p. 144).
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with the decision, because how facts are interpreted depends on the paradigm 
that they believe.5 The last crisis is the epitome of this problem. The left argues 
that crisis was caused by lack of regulation, whereas the right argues that there 
were too many regulations. In the end, it means that no amount of evidence can 
decide between paradigms. What is essential for Kuhn, is the fact that paradigm 
does not concern only one person but the whole scientific community. This is 
why he underlines the context of discovery (science is embedded in society). 
Kuhn argues against the enlightenment view of science where knowledge 
cumulates with time. Kuhn (1962) claims that science develops from revolution 
to revolution which he calls “paradigm shifts.” Before the revolution, in time 
of ‘normal science’ scientists follow paradigm and they are dogmatic. They try 
to dismiss anomalies and find a way to defend their paradigm. However, with 
time a paradigm has to deal with more and more anomalies. When a paradigm 
is unable to deal with anomalies and cannot resolve accumulating problems, 
then science will fall into crisis. The dogmatic scientists start to be open for 
a change and they are more open for philosophical reflection on their work. 
Scientists want to know some new rules that would make their work successful 
again. We could observe this mechanism in the 1980s when economists started 
to be interested in philosophy and philosophy of economics emerged. Scientific 
revolution is similar to social revolution, because in both cases there are no 
rational arguments to decide which theory is better. This is why, in the end, the 
scientific community decides which paradigm is better. Very often this process 
takes the form of a struggle between older scientists who try to defend their 
theory and young scientists who criticize old order.6 In the end, the group which 
wins is the one which has more power, more persuasion and more supporters 
(Sady, 2013, p. 163). In economics, we could observe this struggle in the 1980s 
when behavioural economics criticized the neoclassical paradigm. At the 
beginning, the conclusions from behavioural economics were in many ways 
dismissed (Thaler, 2015). However, recently behavioural economics started to 
be identified with the mainstream (Angner, 2019; Thaler, 2016; Truc, 2018). 
Kuhn has changed the game for the philosophers of science. From that time, they 
have had to agree on the relativity of the scientific method. However, scientists 
have been trying to escape from absolute normativity by creating rules that can 
govern the scientific method. Lakatos is one of them. In Chapter 2, the ‘scientific 
research programme’ conception was analyzed. Therefore, here Lakatos is 
presented from a different angle. In the context of Kuhn and Popper. In general, 
Lakatos uses insights from both Popper and Kuhn, but in many cases, he dis-
5 In economics Kaldor (1957) writes about “stylized facts.” 
6  The German physicist Max Planck even wrote that “a new scientific truth does not triumph 
by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents 
eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it” (Planck, 1950, p. 33).
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agrees with them. Although he assumes that ‘hard core’ does not require to be 
falsified, he emphasized the importance of empirical content which is thoroughly 
Popperian. Lakatos, like Popper, describes the empirical content of a theory to 
be “the set of its potential falsifiers: the set of those observational propositions 
which may disprove it” (Lakatos, 1980, p. 14). Therefore, empirical data provided 
by the auxiliary hypothesis should be falsifiable. Secondly, Lakatos highlighted 
the importance of novel fact with the requirement of “independent testability” 
(Hands, 2001, p. 112). It means that we cannot avoid any falsifying evidence. 
For example, we cannot state that “all ravens are black except the white one you 
just showed me” (Hands, 2001, pp. 124, 125). This kind of strategy is called ad 
hocness, and science needs to rule this out if it wants to have the real progress, 
as was indicated in the case of Becker’s economic approach.
However, in many cases, Lakatos disagree with Popper and his ideas are more in 
line with Kuhn. The obvious example is the fact that ‘hard core’ is unfalsifiable. 
Moreover, Lakatos argues that all theories are “born refuted” (Lakatos, 1980, 
p. 128) and that the progress comes from the corroboration, not falsification of 
novel facts (Hands, 2001, p. 205). Lakatos also uses a historical meta-methodology 
in which theories are assessed from a historical perspective (progressive or not), 
whereas falsificationism is the method independent of history. The differences 
from Popper make Lakatos popular in economics, because he enables scientists 
to choose between different theories. 
Although Lakatos agrees that scientists are governed by paradigms, he wants 
to understand why scientists choose the particular paradigm. Often scientists 
do not know what criteria they use to assess scientific theory or if they know, 
they indicate contradictory criteria. Lakatos does not think that scientists are 
irrational, but that they just do not know the whole picture of their choices. 
Lakatos thinks that the goal of science is to reconstruct the decisions of scientists 
about paradigms rationally. He believes that thanks to this process, some 
universal criteria of choice between paradigms can be found (Sady, 2013, p. 183). 
From Lakatos’ perspective, some research programmes can be assessed only 
with hindsight. Scientists need to wait and see if each programme is progressive 
or not. Lakatos writes about three concepts of progress. The first one, “theoretical 
progress” means that new theory “has some excess empirical content over its 
predecessor, that is, if it predicts some novel, hitherto unexpected fact” (Lakatos, 
1978, p. 33). The second one, “empirical progress” takes place when “some of 
this excess content is also corroborated, that is, if each new theory leads us to 
the actual discovery of some new fact” (Lakatos, 1980, p. 34). Lakatos describes 
a research program as a “progressive,” if it is “both theoretically and empirically 
progressive, and degenerating if it is not” (Lakatos, 1980, p. 34). Finally, the 
third concept – “heuristic progress” – specifies that the changes in protective 
belt are consistent with the hard core of the programme. Lakatos’ notions of 
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theoretical and empirical progress presuppose that the changes in question 
are in accordance with heuristic progress (Hands, 2001, p. 204). For Lakatos, 
the scientific progress takes place when degenerating research programme is 
replaced by a new progressive one. However, each scientific programme can 
change both from progressive to degenerative and vice versa.
The last philosopher in the story is Feyerabend (1993). He introduces the idea 
of epistemological anarchism which is captured by the phrase ‘anything goes.’ 
Sometimes scientists misinterpret his work and perceive him as a some kind of 
a lunatic. However, we need to remember that he was influenced by Nietzsche 
and in some way he purposefully provoked scientific community (Feyerabend, 
2005, p. 48). Moreover, he did not criticize science for the sake of criticism. He 
displayed some problems of science because he wanted science to do better. 
Firstly, he argued against authoritative and dogmatic science which behaved 
like a church. Feyerabend cautioned against people who thought that they knew 
what the Truth was. In this sense, he was a fierce critic of fundamentalist idea 
of the Truth. For him science started to behave like church because it believes 
in its own infallibility and tries to make scientific method the only proved tools 
for understanding the world. Because of this criticism, some can think that 
Feyerabend was against science as a whole. It must be stated that he fought with 
fundamentalist science, not science in general. He would not state that ‘anything 
goes’ and that vaccine deniers would be right to hold their views.
Secondly, he argued that science should not have any methodological rules. 
Because none of them guarantee success. He challenged scientists to present him 
some scientific methodology and he would prove that it did not work at some 
point in history. Feyerabend (1975) enjoyed giving examples of theories that were 
discovered precisely because scientists did not follow the ruling methodology at 
that time. He showed that a particular methodology could be effective in one case 
and ineffective in another. It means that scientists just do not know which rules 
work and which do not. Therefore, we all should be anarchists in methodology 
because it can lead to new discoveries in science. It comes as no surprise that 
Feyerabend criticized every methodology (e.g., induction, deduction, Lakatos, 
falsificationism). Although he criticized falsificationism, he was Popperian in 
spirit (Feyerabend, 1961), for a discussion, see (Tambolo, 2015; Collodel, 2016). 
For Feyerabend scientists constantly had to criticize their theories. They should 
not do this when their theory turned out to be wrong and falsified, but much 
earlier, when the theory had been successful. This is the only way to defend 
oneself from dogmatism. Even though Feyerabend admired Lakatos,7 he argued 
that knowledge about the fact that paradigm was progressive or degenerative 
was useless as a tool to decide between theories. It is a historical perspective and 
7 He wanted to write book with him but premature death of Lakatos stood in the way.
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theories in the future can switch from degenerative to progressive programmes 
and vice versa. Moreover, Feyerabend (1993, p. 163) argued that Lakatos’ 
scientific research programme lead to relativism, because the only way for 
a scientific community to support progressive and to abandon degenerative 
programme was by institutional violence (withdraw money for research that 
deals with the degenerative programme, do not publish their work, etc.). 
Of course, the history of philosophy of science has not ended on Feyerabend 
and 1980s. From that time on many different approaches in the framework of 
constructivism have been developing (e.g., feminist epistemology, the sociology 
of science, postmodernism, and performativity); see these approaches in the 
context of economics (Boldyrev, & Svetlova, 2016; Brisset, 2016; Callon, 2006; 
Mackenzie, 2006; MacKenzie, Muniesa, & Siu, 2007; Scheuer, 2015; Zboroń, 2009a, 
2009b, 2013). Moreover, naturalism started to be popular among scientists over 
the last years (e.g., (Beed, & Beed, 2000; Caplin, & Schotter, 2008; Davis, 2016; 
Dekker, & Remic, 2018; Ross, 2005)). All of these approaches are significant, but 
due to limits of this book the discussion must end right here. The essential fact 
about all these approaches is that they use the insights from Kuhn, Lakatos, 
and Feyerabend. All of them criticize fundamentalist epistemology of science. 
They underline the problems of theory-ladenness, underdetermination, socially 
constructed knowledge, representation of reality, objectivity, and scientific facts. 
The purpose of the discussion on the philosophy of science was to present that 
fundamentalistic idea of epistemology in which there is objective Truth is no 
longer an available option. There are no firm rules by which sciences can be 
cultivated. However, many economists do not care about this state of affairs 
and they do science as if nothing happened. To this day, many economists are 
positivistic in spirit and they believe in facts, falsificationism, independence 
between theory and reality, and is/ought distinction (Fiedor, & Ostapiuk, 2017; 
Gorazda, Hardt, & Kwarciński, 2016; Hands, 2001; Hardt, 2017; Hausman et al., 
2017; Kincaid, & Ross, 2009; Lawson, 2015; Mirowski, 2002; Putnam, & Walsh, 
2011; Reiss, 2013; Rodrik, 2015).
5.2. Positivist methodology of economics 
Over 30 years ago McCloskey described the methodology of mainstream 
economics, and in many ways this description is still accurate. Before starting our 
analysis, some arguments have to be made to justify McCloskey’ almost 40-year-
old description of methodology of economics. As was indicated at the beginning 
of my book, many scholars argue that recently economics has transformed due 
to the incorporation of the knowledge from other social sciences like psychology 
and sociology. Therefore, contemporary mainstream economics is different from 
orthodox neoclassical economics of the 1950s (e.g., (Cedrini, & Fontana, 2018; 
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Colander, 2000; Colander et al., 2004; Davis, 2006)). The paragon of economics’ 
transformation is behavioural economics which started to be perceived as a new 
mainstream (Angner, 2019; Thaler, 2016). Moreover, it is argued that economics 
is not so theoretical anymore, and we could observe ‘empirical turn’ in the last 
years (Backhouse, & Cherrier, 2017). In general, the process of opening economics 
to other social sciences is called ‘reverse imperialism.’
However, many argue that despite the changes, the foundations of economics 
have not changed and mainstream economics works as it used to (Berg, 
& Gigerenzer, 2010; Dow, 2012; Lawson, 2015; Madra, 2016; Ostapiuk, 2019a). 
Everyone agrees that economics has incorporated many insights from other 
social sciences. However, they are perceived only as adjustments, whereas the 
paradigm has not changed. Many economists still rely on positivism and believe 
in objective and value-free economics which is based on deduction and axiomatic 
revealed preference theory (viz. rationality, utility, and homo economicus).
Therefore, McCloskey’s 40-years-old description of the methodology of 
economics is, in many ways, still accurate and worth analysing. She highlights 
(1983, pp. 484, 485) its main precepts such as: 
(1) Prediction (and control) is the goal of science.
(2) Only the observable implications (or predictions) of a theory matter to 
its truth.
(3) Observability entails objective, reproducible experiments.
(4) If (and only if) an experimental implication of a theory proves false is the 
theory proved false.
(5) Objectivity is to be treasured; subjective ‘observation’ (introspection) is 
not scientific knowledge.
(6) Kelvin’s Dictum: ‘When you cannot express it in numbers, your 
knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind.’
(7) Introspection, metaphysical belief, aesthetics, and the like may well figure 
in the discovery of an hypothesis but cannot figure in its justification.
(8) It is the business of methodology to demarcate scientific reasoning from 
non-scientific, positive from normative.
(9) A scientific explanation of an event brings the event under a covering 
law.
(10) Scientists, for instance economic scientists, have nothing to say as 
scientists about values, whether of morality or art.
(11) Hume’s Fork. 
Due to the fact that in the first chapter the problems with value-free economics 
were indicated, in this section the influence of logical positivists on economics 
is presented mainly in the context of the mathematization of economics. This 
process which sometimes is called “formalist revolution” (Blaug, 2003) is one 
of the reasons why it is possible for economists to still hold neopositivistic view 
of science even though it is obsolete. Economists wanted economics to be like 
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hard science (physic envy). In order to have predictive power, they search for 
universal rules and models which are unrealistic.8 Many papers, and books 
were written about this issue (Beed, & Kane, 1991; Debreu, 1991; Godłów-
-Legiędź, 2014; Mirowski, 2002; Ostapiuk, 2017a, 2019a; Weintraub, 2002) and 
this topic is well-analysed. Therefore, only the most important issues about 
mathematization of economics are underlined in this section. Many economists 
follow Samuelson who writes that “mathematics is language” (Samuelson, 1952, 
p. 52). However, it is important to understand that economists did not invent 
this idea. They took if from the only philosophy they knew, at the time, logical 
positivism (Mirowski, 2004). Around that time, Carnap was advertising a vision 
of philosophy as “the mathematics and physics of language” (Richardson, 2003, 
p. 180) and had just published his Logical syntax of language (1937) where he tried 
to provide a metalanguage for all of science. Mathematical language is crucial 
for neoclassical economics because it provides economists with a tautological 
system in which every theory is consistent within itself. The assumptions 
of economic approach or welfare (revealed preference) are always fulfilled 
thanks to that. Many assumptions of neoclassical economics are purposefully 
unrealistic (e.g., representative economic agent). Due to that, economists can 
dismiss descriptive criticism from psychologists or sociologists.9
Thanks to tautologicality of the assumptions, the economic approach works. 
This is why so many economists still believe in value-free economics and they 
champion mathematical approach towards economics. Vickery (1964, p. 5) indi-
cates that: 
Economic theory proper, indeed, is nothing more than a system of logical 
relations between certain sets of assumptions and the conclusions derived 
from them. The propositions of economic theory are derived by logical 
reasoning from these assumptions in exactly the same way as the theorems of 
geometry are derived from the axioms upon which the system is built. 
After the Second World War some economists started to look like the scientific 
community in The glass bead game (Hesse, 2000) where scientists live in an ivory 
tower and they do not care about reality. Blaug makes this point when he writes 
that “economy increasingly become an intellectual game played for its own sake 
and not for its practical consequence for understanding the economic world” 
((Blaug, 1997, p. 3), similar point was made by Lipsey (2001)). Many economists 
create theories for theory’s sake. It does not matter if they are descriptively 
true. The most important thing is if these theories are closed axiomatic systems 
that work. This fascination with the effectiveness of theories, not with their 
8 Using models is something that distinguish economics from the other social sciences, see 
(Leijonhufvud. 1973).
9 The role of idealistic models in economics, see more in: (Hardt, 2013, 2016, 2017; Mäki, 2002, 
2006; Morgan, 2012; Reiss, 2013; Sugden, 2000, 2009b).
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accuracy towards reality, displays economics’ schizophrenia. On the one hand, 
economists are naïve realists who believe in objective (measurable) data and 
logical positivism. On the other hand, they use instrumentalism in which the 
truth cannot be known, and prediction is the only thing that matters because 
of its usefulness. This inconsistency is the result of a lack of methodological 
knowledge and the opportunism of economists. They use methodologies that 
suit them. Objective data give them a rigid and scientific foundation that differs 
them from the other social scientists. On the other hand, instrumentalism 
with disbelief in the Truth gives economists justification for the simplified 
mathematical models which do not need to explain reality. They only need to 
have predictive power. 
The arguments against objective science were presented earlier. Therefore, in 
this section they are investigated only in the context of falsificationism which 
is preached in neoclassical economics. There are two main problems associated 
with falsificationism in economics. Firstly, economists never really have practiced 
it. Blaug makes this point when he writes that “modern economists frequently 
preach falsificationism [...] but they rarely practice it: their working philosophy 
of science is aptly described as ‘innocuous falsificationism’”10 (Blaug, 1992, 
p. 111). Of course, economists engage in empirical research which should make 
their theories more prone to falsification (it is not a metaphysics in the end, but 
facts). However, as Blaug (1992, p. 241) shows: 
much of it is like playing tennis with the net down: instead of attempting to 
refute testable predictions, modern economists all too frequently are satisfied 
to demonstrate that the real world conforms to their predictions, thus 
replacing falsificationism, which is difficult, with verification, which is easy. 
Therefore, in the opinion of Blaug, economists do not really falsify their theories 
but rather verify them ,which shows the lasting influence of logical positivism 
on economics. 
The problems with falsificationism are deeper. Many economists have 
insufficient knowledge about underdetermination and theory-ladenness. They 
see falsificationism as a special type of empiricist foundationalism (logical 
positivism) but without the problem of induction (Hands, 2001, p. 292). Because 
Popper was never an empirical foundationalist, it means that economists are 
Popperians for the wrong reasons (Hands, 2001, p. 292). Secondly, if they read 
Popper in a modern way, they would not be Popperians, because falsificationism 
does not provide a methodology that demonstrates how science should be done. 
Moreover, it does not establish the firm demarcation line between sciences and 
pseudo-sciences. In the end, one cannot escape from metaphysics.11 Hands 
10 Blaug owes this formulation to Coddington (1975, p. 542).
11 Lawson (1997, 2003) shows the failure of dismissing metaphysics in neoclassical economics.
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(2001, p. 293) writes that “the falsificationist methodology of bold conjecture 
and severe test provided a set of rules for the game of science without providing 
an ultimate aim or purpose for playing the game”. However, the goal must be 
provided which was indicated by Lakatos (1980 p. 154): “the rules of the game, 
the methodology, stand on their own feet; but these feet dangle in the air without 
philosophical support”. 
Now, it is time to present some criticism of instrumentalism which is popular 
methodological stance in economics. Its main premises were presented in the 
second chapter in the context of Becker’s economic approach. To show a problem 
with instrumentalism, the philosophers of science use the example of Ptolemy’s 
astronomy where it is assumed that the Earth is at the centre of the Universe. 
Although the theory is false, it has strong predictive power. The theory was 
useful, because it guided a navigation and helped in the creation of a more 
accurate calendar. If judged only by its usefulness, we would hold this theory 
until now. However, it is obvious that nobody treats Ptolemy’s astronomy 
seriously despite its usefulness. 
In general, instrumentalism is not wrong in stating that there is no Truth and this 
is why the ultimate goal of science is usefulness. Instrumentalism has its roots in 
pragmatism but seems to go too far. Pragmatists like William James or Charles 
Peirce did not argue against the possibility to decide if theories are true or false. 
They just argued that theories, in the end, must serve practical ends (‘cash value’) 
(Capps, 2019; James, 1981). Cash value of a theory is not only its predictive 
power. If theories are like instruments that we use, we need to know for what 
purpose we need them. A barometer measures air pressure and because of that 
people can predict and anticipate the changes in the weather. However, other 
tools are necessary to control the weather. A barometer alone can only assist in 
measurement or observation (Hausman, 1998, p. 190). Conversely, a hammer 
helps one to act. Both these instruments have different purposes. Therefore, the 
idea of theories as tools is ambiguous, which was pointed by Hausman (1998, 
p. 190): “Should it aim to give them tools to measure and passively to predict, 
or should it aim to give them tools to act and to control?”.
We should step down from these abstractions towards real economic problems. For 
a while, Phillip’s curve enabled economists to predict the rate of unemployment 
connected with the rate of inflation. However, the relationship ended when the 
governments started to use this relation to regulate the rate of unemployment. 
Why did it happen? Prediction requires only knowledge of stable correlations, 
whereas control demands knowledge of causation (Hausman, 1998, p. 190). 
Instrumentalists do not care about this distinction, because they believe that the 
only practical goal is a prediction. They hold this view because they believe that 
it is impossible to know the Truth. As a consequence, they did not notice that the 
knowledge of causes had a practical end (control). This is why Hausman (1998) 
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argues that search for causes is central to science. In general, most philosophers of 
science are not instrumentalists. Most of them agree that the goal of science is both 
predictive and explanatory (Cartwright, 1989; Gorazda, Hardt, & Kwarciński, 
2016; Hands, 2001; Hausman, 1992; Reiss, 2013).
The criticism mentioned above has its bearing on value-free economics. Firstly, 
we know that prediction is not the only thing that matters and that explanation is 
also important. This is why economists cannot create theories whose only purpose 
is to work logically. Economics cannot be only an intellectual game. Secondly, 
as was indicated in the first chapter, there is no fundamental and unbridgeable 
distinction between normative and positive approaches. We also know that the 
economic theory of well-being (welfare) contains normative statements. From 
this perspective, it seems justified to argue that economics should be closer to 
reality and help people in achieving a good life. To do that, economists need 
to consider normative approaches as full-fledged scientific programmes. Many 
economists still believe in is/ought distinction and they consider a discussion 
about values as something meaningless. As a scientific community, we need 
to understand and accept the fact that maybe we will never find the conclusive 
answers about people’ ends. However, it does not mean that we cannot, and 
should not discuss them. 
5.3. Weber and value-free economics
It has already been presented where value-free economics leads. Paradoxically, 
Max Weber’ works show why value-free economics faces unresolvable 
problems and why economists need to investigate its values. It can sound 
paradoxical, because many economists perceive Weber as a founder of value-
-free science (Hammersley, 2017; Klimczak, 2014; Mongin, 2006; Van Dun, 
1986). Many economists used his work to support the is/ought distinction. This 
misinterpretation of Weber is possible, because Weber’s ideas are complex and 
broad, which can lead to ambiguity (Weber, 1949). There is much discussion 
whether by value-freeness he means ethical neutrality of researcher, i.e., we 
should deal with facts without an axiomatic ingredient, or that we should not 
express normative statements at all (Klimczak, 2014). 
To begin with, it is essential to underline that Weber did not try to present 
a systematic epistemological treatise which would end the ‘strife over methods’ 
(Methodenstreit) of his time between positivism and historicism. His goal was 
much more pragmatic. Wolin (1981, p. 414) writes that Weber “formulated the 
idea of methodology to serve, not simply as a guide to investigation but as 
a moral practice and a mode of political action”. For Weber ethics and science go 
hand in hand. He demands intellectual honesty from scientists who make claims 
about scientific truths, hypotheses, and meaning postulates (Van Dun, 1986, 
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p. 19). Weber realizes that scientists cannot escape from values, so they should 
scrutinize them honestly. From this perspective “it would perhaps be better 
to drop the term Wertfreiheit altogether, and to speak only of ‘freedom from 
prejudice’” (Van Dun, 1986, p. 20). The only place where Weber is explicitly 
against values in science is when he argues against the lecturers who impose 
some ideologies on students (Kalberg, 2005, p. 318; Weber, 1919).
In Weber’s opinion, scientists cannot escape from values in their scientific work. 
Even one’s interest in some field is triggered by some values that one cherishes. 
Because in many ways Weber was pragmatic, he understood that if scientists 
cannot eliminate their values, they should at least scrutinize them rationally. 
Moreover, this assessment will provide a great benefit for science. To scrutinize 
values, Weber makes a distinction between ‘instrumental value judgments’ 
and ‘methodological value judgments.’ ‘Instrumental value judgments’ should 
make a scientific discussion possible and fruitful. They can take the form of: 
(1) assessing the internal consistency of the value premises from which various 
normative judgments are derived, (2) deducing the implications of these 
value premises in the context of the specific circumstances to which they are 
used, (3) observing the factual consequences of different ways of achieving 
normative judgments (Runciman, 1968, pp. 564, 565; Weber, 1949, pp. 20, 21). 
‘Methodological value judgments’ cannot be checked, but without them science 
could not exist. They are the main assumptions of scientific approaches. In value-
free economics ‘methodological value judgments’ are for example invisible hand, 
equilibrium and effectiveness of markets, instrumental rationality (WARP), and 
revealed preference theory. Even though we cannot find an objective basis to 
compare them, we need to investigate these values. Scientists must practice 
a “contemplative attitude” towards these values (Schweitzer, 1970, pp. 18, 19). 
Contemplation here does not mean indifference towards values but impartiality. 
Scientists must accept subjectivity of science, and this is why they should be 
self-consciously subjective. What kind of implication it has on value-free 
economics? Most importantly, many economists tried to eradicate every value 
from economics. In the light of Weber’s distinction, it is impossible, because we 
still have ‘methodological value judgments’ in economics. Economists should 
use Weber’s insight, because it enables them to realize the normativity of their 
fundamental assumptions which many treated as positive. Thanks to that, 
they will be better prepared to see the implications of their theories. Moreover, 
it would encourage them to dismiss the assumptions that do not work. 
The concept of ideal type is the next methodological idea of Weber that is 
essential in the context of value-free economics. ‘Ideal type’ is a methodological 
construction which is based on some fictional assumptions about people 
or reality. We exaggerate and emphasize significant characteristic of social 
phenomena and then we classify them into a model that is useful for the 
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researcher (Reiss, 2013, p. 110). It goes without saying that ideal type is only 
simplification and its purpose is not to describe people’s behavior correctly.12
In economics, there is a long tradition of using ideal types. Machlup (1978, 
p. 298) suggests that homo economicus should be perceived as a Weberian ideal 
type (see also (Morgan, 2006)). The main purpose of ideal type is to predict the 
future. It should be a useful heuristic device for scientists. However, Weber 
does not claim that scientists should be solely focused on prediction. He also 
underlines the importance of generalization about a social phenomenon which 
has explanatory power (Reiss, 2013, p. 110). Secondly, Weber warned against 
perceiving ideal types as covering laws that claim universal applicability. For 
him this misunderstanding has led to “naturalistic monism in economics” 
(Weber, 1949, p. 86). His warnings come true and some economists believe that 
homo economicus is a real human (Thaler, 2015). 
In times of Weber the distinction between is/ought was treated as something 
obvious and Weber was not an exception. He believed that a distinction between 
fact and values exists. Nowadays, however, due to Kuhn and others (e.g., 
(Feyerabend, 1993; Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1980; Rorty, 1979)), we know that this 
distinction is fragile and even facts are theory-laden is some way. Many scientists 
tried to reconcile scientific statements with their unavoidable relativisms. Nagel 
was a philosopher who tried to protect Hume’s guillotine. He made a distinction 
between ‘characterizing value judgments’ and ‘appraising value judgments,’ 
which is similar to Weber’s distinction between ‘instrumental value judgments’ 
and ‘methodological value judgments.’ Nagel’s ‘characterizing value judgments’ 
contain criteria that can be assessed. For example, it can be done by logic or data. 
Different judgments can be compared thanks to objective criteria. On the other 
hand, ‘appraising value judgments’ evaluate states of the world. For example, the 
desirability of a particular kind of human behaviour or assessment of the outcomes 
that are created by that behaviour. Scientists cannot choose between ‘appraising 
value judgments’ because there are no objective criteria to do so. There is only 
political and social power. Nagel understands that science cannot work without 
values. However, he believes that science can be free, at least, from ‘appraising 
value judgments’ and scientists can use ‘characterizing value judgments’ that can 
be compared by the scientific method (Nagel, 1961, pp. 492–495).
A similar distinction was made by Sen. He distinguishes ‘basic’ and ‘nonbasic’ 
value judgments. Sen explains that “a value judgment can be called ‘basic’ 
to a person if the judgment is supposed to apply under all conceivable 
12 Rodrik (2015, pp. 43, 44) presents Borges’ story On the exactitude of science to make a point 
about models in economics. The story is about society that builds maps. With time, they 
want to describe world more realistically (build ideal map) and in the end they build map 
in scale 1:1. Rodrik uses this analogy because he wants to show that models must be always 
simplified to be useful.
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circumstances, and it is ‘nonbasic’ otherwise” (Sen, 1970, p. 59). This distinction 
is essential, because it draws the line between sciences and nonscience. If we 
have basic or pure value judgments like freedom and we do not consider any 
other value (e.g., well-being), then it is impossible to have a discussion, because 
discussion assumes that we can change our opinion due to the arguments that 
are presented. The essence of science is a discussion within which we can change 
our values and opinions. Thus, only ‘nonbasic’ judgments make science possible. 
Blaug also observes that the methods which try to give scientists the tools to discuss 
values are not ironclad. He writes that “the difference between the methods of 
reaching agreement on methodological judgments and value judgments is one 
of degree, not of kind” (Blaug, 1992, p. 116). Blaug (1992, pp. 114, 115) notices 
that there is a difference between is and ought statement, but “at the deep 
philosophical level, this distinction is perhaps misleading”. He underlines that 
so-called facts also must rely on the acceptance of some rule of the scientific game 
which strives for objectivity. However, it will never be achieved completely, 
because acceptance of scientific rules depends on the scientific community and 
it is done by persuasion. The similar point was made by McCloskey (1983, 1985). 
Although Blaug agrees that science in the end is theory-laden, he thinks that 
Nagel’s distinction between characterizing (methodological) and appraising 
(normative) judgments is real and significant (Blaug, 1992, pp. 114, 115). Without 
this difference, we fall into absolute relativism which does not offer a lot. Some 
difference between is/ought is necessary, which can be observed in the case 
of Myrdal (1970) who argues that every statement is equally value-laden.13 
If we look from black and white perspective, we will not see a grey area in the 
case of value-ladenness. Of course, the inflation rate is theory-laden. Economists 
decide normatively which products and services should be inclined in this 
measurement. However, when the inflation rate is presented, it is the same rate 
for everyone and this kind of objectivity is essential for science. 
The purpose of this subchapter was to demonstrate that scientists cannot escape 
from values. They always make some ontological, epistemological, and ethical 
preassumptions. Scientists need to deal with them, even though (especially) 
it is impossible to decide which of them are true. From this perspective, it seems 
convincing that economists should work on normative approaches which concern 
human happiness. Of course, at the core they deal with normative statements. 
However, thanks to instrumental value judgments, scientists can check if they 
are logically consistent and if they are supported by the evidence. In the case 
of methodological value judgments which cannot be eradicated from science, 
it can be concluded that it is better to put these values on the table and point 
them out explicitly rather than hiding these values in disguise as it is mostly 
done in positive economics (e.g., welfare economics).
13  However, some argue that this perception of Myrdal is a simplification, see (Hodgson, 2000).
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5.4. Consequentialism versus deontology
There are two main systems that investigate human values: consequentialism 
and deontology. In Chapter 2, the problems of consequentialism in value-free 
economics were presented where a qualitative difference between values like 
altruism and self-interest utility was made. It was demonstrated that utility used 
by economics can mean everything. In this section, the goal is not to compare 
the two large ethical systems (consequentialism and deontology), but to present 
and argue for a difference between intrinsic and instrumental values. Intrinsic 
values are independent of consequences, and their existence is necessary if we 
want to choose which self should be in control. Kant’s deontological system is 
presented as an attempt to establish the ultimate intrinsic values. 
Before discussing these two ethical systems from the above-mentioned 
perspective, we need to underline the difference between ethical propositions 
and preferences. The former are the statements about a rank order of preferences 
among alternatives and they apply to more than one person, whereas preferences 
(tastes) apply only to one person. If one says: “I prefer x to y,” this is a personal 
value judgment or a taste. On the other hand, if one says: “x is better than y,”
there is an assumption that one expects others to prefer x to y. This is why 
a moral proposition is a “common value” (Boulding, 1969, p. 2). Individuals 
often act from moral motives, and this is why economics needs to examine 
them. Understanding consequentialism and deontology is also important in the 
context of human happiness. The former approach is connected with subjective 
well-being, whereas the latter refers to objective well-being. 
In general, deontology and consequentialism are completely contrary to 
each other and always have fierce apologists. In general, consequentialism 
determines the value of an act by the goodness of the state of events that they 
lead to (consequences). Deontological theory assigns intrinsic value to some acts 
which are independent of their consequences. For example, breaking a promise 
is wrong itself, no matter what consequences are (Broome, 1992). Of course, as 
every ethical theory, these two also face criticism. However, from the perspective 
of value-free economics one problem associated with deontology is essential. 
If one performs an act, the consequences are interconnected with performing an 
act. So, if the act is intrinsically good or bad, then the consequence can be also 
good or bad. As Broome (1992, p. 3) puts it: 
When evaluating the consequences of the act, there is nothing to stop our 
including the value of this consequence along with others. In this way the 
intrinsic value of the act can be taken into account within an evaluation of the 
consequences.
Therefore, consequentialism can take into account the intrinsic value of acts 
which seem to be deontological. For example, imagine the moral dilemma 
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where one made a promise (Williams, 1973). If one keeps it, five promises made 
by the other people will be broken. However, if one breaks a promise, these 
five promises will be kept. The rest of the consequences will be equal (ceteris 
paribus). Should this person break her promise or keep it? One answer is that she 
should break it because breaking promises is intrinsically bad and breaking the 
promise in this scenario will bring this bad thing. On the other hand, keeping 
one promise will bring five promise-breaking which is five times as bad. 
Therefore, it is better on balance to break one’s promise and this is what she 
should do. However, this answer is in the spirit of consequentialism. Although 
it takes account of an intrinsic value of promise-keeping, it does it within the 
context of utilitarian calculus.14 How intrinsic values can be taken into account 
by consequentialism was presented in the case of Becker. For him it is possible 
because economics understands utility ad libitum and every value (e.g., good, 
friendship, love) are put in the “bottomless pit” of utility (Ostapiuk, 2017b, 
pp. 73, 74). Even though sometimes there are problems with establishing the 
precise line between deontology and consequentialism, it does not mean that it 
is impossible to distinguish values from utility. Moreover, one needs to this if 
one wants to construct a comprehensive theory of well-being.
The above-mentioned distinction is necessary because, as was indicated in 
Chapter 3, subjective well-being approach has many limitations. This utilitarian 
approach is consequential, because it measures how much happiness each 
action provides and it assumes that people should behave to maximize utility. 
For utilitarians, good is defined in pleasure or happiness. There is nothing 
controversial in saying that happiness has an intrinsic value. However, as was 
indicated in the case of Freud and drugs, it is problematic to agree that happiness 
is the only thing that is intrinsically good because freedom has an intrinsic value 
as well. In the case of preferences, utilitarianism has a problem with answering 
the question “is the satisfaction of preferences an intrinsic good, like pleasure or 
happiness, or is it good instrumentally because it leads to consequences that are 
good in themselves?” (Sagoff, 1986, p. 3). We cannot argue that the satisfaction 
of preference is intrinsically good, because some preferences are racist, sadistic 
or unjust.15 This is the reason why utilitarian calculus cannot be used in some 
cases. However, to know the limits of utilitarian calculus, we need to establish 
some values that are independent of utility. 
14 Nozick (1974) famously uses the structure of this example. There is an act (initiation of police 
force) that violates some people’s rights (people will be taxed and Nozick considers it as 
a violation of rights). However, it will prevent greater violations of rights (murder, rape, 
robbery, and so on). 
15 Harsanyi (1977, p. 33) rejects the utilitarian calculus in the case of “sadism, resentment or 
malice”. The problem of malicious preferences is frequently used against consequentialist 
utilitarianism, e.g., malicious dictator that takes pleasure in killing or torturing people.
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Value-free economics assumes that satisfaction of preferences is not intrinsically 
good but it should be instrumentally perceived. So, economists assess the 
satisfaction of preferences good, insofar as it increases welfare/well-being/
utility of the person.16 However, as was indicated in Chapter 1, this perspective 
does not mean anything, because economists define utility or welfare in terms 
of the satisfaction of preferences and they assume that people always maximize 
their utility. It seems to prove that instrumental reasoning in economics has 
severe limitations. Moreover, the tautologicality of the single dimension utility 
that contains everything (every intrinsic value) was observed by many scholars. 
For example, Brennan (1989, p. 197) writes that “utility is that which an agent 
maximizes through choices, but as defined within economics it has no empirically 
or normatively meaningful existence outside those choices”. Because both utility 
and preferences are defined by choice, it is impossible not to maximize them. 
Due to these problems, Brennan is sympathetic to multiple utility framework in 
which there are different values that cannot be compared in one-dimensional 
utility framework (Brennan, 1989). As was indicated before, multiple utility 
framework can be quite useful to distinguish self-interest from altruism 
(e.g., ‘commitment’ and ‘sympathy’ (Sen, 1977, p. 326)). Lutz agrees with 
Brennan and argues that multiple utility framework has “heuristic function” 
because it promotes a better understanding of human behavior (Lutz, 1993, 
p. 151). Moreover, he indicates five big problems with singe-utility maximization. 
Three of them are essential from the perspective of this book.
1. Because economists assume that agents are unable not to maximize, they 
cannot see a possibility of market disequilibrium. As Boland (1981, p. 1035) 
puts it, “those economists who put maximization beyond question cannot 
‘see’ any disequilibria”.
2. Single-utility maximization undermines “X-efficiency” (Leibenstein, 1966) 
and “satisficing” (Simon, 1957). In Leibenstein’s “selective rationality,” 
people select the extent to which they deviate from maximization behavior. 
They decide how much to constrain their behaviour for the sake of others. 
If one insists that “all is maximization.” there would be no place for any 
degree of “maximization deviation” (Leibenstein, 1979, p. 485). Similarly, 
Simon’s “satisficing” is meaningful only if it is distinct from maximizing. 
It is possible when the levels of aspiration are variable. The problem of 
satisficing was presented previously in the case of instrumental rationality 
in which satisficing could be explained in terms of maximization. One just 
needs to add the constraints within which people maximize their utility 
like time or cognitive abilities. 
16 From mainstream economics’ perspective, preferences ranking is neutral and does not have 
any intrinsic (good or bad) value.
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3. Experimental research in psychology provides evidence of potential costs 
which are the result of an economic focus on incentives (Lutz, 1993). The 
subjects of the study engage in different intrinsically meaningful activities 
like drawing or puzzle solving. In spite of the fact that no (extrinsic) reward 
is necessary for people to find these activities rewarding, it is provided 
anyway. Later, when the pecuniary incentives are suddenly withdrawn, 
the subjects lose all interest in the activity. Therefore, the introduction 
of pecuniary incentives undermines self-motivated behaviour, and it 
suggests that instrumental motivation (money) does not mix well with 
intrinsic motives. Lutz argues that “this is probably as close as we can get 
to empirical evidence on the existence of two different types of ‘utility’” 
(Lutz, 1993, p. 152).17
After analysing some criticism of consequentialism, we can move to deontology. 
Of course, there are many approaches which are based on deontology but we are 
focused on Kant. His approach is a perfect example for two reasons. Firstly, he is 
perceived as the most prominent supporter of deontology. Secondly, he puts reason 
on the pedestal and his argumentation will be especially useful in the discussion on 
the capability approach. In general, deontology is an ethical system which regards 
morality as a duty that ought to be followed. It is about following universal norms 
that tell us how people should behave and what is right or wrong. Deontology is 
about principles which are independent of consequences. Moreover, deontology 
is predominately based on reason in opposition to utilitarianism which is mainly 
based on feelings (pleasure and pain). Reason provides moral rules which are 
indicated by a human will which makes freedom possible. In deontology, a moral 
problem is perceived to be a rational one and can be resolved by finding the right 
moral rule (Van Staveren, 2007). 
Kant is the most prominent representative of deontological ethics because of 
categorical imperative. It is a rule that judges whether some action or maxim has 
moral status. Categorical imperative establishes duties that must be followed to 
act morally despite the cost to the agent. In general, most people know only one 
formulation of categorical imperative, whereas Kant distinguishes three of them, 
see (White 2004). The first one which is most know is “act only according to that 
maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal 
law” (Kant, 1993, p. 30). This imperative is based on consistency. If everyone 
lies (adopts a maxim of lying), no one will believe anything that anyone said. 
The second version is the Formula of Respect (Dignity of Persons): “act in such 
a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (Kant, 
17 For a survey of such research, see the citations in (Schwartz, 1990). See also (Frey, & Jegen, 
2001; Frey, & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy, & Rustichini, 2000; Lepper, & Greene, 1978).
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1993, p. 36). This form is founded on respect for the dignity of humanity. When 
people lie, they are using their humanity, as well as people whom they deceive, 
as merely a means to an end. This rule is not only a negative principle that 
prohibits using others as means but it also teaches one to take the other people’s 
ends as one’s own. The third version is the Formula of Legislation for a Moral 
Community. It is very similar to the first version of categorical imperative 
“so act as if your maxims were to serve at the same time as a universal law (for 
all rational beings)” (Kant, 1993, p. 43). The last version as the first underlines the 
importance of universalization. However, it emphasizes the legislative nature of 
the will. The third formulation leads us towards the ‘kingdom of ends,’ an ideal 
state of the world where every person’s individual ends exist side by side in 
a harmonious, moral community. 
In the common opinion, Kant is identified with strict duties that are connected 
with categorical imperative. However, Kant’s ethical system is much more 
sophisticated and deals with happiness and other ends as well. To understand 
the richness of Kant’s approach we need to analyse the Kant’s distinction between 
two types of duties, perfect and imperfect (White, 2004). A perfect duty is one 
that must be followed, or one “which permits no exception in the interest of 
inclination” (Kant, 1993, p. 30). Such duties are mostly negative duties. For 
example, duties not to steal or not to lie. Perfect duties are mostly derived from the 
Formula of Autonomy or of Universal Law and they are founded on the logical 
inconsistency of the forbidden act. On the other hand, imperfect duties are those 
that people have some latitude in executing – “the law cannot specify precisely in 
what way one is to act and how much one is to do” (Kant, 1996, p. 152). Imperfect 
duties grant latitude in following them because they only prescribe ends that must 
be followed, like duties of self-improvement or beneficence. These are usually 
positive duties which assign general attitudes to be taken up, not specific acts to 
be performed. Happiness was treated by Kant as imperfect duty “to secure one’s 
own happiness is a duty (at least indirectly); for discontent with one’s condition 
under many pressing cares and amid unsatisfied wants might easily become 
a great temptation to transgress one’s duties” (Kant, 1993, p. 12).
To conclude, perfect duties are perceived as duties of action, whereas imperfect 
duties are perceived as duties of ends. When perfect duties bound people to 
a certain action, imperfect duties demands the adoptions of ends that must be 
pursued. However, it does not mean exclusions of the other ends, even those 
connected with self-interest (White, 2004). 
White (2004, 2006, 2011) presents an interesting attempt to incorporate Kant’s 
duty-based ethics into the standard economic model of rational choice. He in-
corporated Kant’s categorical imperative into the neoclassical model of choice 
by making use of Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. These 
two types of duties can be integrated into the model of constrained preference 
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satisfaction, because perfect duties are included as constraints (alongside 
the standard budgetary and time constraints), whereas imperfect duties are 
included alongside the agent’s other options in the preference ranking. It is 
essential for White to perceive the concept of preference in the formal sense 
in which no hedonic desire is implicated by preferences in general. However, 
“some of them are based on self and other-interested inclination and the others 
are based on imperfect duty” (White, 2006, p. 7). Because the term preference is 
very loaded, White uses more neutral terms like “ranking” or “ordering” (White 
2006, p. 7). In White’s model when people maximize their utility (understood 
as an index of preference satisfaction) including above-mentioned premises, 
they are respecting their perfect duties (by observing the constraints) as well as 
following their imperfect duties. White (2006, p. 7) concludes that “as long as the 
duties are followed for the sake of duty and not for another reason, the agent is 
choosing her actions according to Kant’s basic system of ethics”. 
Why it is so important for White to move from loaded term preferences to 
neutral term rankings? It is a case because many economists assume that people 
must be self-interested and with this assumption, a person cannot be moral in 
the Kantian sense. Moral action is solely motivated by duty. Therefore, people 
cannot be motivated by the argument that being truly honest will benefit them 
in the long run. Even if one gives to charity because one derives satisfaction from 
being moral (it feels good), it is not a moral action in a Kantian sense because 
acting based on desire, even if admirable, is not moral. To be moral, one’s actions 
must be performed out of duty, not merely according to duty. To sum up, we 
cannot perceive perfect duties as preferences because perfect duties cannot be 
perceived within the maximization framework. 
This distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is essential from White’s 
perspective. He treats perfect duties as some kind of commitment (White, 2006, 
p. 3) that we stick to, no matter the consequences. Here, we find some similarity 
of White’s perception of duty to intentions and precommitment strategies. 
All of them distinguish values and goals from utility which is identified with 
preferences. White uses this distinction because he wants to propose, within 
neoclassical economics framework, the alternative ethical system to utilitarianism. 
On the other hand, the distinction between values and utility is essential in the 
context of this book because it undermines the revealed preference theory and 
starts a debate about human happiness. However, both approaches are the same 
at one point. Their aim is not to eradicate the framework of preference ranking 
but to make a distinction between values and utility which are perceived as the 
same in value-free economics. 
Many economists observe that value-free economics has problems with 
explaining ethically-motivated behaviors which are prevalent among people. 
Value-free economics tried to resolve that by introducing a “taste for morality” 
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(White, 2006, p. 1). It is argued that people get utility from helping others. 
However, this explanation fails to seize what is special about moral motivation 
and this argument was presented in detail in Chapter 2 in the context of 
economic approach. The models based on duty explain behaviours like voting 
or tipping which baffled economists who try to explain them by broadening the 
understanding of self-interest. White (2006) indicates that commitment (moral 
rules) can override considerations of self-interest. Over the last four decades, 
many scientists have been trying to model ethically-motivated behavior and 
commitment, see (Brekke, Kverndokk, & Nyborg, 2003; Dowell, Goldfarb, 
& Griffith, 1998; Etzioni, 1987, 1988; Goldfarb, & Griffith, 1991a, 1991b; Minkler, 
1999; Rabin, 1995; Sen, 1977, 1987; Van Staveren, 2001). For an overview see 
Hausman et al. (2017). 
In the next chapter, we will analyse one of the deontological approaches – the 
capability approach which tries to establish objective goals without limiting 
freedom. We will see whether we can have a cake and eat a cake.
Chapter 6
The capability approach
Rationality is not only about maximizing;
 it is also about reflecting on what to maximize 
(Hédoin, 2013, p. 19)
6.1. Introduction 
A few words of introduction are necessary before analysing the capability 
approach. The capability approach is a flexible framework which can be 
interpreted in different ways. It is not a flaw because it was done purposefully 
by Sen who is a founder of this approach. However, it means that it is necessary 
to indicate for what purpose we use this approach. In this book, the capability 
approach is perceived as a deontological approach. Firstly, it treats freedom, 
which is connected with reason, as an intrinsic value. Secondly, Sen is a fierce 
critic of the consequentialist approach taken by economics. He underlines that 
choice alone is not enough to understand human behaviour. Some argue that 
the capability approach is mostly compatible with virtue ethics (Van Staveren, 
2007). However, this perception fits better to Nussbaum (2011) who writes about 
human flourishing and is strongly influenced by Aristotle. In my book, the main 
focus is on Sen who is also influenced by Aristotle, but his approach is closer to 
deontology. It is especially noticeable in the context of neoclassical economics 
which Sen criticizes. This is the point of departure for the capability approach. 
The purpose of this chapter is to use the capability approach as a tool to give 
the primacy to well-being and freedom. However, both of them are much more 
sophisticated than similar concepts used in neoclassical economics. 
6.2. The criticism of neoclassical economics 
Before introducing the capability approach, Sen had been comprehensively 
criticizing neoclassical economics for years. He especially criticized the revealed 
preference theory and neoclassical economics’ understanding of rationality. 
Some of this criticism was presented in Chapter 3. However, it is vital to 
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shortly summarize the previous points and have them in one place because 
the capability approach is built on this criticism. Sen (1973) argues that there 
is a deep conceptual ambiguity at the core of the economic theory of rational 
choice. Neoclassical economists use the concept of preference to accomplish 
three different tasks: (1) to describe a person’s choices, (2) to represent whatever 
motives underlie a person’s choices, (3) to represent a person’s welfare. For 
Sen, one concept of preferences, which is seen at the moment of choice, could 
not do so many completely distinct things. Therefore, he replaced one concept 
of preferences with three distinct concepts (choice, underlying motive, and 
welfare). Secondly, he proposed an alternative model of human behaviour – 
commitment (Anderson, 2001).
The second large conception that Sen criticizes is economic rationality which 
is a fundamental assumption for revealed preference theory. Sen (2002, 
p. 19) indicates that there are three different perceptions of the rationality in 
economics: (a) rationality as internal consistency of choice, (b) rationality as self-
interest maximization, (c) rationality as maximization in general. Sen criticizes 
each of these assumptions and this criticism was already presented in this 
book. The first assumption was criticized in the context of menu-dependence. 
The second assumption was criticized in the case of commitment. The third 
assumption refers to instrumental rationality. It was demonstrated to what 
absurd conclusions not reflecting about goals leads. 
For Sen the assumptions behind revealed preference theory and rationality have 
implication in real life. In welfare economics, the concept of preferences is used 
to (1) make judgments about individual welfare, (2) make judgments about 
the overall good of society, (3) articulate a principle of rational choice (utility 
maximization). Sen argues that none of the three concepts of preference (choice, 
underlying motive, perceived self-interest) measures well-being accurately. 
Moreover, preference identified with choice (revealed preferences) fails to do 
so as well (Anderson, 2001, p. 3). For Sen the main reason for that is the fact 
that people have motives that are wider and even counter to their self-interest. 
He called these motives commitments. In Chapter 2, the terms ‘sympathy’ 
and ‘commitment’ were introduced. However, they must be analysed further 
because the concepts of sympathy and commitment are essential for Sen who, as 
was indicated earlier in this book, characterizes them as: 
The former corresponds to the case in which the concern for others directly 
affects one’s own welfare. If the knowledge of torture of others makes you 
sick, it is a case of sympathy; if it does not make you feel personally worse off, 
but you think it is wrong and you are ready to do something to stop it, it is 
a case of commitment. (Sen, 1977, p. 326)
The existence of commitment is essential because it demonstrates that we are 
social animals and we care for the other people and this fact is not fully taken into 
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consideration by value-free economics. Sen makes this point explicit when he 
writes: “I would argue that the philosophy of the revealed preference approach 
essentially underestimates the fact that man is a social animal and his choices 
are not rigidly bound to his own preferences only” (Sen, 1973, p. 253). Moreover, 
the concept of ‘commitment’ demonstrates that people do not always try to 
maximize their well-being. Therefore, individuals’ choices do not always reflect 
their personal welfare. It is not uncommon that people can distinguish between 
the questions: “Which is better, all things considered?” and “Which is better 
for me?” (Hausman, 2011, p. 7). Individuals’ ability to perceive the situation or 
their interest from the perspective of ‘impartial spectator’1 is essential for Sen. 
It means that reason can be objective in contrast to emotions.
In general, Sen criticizes the standard notion of economic welfare because it is 
based only on utility and it does not contain other values. He writes: ”Welfarism 
is an exacting demand, ruling out essential use of any non-utility information” 
(Sen, 1979, p. 478). However, his criticism refers not only to welfarism but to 
happiness as well. As Sen (1985c, pp. 188, 189) indicates: 
Happiness has two basic problems in its claim to stand for well-being. First, 
as it is interpreted in the utilitarian tradition, happiness is basically a mental 
state, and it ignores other aspects of a person’s well-being. If a starving wreck, 
ravished by famine, buffeted by disease, is made happy through some mental 
conditioning (say, via the ‘opium’ of religion), the person will be seen as doing 
well on this mental-state perspective, but that would be quite scandalous. 
Second, as a mental-state concept, the perspective of happiness may give 
a very limited view of other mental activities. There are mental states other 
than being just happy, such as stimulation, excitement, etc., which are of direct 
relevance to a person’s well-being. Furthermore, mental activities involve 
valuation of one’s life – a reflective exercise – and the role of valuation in the 
identification of the person’s well-being obviously cannot be seen in terms 
merely of the happiness that such reflection itself creates. It is hard to avoid 
the conclusion that although happiness is of obvious and direct relevance to 
wellbeing, it is inadequate as a representation of well-being. 
Sen highlights the two main problems of the hedonistic approaches towards 
happiness (e.g., subjective well-being approach). They are only reminded here 
because they were presented in Chapter 3 in more detail. Firstly, people’s 
preferences are malleable.2 Secondly, happiness approach seems to ignore the 
importance of freedom as an intrinsic value.
The criticism towards welfarism makes Sen one of the main characters in 
the debate on human development, and this is probably the area where the 
1 Introduced by Hume and Smith. More about this conception in (Ostapiuk, 2017b).
2 This critique was earlier presented by Berlin. He argues that when people’s lives are 
characterized by the obstacles and deprivation, they avoid important desires by retreating to 
their “inner citadel” (into themselves), because this give people some psychological security 
(Berlin, 2002, pp. 181–187).
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capability approach has the most significant impact. Both human development 
and capability approach indicate that we should look more holistically at 
people’s well-being and that economic growth should not be the only goal of 
development. Sen’s approach is connected with the HDI index and with the 
attempts to measure human well-being by the other measures different than 
GDP (Godłów-Legiędź, 2008; Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2010). Sen is also well-
-known for using the capability approach to reduce poverty worldwide. 
The capability approach is also prominent among scholars who deal with justice 
and the question how to distribute goods. For example, Sen (1999) uses the 
capability approach to determine what we should do in the following situation. 
The woman is hiring an unemployed labourer to work in her garden. There 
are three applicants, each of them would do much the same amount of work 
for the same fee. The employer is a reflective person and she wonders whom 
of these people should she hire. Sen imagines that the woman asks herself how 
by choosing from the applicants she can do the most good. Should she choose 
the poorest candidate (reduce poverty)? Should she choose the candidate who 
would gain the most happiness from being employed (increase happiness)? 
Alternatively, should she choose the candidate for whom the job would make 
the most significant difference to “the quality of life and freedom from illness”? 
(Sen, 1999, p. 54). The story is about alternative ways of distributing a resource 
among three individuals. The first approach is income-egalitarian, the second 
is about classical utilitarianism, and the third one is about capability approach. 
Even though in this section the focus is put on individuals and their well-being, 
not distribution, the understanding of capability approach also provides an 
answer to the issue of justice. 
6.3. Functionings and capabilities
It can be useful to give a definition of the capability approach first and 
later explain what does it mean. So, the capability approach is a theoretical 
framework which is based on two normative assumptions. First, freedom to 
achieve well-being is of primary moral importance. Second, freedom to achieve 
well-being is to be understood in terms of people’s capabilities, that is, their 
real opportunities to do and be what they have reason to value (Robeyns, 2016). 
To understand what each of these statements means we need to introduce the 
terminology used by Sen (‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’). At first, they seem 
unintuitive but one needs to comprehend what they mean to understand the 
capability approach.
Sen uses the example of a bicycle to explain the idea of functioning. A bike 
can be used as a means of transport or it can be sold. One can run alongside 
it while someone else is pedalling, etc. Therefore, a bike is a physical mean of 
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achieving something. It can be the ability to get around but also going out with 
friends, or getting into training for a cycle race, etc. The functioning is whatever 
each person achieves by using a bicycle (Ballet et al., 2013, p. 11). Functionings
can be divided into ‘being and doings’ which are the various states of human 
being and activities that people can undertake. For example, beings are: being 
educated, being illiterate, being well-nourished, being undernourished, being 
part of a circle of friends, being part of a gang. The second group ‘doings’ are, 
for example, caring for an older parent, taking drugs, travelling, eating animals, 
playing with children, arguing. 
These examples should indicate that many functionings can be described either 
as ‘being’ or as ‘doing’. We can state that a person is housed in a pleasantly warm 
house, or that this person does consume lots of energy to keep her house warm 
(Breton, & Sherlaw, 2011). On the other hand, many functionings are much more 
straightforward and they are either being or doing, for example, being healthy 
or eating animals. Secondly, ‘functionings’ is a theoretical category and in itself 
it is morally neutral. Functionings can be unambiguously good (e.g., being in 
good health) or bad (e.g., being injured). Some functionings are stable. Being 
well-nourished demands more or less the same amounts of commodities (food 
and health services). However, the other functionings depend on the society in 
which we live. One of Sen’s favorite examples of such functioning is ‘appearing 
in public without shame’ which is an example given by Smith. He observed 
that working men in his times wore linen shirt to work because without it they 
felt ashamed, whereas working men in ancient Egypt or Rome did not have 
shirts and it did not cause psychological distress (Sen, 1992, p. 115, 1999, pp. 73, 
74). This example shows that some functionings differ in every society. This 
relativism means that the capability approach is a very flexible framework. 
Functionings not only differ among different societies but also within one 
society. We can assess differently goodness or badness of some functionings 
because of the different values that we cherish. Robeyns (2016) to point these 
differences out asks: 
is the care work of a mother who is caring full-time for her child a valuable 
functioning or not? A conservative-communitarian normative theory will 
most likely mark this as a valuable functioning, whereas a feminist-liberal 
theory will only do so if the care work is the result of an autonomous choice 
made against a background of equal opportunities and fair support for those 
who have duties to care for dependents. 
For Sen this diversity of functionings is a positive feature. He argues that 
functionings which are “the various things a person may value doing or being” 
(Sen, 1999, p. 75) give us the possibility to assess social welfare better than 
in the case of utility because they take into considerations the differences in 
individuals’ values. 
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The next essential term in the capability approach is ‘capability’. It is 
a potential functioning, which implies that it is a potential achievement. The 
idea refers to ‘what one could do or be’ and it differentiates capability from 
functioning where ’what one does and is’ (Breton, & Sherlaw, 2011, p. 151). 
For example, a functioning such as ‘to have friends’ would be translated into 
a capability “to be able to make friends if one wishes to” (Breton, & Sherlaw, 
2011, p. 151). Sometimes capabilities are realized and become functionings. 
However, in general, capabilities are perceived as the set of alternatives that 
a person has. Moreover, these alternative options are real opportunities for 
being and doing different things (Foster, & Sen 1997, pp. 199, 200). Therefore, 
if one starves because of one’s religion (fast) and this is one’s choice, then we 
mean capability. However, if one starves, because one does not have money 
to buy food, it is not capability, because one does not have the opportunity to 
do otherwise. It was not one’s choice to starve. For Sen freedom is an essential 
part, because he identifies it with capability. When functionings are the part 
that constitutes well-being (achievements), capabilities are the freedom to 
choose and to accomplish these functionings. Capability as freedom is an end in 
itself. We should not treat capabilities as solely means to achieve functionings. 
Capability is also a reflection on functionings that are worth achieving and 
that can be achieved. If functionings are valuable for us and they constitute 
well-being, then capability represents a person’s freedom to achieve well-
-being (Sen, 1992, p. 49). To properly understand what capability means, we 
need to analyze the concept of freedom which is very specific and complicated 
in Sen’s approach. It is done in the next subchapter. Then, the term capability 
should be more approachable. 
Before moving to the investigation of the concept of freedom, it is necessary to 
underline that the capability approach is focused on end not means as it is done 
in value-free economics. From this perspective, the capability approach is in 
line with Weber’s approach to values in science because all normative values 
are explicitly ‘put on the table’ and it is known what our goals of pursuit are. As 
in Plato’s Meno “if you don’t have any idea what you’re looking for, you won’t 
ever find it” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 15). The capability approach deliberately 
relies on the means-ends distinction. In this approach, we always should be 
explicit when valuing something, whether we value it as a means to a valuable 
end or an end in itself. In the capability approach, the ultimate ends are people’s 
capabilities. Therefore, it asks if people are able to be healthy (capability) and 
if they have access to means (resources) for this capability such as clean water, 
access to doctors or protection from diseases (Robeyns, 2016). The primary 
reason why in capability approach we assume that it is better to focus on the 
ends rather than means is that people differ in their ability to convert means 
into valuable opportunities (capabilities) or outcomes (functionings) (Sen, 
1992, pp. 26–28, 36–38). Because ends are what ultimately matter if well-being 
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is considered, the means only work as a good approximation of people’s 
opportunities to achieve those ends on the condition that all people have the 
same capacities to convert these means into equal capability sets (Robeyns, 
2016). To understand what does it mean exactly, we can get back and use the 
example of a bike. As was indicated before, we are not interested in a bike 
itself, but in what we can use it for. A bike enables the functioning of mobility 
– to be able to move oneself freely and faster than walking. Because people 
have different abilities, they will get more or less from the bike. The relation 
between a good (bike) and the achievement of certain beings and doings 
(functioning) is called ‘conversion factor’ (Sen, 1992, p. 100). It is a degree to 
which a person can transform a resource into a functioning. An athletic person 
who was taught to ride a bicycle when she was a child has a high conversion 
factor enabling her to turn the bicycle into the ability to ride aptly. Whereas 
a person with a physical impairment or someone who was never taught to 
ride a bike has a very low conversion factor. Therefore, the conversion factor 
represents how much functioning one can get out of a good or service; in this 
example, how much mobility the person can get out of a bicycle (Robeyns, 
2016).
Being focused on ends has two additional advantages besides capturing inter-
individual differences. Firstly, the valuation of means will keep the status of an 
instrumental valuation and will not change itself into the intrinsic valuation. For 
instance, money or economic growth will not be valued for their own sake, but 
only in so far as they contribute to an extension of people’s capabilities. Secondly, 
by starting from ends, we do not assume that there is only one important means 
to that ends (as income) but we ponder which types of means are essential for 
the fostering of a particular capability (Robeyns, 2016).
6.4. Freedom as an intrinsic value
To begin with, it must be underlined that Sen treats freedom as an intrinsic value. 
In general, the capability approach is agnostic when it comes to a valuation with 
one exception, freedom. Sen criticizes Friedman’s idea ‘free to choose’ (Fried-
man M., & Friedman R., 1980) because it values freedom for the utilitarian reasons 
(more freedom = more utility). This should make him an ally with libertarians 
who also perceive freedom as an intrinsic value which is independent of 
consequences. However, Sen differs from libertarians in the way he understands 
freedom. Libertarians, as well as most economists, perceived freedom in negative 
terms. In general, “negative view of freedom focuses precisely on the absence 
of a class of restraints that one person may exercise over another, or indeed 
the state may exercise over individuals” (Sen, 1988, p. 272). It is often called 
‘freedom from.’ We can also perceive freedom in positive terms where we are 
concentrated on what people can achieve or what kind of life they can have. 
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It is sometimes called ‘freedom for’ (happiness, wealth, etc.). This distinction 
was famously made by Berlin (1958).3 Sen refers to this distinction: 
if a person happens to be poor and hungry because of low real wages or 
unemployment, without his having been prevented (by the state or by some 
strong-armed individual) from seeking a higher wage or finding employment, 
then the person’s negative freedom may not have been, violated, even though 
his positive freedom from hunger is clearly compromised by circumstances. 
(Sen, 1988, pp. 272, 273)
Sen thinks that negative freedom used by economists is not enough and we should 
perceive freedom in positive terms. However, the distinction between positive 
and negative freedom does not represent accurately Sen’s view on this matter, 
see (Qizilbash, 2011). His understanding of freedom is much more sophisticated 
and it involves both positive and negative freedom. Sen (2002, p. 510) argues that 
there are three main features of freedom which are interconnected: (1) opportunity 
to achieve; (2) autonomy of decision; (3) immunity from encroachment. The first 
two are connected with positive freedom but to achieve them we need to have 
guaranteed the third one which is negative freedom. 
As was indicated in the context of the capability approach, freedom concerns 
“the real opportunity that we have to accomplish what we value” (Sen, 1992, 
p. 31, 1999, p. 74). It does not include freedoms or opportunities that people can 
hold theoretically but they lie beyond their reach in reality4 (e.g., be as wealthy 
as Bill Gates). This is why in the capability approach more choices that people 
have are not always better. For example, “capabilities are, by definition, limited 
to functionings of value; they exclude evil or harmful functionings” (Alkire, 
2005, p. 121). Sen also argues that having more options does not automatically 
lead to an increase in freedom. Firstly, a new option may not be one that we 
value. Secondly, even if the option is valuable for us, more options (freedom of 
choice) may crowd out our ability to live “a peaceful and unbothered life” (Sen, 
1992, p. 63). Sen highlights that “indeed sometimes more freedom of choice can 
bemuse and befuddle, and make one’s life more wretched” (Sen, 1992, p. 59).5
In general, Sen is not against having more choices, but he thinks that freedom of 
choice does not always increase one’s freedom. 
The second point, autonomy of decision, is also complicated in Sen’s approach. 
It refers to the distinction between freedom and control (Sen, 1982). Freedom 
includes “a person’s ability to get systematically what he would choose no matter 
3 The idea of distinguishing between a negative and a positive sense of the term ‘liberty’ goes 
back at least to Kant, see (Carter, 2018).
4 Rousseau has similar view “truly free man wants only what he can do and does what he 
pleases” (Rousseau, 1979, p. 84).
5 Schwartz (2004) demonstrates that having more choices can have negative implications for 
people.
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who actually controls the levers of operation” (Sen, 1992, p. 65). For example, if 
we had a choice, we would choose to work in a smoke-free environment. This 
is why a public programme to prohibit smoking in common work areas does 
boost our freedom. It would be a case even if we were not asked about this 
issue directly. In the absence of this public programme, we would not have the 
freedom to work in a smoke-free environment. Our freedom is enhanced even 
though the number of alternatives from which we can choose does not increase 
(it even decreases because we lose the freedom to smoke). This example shows 
that for Sen the direct control is not the only expression of freedom (Alkire, 2005, 
pp. 120, 121). 
Although Sen argues that direct control is not necessary, he thinks that 
individuals’ choices must be respected and they cannot be overridden by 
somebody else. For him freedom is not connected with decisive choice but with 
decisive preference. Sen (1983, p. 19) presents the example of a person whose 
preferences related to medical treatment are respected even if she is unconscious 
to show why preferences are more important than choice in the case of freedom. 
In this example, a person’s preference for averting a certain treatment guides the 
doctor even if the doctor thinks that it will reduce the probability of the patient’s 
recovery. Sen believes that a person’s liberty is preserved in this case. This is 
why he is in favour of a broader conception of freedom in which the preferences, 
not the direct choices are vital. He makes this point explicit when he writes that 
“To see liberty exclusively in terms of who is exercising control is inadequate” 
(Sen, 1983, p. 19).
If we look at the example with the doctor and smoke-free environment, Sen’s 
idea can look paradoxical. In the first case, the state can decrease the number of 
choices, whereas the doctor cannot change patients’ choice even if it is considered 
harmful. However, there is no paradox here, because in both cases individuals’ 
preferences are what really matters, and what people really want. In the example 
of a smoke-free environment, we want all along not to smoke, and in the case 
with the doctor (before falling into a comma) the patient does not want some 
treatment. In both cases, individuals’ real preferences are respected. If we look 
at the example with smoke-free environment, we can notice that freedom is 
connected with well-being. However, it does not mean that Sen equalizes these 
values. Even though he thinks that well-being is fundamental, he argues that 
freedom is more important. 
The example with the smoke-free environment should only demonstrate that 
not all choices increase individuals’ freedom. However, it does not mean that 
the state should decide what is good for people irrespectively of what they want. 
Even if the action of the state improves people’s well-being and provides a good 
functioning, in such case people will not enjoy the capability of functioning, only 
“good functioning fortune” (Pettit, 2001, p. 9). As was indicated before, having 
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an option of achieving functioning is distinctive from the capability of attaining 
those functionings. For Sen, the latter is the main criterion of evaluation “quality 
of life is to be assessed in terms of the capability to achieve valuable functionings” 
(Sen, 1993b, p. 31). Capability is so important because it is connected with 
freedom and in some respect guarantees it. Sen writes that “the freedom to 
lead different types of life is reflected in the person’s capability set” (Sen, 1993b, 
p. 33). Sen understands that well-being is important but freedom is important as 
well. Moreover, he thinks that some forms of well-being will be better for being 
freely achieved (Sen, 1993b, pp. 39, 43).
Why does Sen think that freedom has an intrinsic value and well-being does not? 
To answer this question, we need to look back at commitment and sympathy. The 
distinction made by Sen demonstrates that people have different motivations 
than their well-being. Therefore, freedom does not necessarily mean improving 
one’s well-being. Because a person’s goal can differ from a person’s well-being, 
“it is important to distinguish between a person’s pursuit of individual well-
-being and a person’s pursuit of overall agency goals, where this latter concept 
includes all the other reasons that motivate individuals to act in the ways they 
do” (Davis, 2003, p. 153). In this context, the agency is not being perceived as in 
neoclassical economics but, as Sen points out, in its “older and ‘grander’ sense 
as someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be 
judged in terms of her own values and objectives” (Sen, 1999, p. 19). Secondly, 
if being free to seek different goals is valuable to people, it is essential to make 
a distinction between the freedom to achieve one’s goals and the freedom to 
pursue one’s goals (Davis, 2003, p. 153). These two distinctions result in four 
concepts of individual advantage which are indicated by Sen: (1) well-being 
achievement, (2) agency achievement, (3) well-being freedom, (4) agency freedom 
(Sen, 1985a). The first concept refers to the concern of neoclassical economics 
in individuals’ interest in satisfying their own preferences. The second concept 
concerns individuals’ ability to achieve goals that do not need to involve their 
own well-being. The third concept concerns individuals having the freedom to 
pursue their own well-being. The fourth concept concerns individuals having 
the freedom to pursue all their goals, no matter if they are successful in achieving 
them (Davis, 2003, p. 153).
Although these conceptions are distinct from each other, sometimes they 
overlap. Sen argues that we cannot choose and focus on one of these conceptions 
and ignore the rest. Sometimes these different goals can be in conflict. For 
example: 
if your riverside picnic is interrupted by the chance to rescue someone from 
drowning, then your agency freedom (and hopefully achievement) increases, 
because you can save someone’s life; but your achieved well-being diminishes, 
as you emerge cold wet and hungry. (Alkire, 2005, p. 122) 
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From the perspective of the above-mentioned examples it should be clear that 
Sen considers freedom as an intrinsic value. In his opinion, freedom gives people 
the possibility to have the life they have reason to value. The last part, ‘reason to 
value’,6 means that Sen underlines the importance of reason. He does not think 
that all individuals’ preferences (desires) enhance freedom and well-being. 
He sees reason as the necessary condition for freedom and autonomy. Therefore, 
the last issue in our analysis of the capability approach is the question if and 
why reason guarantees freedom and autonomy. This question is especially 
important in the context of value-free economics in which rationality is perceived 
instrumentally and it can be identified with Humean approach. 
6.5. Reason and autonomy
There are a few different perceptions of autonomy in philosophy. There is moral 
autonomy which started with Kant. It implies the capacity to ponder and to give 
oneself the moral law. There is political autonomy where one’s decisions are 
respected within a political context. In this book, the focus is put on the third 
concept of autonomy – personal autonomy. In general, this idea refers to the 
capacity to be one’s own person, to live life in line with motives and reasons that 
are perceived as one’s own, not as the product of external forces (Dryden, 2018). 
To discuss personal autonomy, one needs to assume that a true or authentic 
self exists. In fact, the idea of autonomy is strictly connected with a discussion 
about self and its constitution. As was pointed out in the discussion on personal 
identity, the idea of one self should not be taken for granted. Nowadays, many 
scholars support the socially constituted view of self. They argue that we 
cannot talk about autonomous ‘true’ self because we cannot consider agents in 
abstraction from social and relational commitments and contexts. For example, 
communitarians like Michael Sandel criticize the concept of autonomous self 
which is a fundamental assumption in liberal political theory. They argue that 
a person is embedded and shaped by social values and commitments. People 
do not choose their commitments and values from the position of already 
being autonomous individuals. The autonomous self does not exist prior to the 
commitments and values that constitute the basis for its decisions (Sandel, 1998). 
The idea of an autonomous self, which is based on reason, was also criticized 
by Romantics who reacted against the universality of reason introduced by the 
Enlightenment (e.g., Kant). They had their own conception of individuality 
in which passions are more important than reason in developing one’s own 
unique self. This focus on emotions is also critical in phenomenological and 
existential philosophy where being ‘authentic’ is highly praised (Adorno, 1973; 
6 He used it 29 times through the book (Sen, 1999).
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De Beauvoir, 1949; Hegel, 2002; Heidegger, 1962; Kierkegaard, 1980, 1983, 1992; 
Sartre, 1992; Taylor, 1992). 
These approaches which criticize personal autonomy based on reason will 
not be developed further for two reasons. Firstly, when the term ‘emotion’ is 
used in this book, it does not refer to some broad, metaphysical sense like inner 
life. It refers to the situations when people fall into temptations and smoke or 
eat unhealthy food, which are chosen against their better judgment (reason). 
Secondly, this book does not have any pretension to propose a new metaphysical 
theory of self. The goal is much humbler. It is to provide a distinction between 
reason and emotions which is not underlined in value-free economics. 
The discussion between emotions and reason is very old and it started with 
philosophy itself.7 However, we deal with only two great philosophers, Kant and 
Hume, who are nevertheless essential in the context of this book. The first one is 
identified with reason and can be perceived as a supporter of value-based and 
goal-oriented economics in which we discuss human goals and values. On the 
other hand, Hume makes a case for emotions and can be perceived as the father 
of neoclassical economics which is value-free, because it is not entangled in the 
discussion about human goals. Some of the problems with Humean approach 
were indicated in a discussion on weakness of will. Now the question concerns 
even bigger issues: personal autonomy and free will. 
In the first chapter, Hume was presented as a champion of instrumental 
rationality. He writes that “[r]eason alone can never be a motive to any action of 
the will”, and “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (Hume, 
1896, pp. 282, 283). For Hume, passions in themselves cannot be called irrational 
or unreasonable because: 
a passion must be accompay’d with some false judgment, in order to its being 
unreasonable; and even then ‘tis not the passion, properly speaking, which 
is unreasonable, but the judgment […] a passion can never, in any sense, be 
call’d unreasonable, but when founded on a false supposition, or when it 
chuses means insufficient for the design’d end. (Hume, 1896, p. 284) 
What Hume is saying is that for an act to be irrational, the desire which was 
a cause of the action must be founded on false belief. The only way for an act 
to be irrational is to be ineffective (not to use proper means to achieve an end). 
Therefore, we can only say that a drunk is irrational not because he is drunk 
but because he drinks apple juice instead of vodka. Effectiveness is one of the 
axioms of value-free economics and it is the only way for value-free economics 
to judge some action as irrational. 
7 Plato’s famous dichotomy between reason and emotions, and his allegory of charioteer and 
horses (Plato, 1999).
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In the instrumental view of rationality, the action is finally determined by 
psychological states. Therefore, an instrumental theory of choice presents a casual 
explanation of human action which has the same structure as the explanation 
that can be found in natural sciences. Kant understands that we need to accept 
this approach to explain the choices made by people because they are part of 
the physical world and we need to perceive their actions as having physical 
explanations (Sugden, 1991). However, Kant thinks that when people reason 
they have to perceive themselves as autonomous. We must conceive ourselves as 
able to form beliefs and reach conclusions which are not determined by external 
causes. Therefore, when people reason what actions to take, they must perceive 
themselves as being able to determine their actions. Kant thinks that reason has 
to regard itself as the creator of its principles which are independent from the 
alien influences. From this perspective, Humean passions are perceived as alien 
influences, because it is impossible to reason coherently about what to do when 
we think that our choices are fully determined by our psychological states.8
However, the purpose of Kant is not to prove that people are really autonomous. 
He argues that we cannot engage in any form of reasoning without presupposing 
our own autonomy (Sugden, 1991, p. 6).
The second feature of Kantian autonomy is the fact that an autonomous 
individual is one whose actions are governed by the laws that one imposed on 
oneself. Kant agrees with Humean instrumental rationally and he perceives 
it as the source of hypothetical imperative (if you want to achieve X, then 
do Z). However, there is another form of rationality which refers to categorical 
imperatives (do X, regardless of your wants). From this perspective, a choice is 
rational, if it is prescribed by some principle which can be a universal law for 
all rational agents (Sugden, 1991). We can find the analogy here with White’s 
model of Kantian ethics in neoclassical economics framework in which perfect 
duties are connected with categorical imperatives and imperfect duties with 
hypothetical imperatives (White, 2004). The conclusions from this model were 
the same as in the case of rationality. There is a qualitative difference between 
moral laws and preferences as well as between rationality and instrumental 
rationality. In the end, Kantian categorical imperative cannot be embraced by 
the traditional economic framework. 
For Kant reason is strictly connected with freedom and autonomy. Why can 
emotions not be perceived in the same way? Can we even assess whether 
emotions are rational or irrational?9 A negative answer to this question comes 
from two premises. Firstly, emotions being predominately involuntary cannot 
be perceived as actions. Secondly, only freely chosen actions can be assessed to 
8 This state is called ‘heteronomy’ by Kant (1993).
9 The discussion about rationality of emotions is very extensive and there is no possibility to 
present it in this chapter (see (De Sousa, 1990)).
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be rational or irrational (Elster, 1996, p. 8). Each of these premises was questioned 
but the explanations are far from being convincing. The first premise (emotions 
are involuntary) was questioned by the authors who argue that emotions are 
chosen by people (e.g., (Sartre, 2015; Schafer, 1976; Solomon, 1980)). For them, 
emotions are actions in the same way as mental calculations are actions. Elster 
gives a commonsensical objection to these theories. He writes: “If we can choose 
our emotions, why do we not choose to be happy all the time? And why would 
anyone ever choose to be sad?” (Elster, 1996, p. 8). The second premise seems to 
be at variance with the idea of rational belief. People form beliefs, but they do 
not choose them. Actually, it is commonly accepted that the idea of deciding to 
believe is self-contradictory (Williams, 1970). 
Frankfurt (1971) also argues that emotions (desires) do not make people free. As 
was only briefly indicated in Chapter 2, the condition when people are tossed by 
their desires Frankfurt called “wanton” (Frankfurt, 1971, p. 11). The predominant 
feature of a wanton is that it does not care about people’s will. The desires move 
people to do a particular thing without asking them either that they want to be 
moved by those desires or that they prefer to be moved by the other desires. 
For Frankfurt ‘wanton’ is the feature of young children and animals. We do 
not perceive wanton as having freedom of will even though we recognize that 
animals can be free to run in whatever direction they want. Therefore, Frankfurt 
(1971, p. 9) argues that “having the freedom to do what one wants to do is not 
a sufficient condition of having a free will”. Here, Frankfurt makes a distinction 
between being free to do what one wants and being free to decide what one 
wants. These concepts are completely different:
A person who is free to do what he wants to do may yet not be in a position 
to have the will he wants. Suppose, however, that he enjoys both freedom of 
action and freedom of the will. Then he is not only free to do what he wants 
to do; he is also free to want what he wants to want. (Frankfurt, 1971, p. 14) 
In order to explain this difference, Frankfurt provides the idea of ‘second-order 
desires’ which was introduced in the second chapter briefly. For Frankfurt 
(1971), the capacity to have second-order desires (see meta-ranking (Sen, 1977)) 
distinguishes humans from other forms of life. Moreover, free will should be 
perceived as the ability to choose in accordance with one’s second-order desires 
(called also ‘metapreference,’ ‘metarankings,’ or ‘preferences over preferences’). 
It means the ability to construct the preferences that one would prefer to have.10
10 However, higher preferences do not automatically imply that they are better and people 
should follow them, Example of that is presented by Hollis (1983). Suppose a “conflicted” 
gay male who prefers men to women but prefers to prefer women because he is socially 
pressured. This person has a third-order preference for men. In such cases, Hollis argues, the 
agent would be better off trying to adjust his metapreference so as to bring it in line with his 
preference (as well as with his third-order preference)
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Metapreferences and the idea of hierarchical self are frequently used by 
philosophers in debates on personal autonomy. When we look at Frankfurt’s 
second-order desires, it is possible to see that this approach is much closer to 
Kant than Hume. Although individuals have preferences (first-order desire) as 
in Humean approach, they can reason and reflect on their preferences, and this 
is where the ‘true’ self lies. However, metapreferences approaches are not as 
strict as Kant’s approach, because they allow the influence of society in shaping 
values (see (Sen, 1973); to know more about differences between Kant’s and 
Sen’s approaches see (Pauer-Studer, 2006)).
In the 1970s, Frankfurt with Dworkin were among philosophers who started the 
contemporary discussion on personal autonomy. The goal was to decide what 
kind of individual freedom should be protected and how it can be presented 
from the perspective of contemporary conceptions of free will. Their conclusion 
was that people’s actions are worth protecting, if they are ingrained in values, 
general commitments and objectives that people have. On the other hand, 
they are not worth protecting, if they go against those values, objectives, and 
commitments. Both Frankfurt and Dworkin use hierarchical models in which 
an agent is autonomous only if her first-order desire is accepted by a second- 
-order desire which is identified with volition (Frankfurt, 1988, pp. 12–25). This 
approach is neutral when it comes to the origins of higher-order desires. It does 
not exclude the desires and values that are socially constructed. The cause of such 
desires does not matter, only the agent’s identification with them (Frankfurt, 
1988, pp. 53, 54). Autonomy concerns our ability to examine and ask whether we 
do identify with our desires or whether we may wish to override them (Dworkin, 
1988). ‘We’, in this case, is established by our higher-order preferences. Dworkin 
as Frankfurt speaks of them as the agent’s “true self” (Dworkin, 1988, p. 59).
Identifying freedom with reason and reflection about desires is a common 
theme in philosophy. In general, freedom refers to the self-determination of 
a subject who possesses both reason and will (Ballet et al., 2013, p. 4). More 
fundamentally, freedom refers to the choice of a particular way of life that reflects 
one’s values and commitments. It is a different account than negative freedom 
used in neoclassical economics where it is enough for people to act upon their 
autonomous preferences. Therefore, the concept of freedom presented in this 
book is the choice of values and commitments that reflect the life one is living 
(Ballet et al., 2013, p. 6). We need to keep in mind that self-determination does not 
mean the choice alone as it is in neoclassical economics (revealed preference) but 
the capacity to choose. In other words, the capacity to evaluate and re-evaluate 
one’s choices (Ballet et al., 2013, p. 6) which can be identified with precommitment 
strategies and intentions. Sen’s concept of self and personal autonomy is very 
similar to the above-mentioned philosophical concepts. For him the concept 
of self or person which is connected with commitment is explicitly reflexive. 
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This means that individuals are able to engage in reasoning and self-scrutiny. 
Sen (2002, p. 36) writes that: 
A person is not only an entity that can enjoy one’s own consumption, 
experience, and appreciate one’s welfare, and have one’s goals, but also an 
entity that can examine one’s values and objectives and choose in the light of 
those values and objectives. 
Moreover, Sen’s perception of personal identity (self) which relies on reflexivity 
is essential for morality. He argues that only self-scrutinizing and reasoning 
individuals who are isolated from the instrumentality of self-goal choice can make 
commitments to others. It is so because only individuals who self-reflect are able 
to recognize the non-instrumental and intrinsic value of social rules (Davis, 2005, 
p. 23). These rules do not serve as means to some ends but can be ends in themselves. 
Self-scrutiny is essential for Sen, because it can also constitute personal identity. 
It takes distinctness of people as the essential element in any account of 
personal identity. It is so because the act of taking oneself as a separate object of 
deliberation is equal to perceiving oneself as distinct and independent (Davis, 
2005, p. 23).11 Although Sen argues for the primacy of reason as it was done by 
Kant, he differs from him considerably, because the Noble Prize winner includes 
society in shaping values. For Sen there is not one strict path to establish values. 
People are social animals and their values are shaped by the society in which 
they live. Sen (2002, p. 215) writes that: 
Community, nationality, race, sex, union membership, the fellowship of 
oligopolists, revolutionary solidarity, and so on, all provide identities that can 
be, depending on the context, crucial to our view of ourselves, and thus to the 
way we view our welfare, goals, or behavioral obligations. 
At the end of the discussion on personal autonomy, we get back to the issue 
of personal identity. These two concepts are inextricably linked. In general, 
to indicate individual we must be able to initiate some course of action 
because this alibility distinguishes a source from which something occurs. 
In neoclassical economics, agents act upon tastes that are imposed on them 
(they act upon the preferences they have), which makes it problematic to detect 
personal autonomy or identity in this approach.12 Sen’s idea of self is entirely 
different because he perceives agents as self-scrutinizing beings that can assess 
their desires by the overall values and goals and according to these values and 
goals. For Sen this is real freedom. Having in mind the discussion on personal 
identity and autonomy it seems justified to conclude that economics concepts 
11  We can see the influence of Smith on Sen once again. Self-securitization can be identified with 
Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’ which also takes other people into consideration (see (Ostapiuk, 
2017b)).
12 The point that agents in neoclassical economics do not have freedom was made by Lawson 
(1997).
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of personal identity and autonomy are too simplified and they do not reflect 
the intricacy of the long-lasting debates in philosophy. 
6.6. The criticism of the capability approach
Over the last years, the capability approach has attracted a lot of attention 
from different fields of science. As it is not uncommon, with popularity comes 
criticism. In this section, some part of this criticism is presented. There are two 
reasons why not every criticism of the capability approach is examined. Firstly, 
much criticism refers not to capability approach itself but to the implications 
of this approach. As was indicated before, Sen deliberately designed a flexible 
framework which can be used in different ways. Therefore, the problems with 
his framework frequently concern the implementation of the capability approach 
and not the framework itself. Secondly, the criticism predominately concerns 
a social aspect of Sen’s approach. The focus in this work is on individuals, so 
there is no need to broaden the scope here. 
There are two main kinds of criticisms of the capability approach that will be 
analysed. The first one concerns a philosopher Marta Nussbaum. However, 
this criticism can be perceived more as the expansion of Sen’s work than 
its dismissal. Nussbaum indicates three differences that distinguish her 
capabilities approach from Sen’s approach. Firstly, she criticizes Sen for not 
dismissing cultural relativism explicitly. Although Sen has sympathy for 
universal norms, he was not able to reject cultural relativism completely 
(Nussbaum, 2000). Secondly, Nussbaum criticizes Sen for not establishing his 
theory in the Aristotelian framework in which human functioning is essential. 
Nussbaum argues that Sen uses the structure of Aristotelian approach but 
he did not make it explicit. If he did, he would be able to provide the lists of 
central capabilities (see (Kleist, 2018)). Nussbaum creates such a list herself, 
which is one of her most significant contribution to the capability approach. 
In general, she is mostly interested in a theory of basic social justice and in this 
area she used the capability approach. She used the list of central capabilities 
to develop a theory of ‘universal fundamental political entitlements’ where 
entitlements are given, by a list of ten central capabilities: (1) life, (2) bodily 
health, (3) bodily integrity, (4) senses, imagination and thought, (5) emotions, 
(6) practical reason, (7) affiliation, (8) other species, (9) play, and (10) political 
and material control over one’s environment (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 33, 34).
From the beginning, the list has been fiercely debated, which was encouraged 
by Nussbaum who pointed out that the capabilities on the list can be changed.13
However, the list has not been changed since its beginning. 
13 At the beginning, Nussbaum (1995) argued that her list was static but later she changed her 
mind.
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In general, it must be stated that Nussbaum’s criticism towards Sen is the result 
of the Aristotelian tradition from which she descends. Nussbaum is focused on 
the goals (telos) and human flourishing. This is why she tries to switch the main 
focus in Sen’s capability approach (freedom) towards well-being. It is visible 
when she wants to dismiss the distinction made by Sen between well-being 
freedom and agency freedom. She argues that “the distinction is obscure and not 
useful to one who, like Sen, has rejected (on good grounds) utilitarian notions 
of well-being” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 200). Nussbaum argues that this distinction 
is not needed, because in her approach we are focused on capabilities rather 
than functionings and the practical reason has a fundamental place in the list of 
capabilities. She writes that “because what is valued is the freedom to do or not 
to do, agency is woven throughout” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 201). 
However, many philosophers who deal with the capability approach, state that 
the distinction between well-being and agency is useful. For instance, agency 
may refer to particular sacrifices one might want to make of one’s own well-
-being out of commitment to collective values (e.g., the environment) or out of 
commitment to the value of the quality of life of others (e.g., the decision of an 
adult child to care intensively under difficult circumstances for her terminally 
ill parent) (Robeyns, 2011). In these cases, people can easily distinguish between 
the course of action which is the best for them (well-being) and which is a thing 
they value the most (agency).
In general, the differences between Sen and Nussbaum are not so significant and 
we can perceive these approaches as complementary rather than opposing each 
other. Both Sen and Nussbaum have a high regard for each other. The differences 
in theories can be a result of the different goals that Sen and Nussbaum set for 
themselves. Sen is more interested in the assessment of the quality of life, whereas 
Nussbaum tries to implement her theories in social justice. In this book, Sen’s 
approach is used because it gives primacy to freedom. It guarantees pluralism 
where everyone can build their own system of values. Thanks to that, we should 
not fall into a dogmatism (‘basic’ value judgements (Sen, 1970)). Freedom is 
a good foundation for the different normative approaches and Nussbaum can 
be treated as one of the thinkers that implements Sen’s framework. 
The second kind of criticism towards Sen’s approach comes from a completely 
different place. It concerns a threat to freedom because of the activity of the state. 
Especially these words written by Sen make libertarians very uncomfortable: 
Being free to live the way one would like may be enormously helped by the 
choice of others, and it would be a mistake to think of achievements only 
in terms of active choice by oneself. A person’s ability to achieve various 
valuable functionings may be greatly enhanced by public action and policy, 
and these expansions of capability are not unimportant for freedom for that 
reason. (Sen, 1993b, p. 44) 
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This paragraph causes many problems, because Sen has never really explained 
in detail how the democratic process and public reasoning could select and 
enhance valuable functionings. The process of choosing between functionings is 
important, because we know that some of them do not enhance individuals’ well-
-being and freedom. Thus, they do not deserve social attention (e.g., smoking). 
The critics of the capability approach identify it with an Aristotelian approach 
in which the most crucial issue is human flourishing. From this perspective, it 
does not seem controversial to judge negatively capability to smoke because 
it does not enhance human flourishing (Breton, & Sherlaw, 2011). This kind of 
conclusions come from Sen’s perception of capabilities in which people can “lead 
the kind of lives they value – and have reason to value” (Sen, 1999, p. 18). There 
is a potential ambiguity around the expression ‘reason to value.’ The critics of 
the capability approach used this ambiguity to question whether the capability 
approach, despite democratic deliberation advocated by Sen, could cause the 
infringement of personal freedoms like the freedom to smoke (see (Sugden, 
2006, 2010)). Sugden makes this point explicit when he writes that “my unease 
about Sen’s proposal is that it licences collective decisions that override some 
individuals’ actual desires about how to live their own lives, in favour of other 
people’s judgements about what people have reason to desire” (Sugden, 2006, 
p. 41). Sen (2006) dismissed such a critique. Qizilbash (2011) comprehensively 
explained why the Sugden’s criticism is the result of the misrepresentation of 
Sen’s approach. 
There is no need to delve into these dense explanations. However, a few points 
must be made to address some of Sugden’s concerns, because they are of 
great importance for public life in general. Firstly, it is true that the capability 
approach can be ambiguous, but it is a result of its flexibility. In the case of 
smoking, Sugden’s concerns can be justified, because Sen argues that the state 
which creates a smoke-free environment does not diminish but boost freedom. 
It is possible because we do not value choices for their own sake. They must be 
in line with our ‘decisive preferences’ ((Sen, 2002, ch. 20, 21), see (Pettit, 2001)). 
The problem that is indicated by Sugden is how we can know what individuals 
‘really’ want if we do not observe their choices. Also, how the state can decide 
which preferences are valuable and guided by reason? Although the unease 
of Sugden is justified, the conclusions that he draws (infringement of personal 
freedom) are not. 
It is a case because freedom in the capability approach has an intrinsic value 
and it is highlighted by Sen. We can observe that in the case of the doctor who 
needs to respect values and commitments of the unconscious patients even 
though they are bad for these patients and decrease their well-being (Sen, 
1983, p. 19). This example indicates that the capability approach is more about 
having appropriate information and knowledge to decide what people’s values 
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are rather than to decide which values are desirable for them. This is why Sen 
underlines the importance of the education system which increases people’s 
capabilities.14
The example of a comma is extreme, but one can imagine many situations in 
which people stick to the values that diminish their well-being. For example, 
imagine a conscious person who is Jehovah’s Witness and she does not want the 
transfusion of blood because of the religious values even though it means death. 
There is a question whether values are the result of social pressure and they are 
connected with the malleability of preferences as it was in the case of Arabic 
women or they are real values which are important to this person. There is no 
clear answer to this dilemma. However, it seems plausible that Sen would accept 
the decisions of Jehovah Witness even if it meant her death because freedom has 
an intrinsic value. However, before that, he would probably try to rationally 
discuss this issue with the patient and make her well-prepared for a decision. 
Of course, there always will be the question how much knowledge is enough 
to be able to make a well-informed decision. However, as was indicated in 
Chapter 5, we cannot escape from relativism, and lack of definite answers is not 
a sufficient reason to reject some conceptions. From this perspective, a public 
discussion advocated by Sen can provide more capabilities because people will 
have more information to reflect upon. It goes without saying that establishing 
which conditions are proper for decision making is paternalistic. However, 
because people live together in a democracy where government exists these 
conditions must be established somehow. 
The next problem with Sugden’s criticism is that his libertarian position implies 
that we can only know what people really want if we look at their choices. 
However, one of the main goals of this book was to establish that people often 
do not choose the best options because of cognitive biases. Moreover, negative 
perception of freedom, as in libertarianism, is too simplified to capture the 
convoluted connection between freedom and well-being which the capability 
approach tries to underline. Libertarian position is very similar to neoclassical 
economics view with revealed preference theory. Both use the same assumptions 
about personal identity and they perceive freedom as ‘free to choose.’ Therefore, 
the criticisms of neoclassical economics presented in this book will apply to 
some parts of libertarian argumentation as well. 
Although this criticism was presented, it concerns only individuals. The in-
teraction between the state and individuals are much more complicated and 
Sugden’s worries about infringement of freedom are justified. The discussion 
about happiness versus freedom is presented in the next chapter on the example
14 Being educated is described by Sen (1992) as a basic capability.
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of libertarian paternalism. It is checked whether the state can guarantee both 
of these things at the same time. Moreover, the idea of libertarian paternalism 
is presented as the practical implementation of the capability approach. 
6.7. Conclusions
Here I want to conclude the last three chapters. I do so, because they are 
interconnected and they form a part of a larger whole. The goal of Chapter 4 
was to investigate the concept of multiple self. The implications of this concept 
suggest that both revealed preference theory and subjective well-being do not 
properly describe and explain human happiness. It is visible on the example of 
hyperbolic discounting where choices over time cannot be compared by utility 
measures on which two previous approaches are based. Moreover, hyperbolic 
discounting demonstrates that people have different selves with completely 
different preferences and goals. To justify the concept of multiple self, the 
philosophical discussion on personal identity was presented. The conclusion 
from this debate is that the conception of stable self over time which is used 
in neoclassical economics is dismissed by many philosophers who indicate the 
problems with this idea. 
From this perspective and because of hyperbolic discounting it seems justified 
to distinguish between ‘long-term human’ and ‘short-term human’. The for-
mer has long-term values and goals and it can it be identified with reason and 
self-reflection. The latter is driven by emotions and temptations which are 
predominately connected with the short-term pleasures. Value-free economics 
assumes that the problem with different preferences over time does not exist 
because what people choose is what they want and it indicates who they are 
(revealed preference theory). However, comparing intertemporal choices by 
utility measurements seems impossible. This problem raises the question which 
self should be in control and which goals and values are more important. 
To answer this question, it is necessary to establish values that are independent 
of choice. The effective way to do that is to observe precommitment strategies in 
which the contest between ‘long-term’ and ‘short-term’ human is visible. The idea 
of precommitment is also connected with the discussion on weakness of will. 
The conclusion is that commitments and intentions are necessary to understand 
and accept the possibility of weakness of will. Without these conceptions many 
human behaviours do not make any sense. 
Value-free economics is reluctant to accept the conception in which values are 
independent of choices because the revealed preference theory is very effective. 
It is one of the reasons why economics has a dominant position among the 
other social sciences (economic imperialism). In Chapter 5, the conclusions from 
the contemporary philosophy of science were presented to indicate that it is 
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impossible for scientists to establish the absolute Truth and economists are not 
the exception. Therefore, there is no methodological higher ground for positive/
value-free economics and normative approaches are not intrinsically less 
scientific than positive approaches. It means that economics needs to investigate 
values. Weber is presented as a scientist who knew that scientists could not get 
rid of values in their research (Weber, 1949). This is why they need to rigorously 
scrutinize values and indicate them explicitly in their work. Economists need to 
put values on the table. Deontological approach, which shows values explicitly, 
was presented as the opponent of consequentialism which is used in value-free 
economics. Kant as a main figure of deontology was analysed to demonstrate 
that some parts of his theory (categorical imperatives) do not fit into the 
preference framework used in value-free economics. It means that morally or 
value-motivated actions cannot be fully incorporated into value-free economics.
In Chapter 6, the capability approach was presented as a way of establishing 
values independent of choice and that it can help us in better assessment of well-
-being. The capability approach criticizes conceptions of well-being proposed by 
both neoclassical economics (welfare) and economics of happiness (subjective 
well-being). However, the capability approach does not provide us with 
objective values besides freedom. Sen’s approach is a flexible framework based 
on freedom which enables people to find their own personal values and goals. 
Although it is a very personal approach, Sen’s statement that what matters is 
“our capability to lead the kind of lives we have reason to value” (Sen, 1999, 
p. 285) implies that our values are not random. Sen gives primacy to reason and 
self-reflection. This suggests that in some way he would support the ‘long-term 
human,’ not the ‘short-term human’ which is driven by emotions. Although 
Nussbaum extended Sen’s approach by giving primacy to well-being, Sen’s 
flexible framework is used in the book. The purpose of this chapter was not to 
indicate what is good for people as it was done by Nussbaum, but to show that 
economists need to choose normatively between selves. The primacy of reason 
indicated by Sen seems to support the author’s conception of ‘long-term human,’ 
because reason guarantees both well-being and freedom. 
In the next chapter, libertarian paternalism is presented to check whether it can 
provide both freedom and well-being and if the idea of ‘long-term human’ can 
be supported. Also, it is checked if it is even possible to discuss human goals and 
make decisions based on them in real life. Moreover, we will see whether the 
conclusions from previous chapters can be used to put libertarian paternalism 
on a more solid methodological ground. It can provide an answer to some 
criticisms of libertarian paternalism.
Chapter 7
Libertarian paternalism. 
The discussion on freedom and well-being
7.1. Introduction
In the previous chapters it was indicated, among other things, that we need to 
have a discussion about goals and what is good for people. Value-free economics 
was criticized from various perspectives. The revealed preference theory was 
the conception that was criticized the most. Mainly, it was pointed out that it 
is not always a good indicator of well-being. Value-free economics was also 
presented as a theory which was not descriptively accurate. Moreover, it is based 
on axiomatic assumptions which in the end lead the economic approach to be 
the degenerative programme. Value-free economics was also criticized from the 
epistemological perspective. It was argued that science should not be reduced 
to a process of building systems which are based on axioms and ‘objective facts.’ 
This criticism concerns the theoretical foundations of value-free economics. 
In this chapter, we derive practical implications from the criticism and
we introduce a normative approach that can resolve some of the above-
-mentioned problems. Underlining practical concerns is crucial, because the 
theoretical assumptions of value-free economics have a significant impact on 
the contemporary free-market society. Thanks to the mathematical models and 
unified methodology, economics has high predictive power which makes it 
commonly viewed as the most influential among social sciences. Economists 
are constantly invited to TV studios as experts. In general, they shape political 
and social reality in a greater degree than the other social scientists. The zenith 
of neoclassical economics’ influence was in the 1980s when Regan and Thatcher 
implemented some theoretical ideas of neoclassical economics into reality.1
After the 2008 crisis neoclassical economics experienced a backlash, but it has 
not changed the foundation of neoclassical economics (Fiedor, 2010; Ratajczak, 
2017). Still, the assumptions of neoclassical economics about negative freedom 
and rationality (people know what is the best for them) are very influential. 
In most of capitalistic and democratic societies it is assumed that giving people 
choice is enough (‘free to choose’ (Friedman, M., & Friedman, R., 1980)), because 
people are rational and autonomous and they know what is the best for them. 
1 For historical analysis of this process, see (Mirowski, 2002).
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In the end, value-free economics mainly leads to a normative political system – 
capitalism with the free market.2
It is important to underline that capitalism with its values has not been imposed 
on people. They really wanted it. Most people think that free will is about making 
choices which are unconstrained by the external factors. When one does as one 
wants (Monroe, & Malle, 2010). This view supports neoclassical economics’ 
view of freedom which is perceived as negative freedom (freedom from). This 
is why many people argue that a free market provides freedom in contrast to 
the government. Also, Stillman found that people’s understanding of free will 
is connected with morally responsible behaviour, achieving goals, self-control, 
deliberation, and conscious thought (Stillman, Baumeister, & Mele, 2011). It also 
means that people connect rationality with free will. 
In a capitalistic system it is assumed that people do what is best for them, 
because they are rational. This assumption together with the perception of 
people as autonomous entities is the foundation on which contemporary liberal 
democracies are based on. The purpose of this book and this chapter is not to 
dismiss the assumptions of rationality and autonomy, but to criticize these 
assumptions to improve them. 
The next reason for criticizing the consequences of value-free economics is 
the fact that the developed countries became much wealthier after the Second 
World War, but it did not make people happier (e.g., (Easterlin, 1974; Offer, 2006; 
Scitovsky, 1976)). The insight that consuming more goods does not guarantee 
happiness surprises only economists. The vast majority of philosophical 
approaches towards happiness argue that hedonism does not guarantee 
happiness. For them, it is a simplified version of well-being which contains 
much more than pleasures (Alexandrova, 2017; Bruni, & Porta, 2005, 2007; Bruni 
et al., 2008; Fletcher, 2015). Even hedonists like Epicurus or utilitarianists like 
Bentham understand that higher goods (e.g., intellectual pleasures) can give 
people more happiness rather than simple (sensorial) pleasures. Smith, the 
father of contemporary economics, also thought that the craving for material 
goods was not going to make people happy even if it was good for economy (see 
(Rasmussen, 2006)). The revealed preference theory was taken at face value in 
a capitalistic system. It is a problem because, as was indicated before, it was only 
proposed as a technical framework in order to make axiomatic assumptions of 
value-free economics work. It should never have been treated as a substantive 
theory of well-being (what is good for people), which is how it is predominately 
perceived in a capitalistic system.
2 However, it is important to notice that it can lead to different system. For example, socialism 
proposed by Lange. On the other hand, it is possible to be against neoclassical economics and 
be in favour of the market as Hayek (thanks for this comment to Professor Godłów-Legiędź).
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The technical assumptions of value-free economics seem to have a negative 
impact on society and people. Libertarian paternalism is presented as a normative 
conception that can help people with achieving both freedom and well-being. 
Besides the presentation of libertarian paternalism, one of the most important 
goals of this chapter is to provide a philosophical grounding to libertarian 
paternalism. It has not been sufficiently done by Thaler and Sunstein who were 
focused on the practical implications of their conception. The conclusions from 
the previous chapters are used to check whether some claims made by libertarian 
paternalism can be justified. Firstly, revealed preferences are not always a good 
indicator of well-being and this is why Thaler and Sunstein (2008) use the findings 
from behavioural economics and economics of happiness to discover what brings 
happiness to people. The conclusions from the discussions about precommitment 
strategies, weakness of will, and multiple selves are used as the arguments for 
libertarian paternalism. Moreover, libertarian paternalism is perceived from the 
perspective of the capability approach in which both freedom and well-being can 
be simultaneously satisfied. Furthermore, the criticism of libertarian paternalism 
is presented to indicate and establish the limits of this approach.
The next goal of this chapter is the discussion about freedom and happiness. 
The previous discussion on freedom and rationality is used in the context of 
libertarian paternalism which has a more sophisticated view about these 
issues than revealed preference theory. It is argued that sometimes we need to 
compare well-being with freedom and choose what is best for people. This is 
why freedom cannot be treated as a ‘nonbasic’ value (Sen, 1970) which cannot be 
discussed. In general, the discussion in this chapter is constrained to issues that 
were discussed previously in the book. The goal of this chapter is not an attempt 
to resolve the endless debate between libertarianism and utilitarianism. 
7.2. Psychological background
At the very beginning of their book, Thaler and Sunstein make a +distinction 
between ‘econs’ and ‘humans’ (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 7). This distinction 
is the result of the criticism towards homo economics in its most idealistic form 
where it is assumed that people are fully rational and can compute all the 
information. Humans, on the other hand, are ordinary people who are frequently 
irrational and they are influenced by cognitive biases. This distinction is the 
result of the psychological knowledge that people use two different thinking 
systems. Thaler and Sunstein named their systems ‘automatic’ and ‘reflective’ 
which in psychology are frequently referred to as ‘system 1’ and ‘system 2’ 
(Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 19). Despite the differences these two systems are 
interconnected, which was indicated in Chapter 4. Table 2 shows the differences 
between these two systems.
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Table 2. Comparing the automatic with a reflective system







Source: (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 20).
‘System 1’ is mainly responsible for the cognitive biases and heuristics which 
are identified with irrationality. If we had used only ‘system 2’, homo economicus 
would not have been only a theoretical model. However, as was indicated 
earlier in this book, the constant deliberation about every prosaic choice would 
make people’s lives unbearable, because it would take too much time to make 
some decisions. At the beginning of the 1980s psychologists and behavioural 
economists were focused on the errors of the system 1 to show the unreality of 
homo economicus (e.g., (Kahneman, 2011; Thaler, 2015)). Despite this criticism, 
the conclusion is that people are inhabited by both homo sapiens and homo 
economicus and ‘system 1’ works together with ‘system 2’ (Kahneman, 2011).3
It goes without saying that nowadays most economists do not perceive people 
as hyper-rational agents (econ) and they know about bounded rationality and 
cognitive constraints. However, other social scientists think that most economists 
really believe in homo economicus. Over the last years, homo economicus started to be 
a strawman that many social scientists criticize (Chmielewski, 2011; Cohen, 2014; 
Kahneman, 2011; Sedláček, 2011). Even though nowadays very few economic 
scholars really believe in homo economicus, it is still a popular conception among 
the supporters of a capitalistic system. Thaler and Sunstein spend a lot of time 
to demonstrate that people are not perfectly rational. They use the findings from 
behavioural economics to make that point. This knowledge is well-known in 
the literature and was presented through this book. This is why it will not be 
expanded further in this section.
3 The necessity of system 1 was famously demonstrated by Damasio (2005) on the example of 
Phineas Gage.
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7.3. Libertarian paternalism
7.3.1. Introduction
By the term ‘libertarian paternalism’ Thaler and Sunstein want to demonstrate 
that these two opposite systems can work together. The creators of libertarian 
paternalism have large ambitions and they perceived their theory as a ‘third 
way’ which can reconcile capitalism with socialism. For them laissez-faire and 
interventionism can work together. Thaler and Sunstein put their theoretical 
conception in a political context. They argue that the discussion between 
Democrats and Republicans which has been going from the time of New Deal 
(Roosevelt) does not make sense. From that time, we can observe a strong 
polarization both on political and social grounds. On the one hand, Democrats 
highlight market failures and they expect from the government to do something 
about them. On the other hand, Republicans underline the adverse outcomes 
of state intervention and they argue that a free market is ideal and it should 
not be constrained by the state under no circumstances. From this perspective, 
it seems that the consensus between these two camps is impossible. However, 
Thaler and Sunstein think that we can find common ground for these two 
opposite approaches and libertarian paternalism can be the ‘third way’ (Thaler, 
& Sunstein, 2008, pp. 252, 253).
Their theory contains both libertarian and paternalistic dimensions. Thaler and 
Sunstein argue that people should be free to do what they want. They use the 
famous wording presented by Friedman that people should be ‘free to choose’ 
(Friedman M., & Friedman R., 1980). The paternalistic dimension is the result of 
behavioural economics which indicates that people have cognitive constraints 
and they do not choose the best option. The important issue for Thaler and 
Sunstein is that people’s lives should be better. However, it does not mean that 
the state decides for people what is good for them. They should be better off by 
their own judgment (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 5). 
Libertarian paternalism is a weak, light and invasive type of paternalism. 
If people want to smoke cigarettes, eat too many sweets, choose the wrong 
health plan or not to save for retirement, then libertarian paternalists will not 
force them to do otherwise. On the other hand, this approach can be perceived 
as paternalistic, because ‘choice architects’ (later it will be explained what does it 
mean) try to push people in the direction of the choices that make people’s lives 
better by means of nudges. ‘Nudge’ is the title of Thaler’s and Sunstein’s book 
(2008). It is a vital part of the libertarian paternalism, because thanks to nudges 
choice architect can direct people towards the right decisions. 
Libertarian paternalism can be explained on the example of parents who raise 
their children. The very term ‘paternalism’ descends from Latin word pater
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(father) who can be identified with a strict parent who tells children what they 
should do and who does not give them the possibility to choose independently. 
On the other hand, parents can choose a stress-free upbringing where a child can 
do whatever it wants. Thanks to freedom it can learn to think and make choices 
independently. This approach should be identified with laissez-faire. The third 
option preferred in libertarian paternalism are parents that allow children to 
make their own choices, but simultaneously they establish the rules and norms 
to which children need to relate. Moreover, parents try to help children with 
taking the right decisions. Libertarians would question the adequacy of the 
above-mentioned comparison, because a grown person cannot be compared with 
a child. Parents can decide on behalf of children, because children have problems 
to make the right choices. Libertarians do not make a claim that everyone must 
decide for oneself. They give the example of children and psychotics for whom 
the decisions can be made by the others, because they cannot choose properly 
for themselves. However, for behavioural economics people have so many 
cognitive biases that they frequently do not choose in accordance with their 
own interest. This is why from behavioural perspective people sometimes can 
be treated as ‘children’ that should be helped. Of course, this approach results 
in the objections from libertarians that people are infantilized. This issue will be 
discussed later.
It is important to underline that paternalism has different forms and it is not 
necessarily as invasive as libertarians might think. Sunstein (2013b) shows the 
difference within the paternalistic position. One can imagine paternalism within 
which the influence is limited to the choice of means only. The second approach 
is paternalism within which the government decides about goals and which is 
much more invasive than the former. The example of ‘means paternalism’ is
the government that encourages or even presses people to have the fridges that 
have low maintenance costs because saving money is exactly what people want 
(Sunstein, 2013b). More invasive version ‘ends paternalism’ is the government 
that banishes some sexual activities even though they are people who derive 
pleasure from these activities and want them (Sunstein, 2013b). Behavioural 
economics and the founders of libertarian paternalism are focused on ‘means 
paternalism’ not the latter. The next distinction is between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
paternalism. ‘Hard paternalism’ contains methods like a prison, fine and other 
financial penalties. ‘Soft paternalism’ consists of warnings, default option 
and disclosure of information. In this context, nudges are the means of soft 
paternalism (Sunstein, 2013b). 
7.3.2. Choice architecture 
Thaler and Sunstein think that the state in libertarian paternalism should be 
a ‘choice architect’ who by using the default option directs individuals towards 
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decisions which would be taken if it were not for cognitive biases. The most 
frequently used example to understand how choice architect works is a person 
who is responsible for the arrangement of food in school cafeterias. The idea is 
to display at the beginning of a counter the healthy food and less healthy food 
closer to the cash desk. People want to eat healthily most of the time. However, 
they cannot resist the temptation and they reach for unhealthy food. Thanks 
to the proposed display of food, the temptation for unhealthy food is weaker, 
because it is harder to get them and individuals’ strong will is not exposed to 
the temptation. In this case, people still can choose unhealthy food if they really 
want it. On the other hand, it is easier to stick to the commitments for people 
who want to eat healthily but fall into the temptation (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, 
p. 2). According to Thaler and Sunstein, this option of the arrangement of food 
is the best if one looks at the alternatives. They gave the example of Carolyn who 
is a director of food services for schools and she must decide how to arrange the 
food for kids: 
1. Arrange the food to make the students best off, all things considered.
2. Choose the food order at random.
3. Try to arrange the food to get the kids to pick the same foods they would 
choose on their own.
4. Maximize the sales of the items from the suppliers that are willing to offer 
the largest bribes.
5. Maximize profits, period. (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 2)
The first option is attractive but very paternalistic. The second option’s 
impartiality can seem neutral but children in some schools will have a healthier 
diet than in other schools. The third option looks right, because we give children 
a choice. However, this system is not neutral, because the choice of children 
depends on the way in which the products are displayed. This is why it is so hard 
to know the true preferences of children. The fourth option is not interesting for 
us, because we are honest and we even did not think about cheating. The fifth 
option is interesting but problematic from the perspective of the person whose 
goal is the well-being of children (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, pp. 2, 3). 
The essential thing about choice architecture is that there are situations in 
which something or someone always has an impact on a choice. This is why 
neutrality does not exist. In some situations, the state cannot remain neutral and 
paternalism is inevitable (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 237). Therefore, it is better 
for the context of choice to be well-planned. This view challenges the libertarians’ 
belief that it is the best to give people as many options as possible from which 
they can choose. Thaler and Sunstein demonstrate that more options can work 
in contrary to people’s interests on the example of the privatization of the social 
security pillar in Sweden. People could create their own portfolios by selecting 
up to five funds from the 500 which were put on the list. The Swedes were 
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encouraged to make an active choice (the funds could advertise, every Sweden 
get a thick book with information about all funds). The system was introduced in 
2000 and at the beginning two third of people chose the portfolios on their own, 
whereas one third did not choose them and they were assigned to the default 
fund chosen by the state. With time, it occurs that the profit from the default 
fund was forth times higher than the average profit from the independently 
chosen portfolio. This example shows that giving a free choice for people is not 
always the best option. Especially when a choice concerns some complicated 
issues that most people have limited or no idea about (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, 
pp. 145–156).
Default option is the method that can be used by ‘choice architect.’ It is one 
of the easiest, cheapest and most effective nudges by which the government 
can direct people. It means that when people have many choices, one of them 
is the default option chosen by the government. If people do not choose the 
other options, they are assigned to some default option. This option has a strong 
influence on people because of ‘status quo bias.’ This term was introduced by 
William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser (1988). People’s need to maintain 
status quo evinces in many situations. Most teachers know that students have 
the tendency to sit in the same places in the classroom even though it is not 
sanctioned anywhere. The consequences of status quo bias can be much more 
serious. The research conducted in the 1980s among professors who participated 
in retirement plans shows that more than half of them had never changed the 
way the payments were made. As a result, the decisions concerning a division of 
assets that were made many years before have never been changed. Even though 
the situation on stock exchanges and knowledge of future seniors has changed. 
Status quo bias can be easily extracted and many firms do it. The examples of that 
are free subscriptions to newspapers or the other long-term contracts in which 
at the beginning people get free products but later they need to pay for them. 
It turns out that many people subscribe and buy these products even though 
they do not use them. What works here is the inertia effect. People just do not 
want to change anything (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, pp. 24, 25). 
Default option can have a major influence on people’s life, and organ donation 
is the best example of that. As it turns out, various countries differ entirely in 
the rate of organ donation. For example, 12% Germans donate, 100% Austrians, 
98% Belgians and 28% Dutch. These results come as a surprise, because these 
countries have similar cultures and economies. It has been found that in the 
countries with the low-rate of organ donations the default option was not 
donating organs. When one wants to donate one’s organs one has to declare an 
explicit consent, e.g., while receiving a driving license. On the other hand, in 
the countries where almost everybody donates their organs, the default option 
was donating organs. The minor change in default option has an impact on 
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the big social issue. Moreover, most people declare that they want to donate 
organs, but when it comes to making an effort and declare consent not many do 
it. The small inconvenience (effort) connected with the registration was enough 
to deter potential donors4 (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, pp. 178, 179).
Thanks to default option the problems with status quo bias can be resolved. 
The example is the program “Save More Tomorrow” proposed by Benartzi 
and Thaler (2007). The goal was to increase the rate of savings for retirement. 
The question if people should save more is a normative question and this is not 
the reason for Thaler’s and Benartzi’s program. They point out that people on 
their own declare the need for more saving and they are dissatisfied with too 
low contributions they pay. Of course, deeds are more important than words. 
Finally, not many people who declare that they should save more change 
anything in their behaviour. The similar situation is with people who promise to 
quit smoking and exercise more. However, not many people promise to smoke 
more and exercise less. These kinds of statements (which can be perceived 
as precommitments/intentions) are treated by Thaler and Sunstein as the 
information that demonstrates that people are open for some strategies that 
can help them to achieve their goals (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 107). This is 
a very controversial approach for many scholars. Later we will investigate the 
problems with these kinds of resolutions. 
Generally, the automatic retirements plans assume a low rate of savings (2–3%) 
with the very conservative choice of investments. Even the saving rate of 6% 
is not going to change the situation dramatically. Because of the inertia effect, 
people very rarely change the rate of savings during the contract (Thaler 
& Sunstein, 2008, pp. 113, 114). Moreover, people spend little time to make 
a huge financial decision like retirement. It turns out that 58% of people spend 
less than an hour to fix the rate of contribution and make the investment decision 
(Benartzi, & Thaler, 2007). 
For these reasons, the program “Save More Tomorrow” was introduced. 
It obligates the users to connect the rise of contribution for retirement with the 
rise in their salaries. Because of that people do not treat the rise of contribution as 
a loss because there is no decline in earnings. The program uses the inertia effect 
(automatic rise), but in this case inertia work in favour of more savings (Thaler, 
& Sunstein, 2008, p. 113). Most people who sign for the “Save More Tomorrow” 
stay there for four consecutive rises. After that, the growth was halted because 
4 Thaler and Sunstein understand that the default option in the case of organ donations can be 
a sensitive issue. This is why they propose a compromise. When people extend their driver 
license, they will be obliged do declare their preferences for organ donation. An application 
for driver’s license extension will not be approved until one of the options is marked. Thanks 
to this, a lot of people can be saved and at the same time the freedom of choice is respected 
(Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 180).
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the employees achieved the highest rate of saving in their retirement plans. After 
the success of the pilot program many firms started to use some planes based on 
the automatic indexation (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 114).
Although Thaler and Sunstein support choice architecture, they understand that 
it is not a magic wand that resolves every problem. Choice architects are very 
useful, but only in some specific situations. They are needed when they can 
know what is the best for the agents. Choice architects can foresee what people 
want when they possess expert knowledge and the differences among particular 
tastes and preferences are not too large. (Almost everyone prefers, ceteris paribus,
to be healthy than sick, live longer than shorter, etc. Sometimes we just know 
when we deal with Dr. Jekyll and when with Mr. Hyde.) Moreover, choice 
architects are useful when preferences can be easily discovered (e.g., when the 
government comes to the conclusion that people want a drug reimbursement 
program which offers low prices for drugs that are taken regularly). Choice 
architects will be helpful when one chooses a mortgage credit, but it is needless 
for a person who decides between Pepsi and Cola. To conclude, choice architects 
are useful when they have expert knowledge, choices are complicated, and 
differences in individual preferences are insignificant or they are easy to be 
assessed (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, pp. 247, 248). 
7.3.3. Default option versus freedom
Both default option and choice architecture demonstrate how easy it is to 
influence people’s choices. This is why some scholars object that it can result in 
manipulation and restriction of liberty (Gill, & Gill, 2012; Grüne-Yanoff, 2012; 
Mitchell, 2005; Qizilbash, 2012; Rebonato, 2014; Sugden, 2008b, 2018; White, 
2013). Thaler and Sunstein respond to this criticism. They argue that in spite of 
default option the freedom of choice is preserved. How default option is used 
shows what libertarian paternalism is really about.5 The existence of default 
option as such is paternalistic. Finally, somebody decides for individuals what is 
appropriate. However, people can shift from default option to option that suits 
them the best. It provides a free choice and this should make libertarians satisfied 
in Thaler’s and Sunstein’s opinion (2008, p. 5). Some can argue that no default 
option should be provided and people must be left with an unconstrained free 
choice. However, as the example with the drug reimbursement system show 
us (six million people did not sign up)6 not everyone wants to have this choice. 
5 It is important to underline the fact that Thaler and Sunstein are the supporters of free market 
and they do not want state to have more influence on people that it has right now. Their 
liberal agenda is visible when they gave support to a free market for an organ trade (Thaler, 
& Sunstein, 2008, pp. 174, 175).
6 The market oriented system that was introduced by George W. Bush (Thaler, & Sunstein, 
2008, pp. 159–166).
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As a result, these people are assigned to the random program. This is why the 
same question arises as in the case of the cafeteria. Would it not be better to give 
people who do not want to choose better conditions rather than random choice?
Thaler and Sunstein, even more importantly, argue that sometimes the state 
cannot remain neutral. It puts people in some context of choice which makes 
paternalism unavoidable. In the cases like organ donation the state creates 
the context of choice by establishing a default option as ‘giving’ or ‘not giving 
organs’. Of course, the state can ask everyone individually and give driver 
licence after signing up for some option. However, it would generate enormous 
costs. From this perspective, default option is more effective. In general, Thaler’s 
and Sunstein’s argument about the inedibility of paternalism goes like this. If the 
state cannot remain neutral in some cases and it creates the context of choice for 
people, it is better for this context to be organized, transparent and beneficial for 
people rather than random. The problem with neutrality also occurs in the case 
of “Save More Tomorrow” in which the automatic signing to retirement system 
can be seen as a substantial interference in human choices. However, libertarian 
view that state’s neutrality is achieved by not assigning people to any program 
is not true from the perspective of libertarian paternalism. It is a case, because 
not assigning people to any program is also a default option which influences 
their choices. 
In general, libertarians argue that state should not exist or should be very limited 
(e.g., (Nozick, 1974; Rothbard, 1978)). In this regard, the criticism of libertarian 
paternalism concerns the justification of the state in general. Thaler and Sunstein 
do not respond to this criticism because they do not discuss whether the state 
should or not exist in theory. Libertarian paternalism is put into contemporary 
political and economic context in which the state exists and it influences people. 
Therefore, Thaler and Sunstein just want the state to work better (Thaler, 
& Sunstein, 2008, p. 237).
However, it is not hard to imagine the situations where default option will have 
too much influence on people and it will not leave enough freedom. The problem 
with default option is that its implementation can be very flexible. The change 
from the default option should be easy and it should not generate significant 
costs for people. However, we know that because of status quo bias, even small 
costs of changing the default option can be high enough to discourage people 
from choosing the option they really want. Thaler and Sunstein understand that 
there is no strict line between libertarian paternalism and direct intervention
of the state. They argue that common sense is enough to decide in particular 
cases whether freedom of choice is preserved (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 237). 
However, it is not always so clear. The example was the choice between OFE and 
ZUS, which Poles had to make. The default option was to be assigned to ZUS. 
If somebody wanted to put some of one’s savings in OFE, one needed to send 
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the document (by e-mail or post). It was not very inconvenient, especially when 
we look at how important this decision was. However, one can imagine that 
more impediments connected with the red tape can result in a situation where 
not many people will change the default option. Therefore, the state can easily 
make the ‘gate’ in a system with default option narrower and it will restrict 
freedom of choice significantly (Ostapiuk, 2019c). 
7.3.4. Some constraints on libertarian paternalism 
In spite of the problems with the state and its potential influence on people, the 
state is the main choice architect in libertarian paternalism. As was indicated 
before, Thaler and Sunstein do not deal with the state in a theoretical context. They 
assume that the state exists and is unavoidable. Starting from this assumption 
they try to show how the state can work effectively. Nowadays, governments 
have a significant influence on people. Thaler and Sunstein want this influence 
to be more organized. For them, it should be based on soft paternalism.7
Thaler and Sunstein want the state to have as little influence on people’s choices 
as it is possible. Although default option is an essential part of their approach, 
they think that it should be used only in specific cases. In general, the main task 
for the state is to make information more transparent for people. Thaler and 
Sunstein gave the example of credit services to indicate what should be the main 
role of the state in libertarian paternalism. The introduction of credit cards in 
the 1980s has changed the model of consumption in the USA. Banks abuse the 
cognitive biases of people which results in easiness and abstractness of spending 
money. The next big problem is the transparency of credits. Banks frequently 
make it harder for people to know the exact rates of interests. There are so many 
different kinds of interests that it is not comprehensible for many people. Thaler 
and Sunstein argue that banks should send the year reports in which all the 
rates are summarized. These reports have two goals. Firstly, users of credit 
cards could easily compare their charges with the charges in the competitive 
banks. Secondly, clients would have a better understanding of what they pay for 
(Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 143). 
The next criticism of libertarian paternalism concerns the fact that cognitive 
biases do not apply to people only but they also concern the governments and 
choice architectures (e.g., (Glaeser, 2006; Qizilbash, 2012)). Thaler and Sunstein 
noticed these problems as well and they proposed the cost-benefit analysis 
as the resolution. Nowadays almost in every developed country, a public 
7 With time their approach has gained more importance and now many countries try to 
implement it. In 2009 Sunstein took the position of the director of regulation in the USA. 
Thaler year later started to be the adviser on the special behavioural economics unit which 
was listened by the prime minister David Cameron.
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institution needs to use the cost-benefit analysis. Thanks to it, choice architects 
can base their decisions on rationality and ‘system 2.’ They will be focused on 
facts and not on their own hunches (Sunstein, 2013a; Sunstein, & Thaler, 2003). 
Later we will see that not everybody agrees that cost-benefit analysis resolves 
the problems with cognitive biases concerning choice architects.
7.4. Libertarian paternalism in the light of capability approach 
At the end of Chapter 6, it was mentioned that libertarian paternalism can 
be treated as the extension or some version of the capability approach. This 
understanding is possible for a few reasons. Firstly, both libertarian paternalism 
and capability approach have a negative attitude towards neoclassical 
economics. Both approaches especially criticize the revealed preference theory 
which assumes that people are rational and they choose what is the best for them. 
The supporters of libertarian paternalism and capability approach disagree 
with this assumption because preferences are malleable and people often do 
not choose what is the best for them. Secondly, in capability approach as well as 
in libertarian paternalism the focus is put not only on the achievement but also 
on the context of choice. It is especially important for the capability approach 
in which an opportunity criterion is the essential part. Also, in libertarian 
paternalism the opportunity to choose the other options is underlined as 
something fundamental. Even though it uses default option.
What makes possible to perceive libertarian paternalism as a framework similar 
to the capability approach is the Reason which is put on a pedestal by both 
approaches. It was spotted by the other scholars. Qizilbash (2009) argues that 
Sen’s formulation ‘reason to value’ has a similar role to the information and 
rationality criteria which are used in informed and rational desires accounts. 
Libertarian paternalism is also the approach that underlines the importance of 
rationality and information. Qizilbash argues that “on my reading, it is clear that 
– while they do not explicitly endorse this – they implicitly adopt a version of 
the informed or rational desire or preference view of welfare” (Qizilbash, 2009, 
p. 19). This understanding is possible, because Thaler and Sunstein frequently 
argue that they want people to make an ideally rational and informed choices 
which are not compromised by cognitive constraints which lead to lower well-
being. They write that “in some cases individuals make inferior decisions in 
terms of their own welfare – decisions they would change if they had complete 
information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of self-control” (Sunstein, 
& Thaler, 2005, p. 177). 
Despite the similarities, there are many points where these two approaches 
differ. The first point of discontent is the attitude towards paternalism. Thaler 
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and Sunstein embrace paternalism whereas the capability approach is against 
it. As was indicated in the previous chapter, Sen dismisses Sugden’s argument 
that the capability approach can infringe freedom (Sen, 2006). Moreover, he 
responded to concerns made by Layard who cautioned against the danger 
of paternalism in the capability approach (Layard, 2005, p. 113; Sen, 2009, 
pp. 272–276). Also, Nussbaum (2000, pp. 51–59) argues against paternalism in 
her version of the capabilities approach. In general, Sen is against paternalism 
in his approach. 
There are other differences. The capability approach is a much more pluralistic 
framework in which people can have different values. Libertarian paternalism 
rather tries to indicate the goals that ideally informed and rational agent would 
choose. It looks for the ultimate goals which most people want to pursue 
(e.g., longer, healthier life, more money ceteris paribus). Therefore, libertarian 
paternalism is more about searching for means by which people can achieve 
these uncontroversial goals. Whereas the capability approach is mostly about 
discussing different goals and this approach is reluctant to establish the goals 
which are good for everyone. Moreover, freedom has an intrinsic value for Sen 
and it is more important than well-being. Although Thaler and Sunstein underline 
the importance of freedom, it does not have an intrinsic value and it can be traded
for more well-being. They also are satisfied with a less demanding version of 
freedom which is perceived from a negative perspective (negative freedom). 
In general, the capability approach is a much more flexible approach than 
libertarian paternalism. Sen purposefully did not want to indicate the ultimate 
goals because it means being paternalistic. This is why he provides the concept 
of capabilities which is hard to pin down. However, his statement ‘reason to 
value’ opens the door to the approaches such as libertarian paternalism that 
want to indicate what values should be chosen by reason. Sen did not want 
to do it. This is why he probably would not like libertarian paternalism to be 
treated as the extension of his framework. However, it does not change the fact 
that libertarian paternalism can be perceived to some degree as the practical 
application of the capability approach.
7.5. The criticism of libertarian paternalism 
7.5.1. Introduction
The most objected part of libertarian paternalism is the term ‘libertarian paternalism’ 
itself. Qizilbash (2009, p. 4) concisely summarizes what this term means: 
This is, on their view, a form of ‘paternalism’ since it involves interfering with 
people’s choices with a view to improving their welfare, while respecting 
freedom of choice. When human beings fall short in terms of either informed 
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or rational choice, the results of behavioural economics can help private 
institutions or the state improve their decision making and increase people’s 
welfare.
Libertarian paternalism was proposed by Sunstein and Thaler (2003; Thaler, 
& Sunstein, 2008) but it is a part of a bigger approach supported by behavioural 
economics which is called ‘soft paternalism.’ Thaler’s term gained the most 
recognition, because he is a pioneer in behavioural economics and he is one of its 
leading practitioners (Sugden, 2009a). At the same time as libertarian paternalism 
very similar idea emerged called “asymmetric paternalism” (Camerer, Issacharoff, 
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003). Loewenstein which was one of 
the people that introduced this approach worked with psychologists and they 
introduced a more sophisticated version of soft paternalism (Loewenstein, & Ubel, 
2008). Even though there are many theoretical accounts of soft paternalism, in this 
chapter we are focused on the popular book Nudge written by Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008). Sugden (2009a, p. 366) underlines the importance of this book: 
although Nudge is written in the breezy style of books targeted at business 
travellers, it can be read– and I shall read it– as a serious work of advocacy 
in support of a method of normative analysis that commands widespread 
support among behavioural economists. 
We indicate three primary sources of criticisms of libertarian paternalism. Both 
criticism and answer to it are presented to understand whether libertarian 
paternalism can be considered as a significant contribution in terms of economics’ 
explanatory and cognitive value as well as a practical application for people.
7.5.2. The concept of purified preferences. 
The problems with the inner agent 
To begin with, it must be stated that Thaler and Sunstein think that the revealed 
preference theory does not indicate what is good for people. They argue for 
informed or rational approach in which it is possible to discover what is the best 
for people. For Sugden the problem with this view is the question who decides 
which desires are informed or rational and why they are good for people. This 
argument was used against the capability approach as well. Sugden and others 
are worried that some experts, philosophers or governments will decide instead 
of people what is good or bad. As a result, it will lead to the restriction of liberty. 
This argument goes like that: 
If people knew the consequences of eating unhealthy food or smoking, they 
would realise that it is not good for them. Given that people are limited in 
rationality and imperfectly informed, society might then impose restrictions 
on smoking or on eating some sorts of food. That would be paternalistic. 
(Qizilbash, 2009, pp. 7, 8)
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The problem for Sugden and others is that if we do not respect people’s 
preferences, it will leave the room for abuse of freedom. Another problem 
for Sugden is that it is impossible to know these rational and well-informed 
preferences (‘purified preferences’8). Even if scientists can define objectively 
what perfect rationality is, there might not be the way to determine what one 
would have chosen, if one had been fully rational (Sugden, 2009a). We might do 
not know that because people do not need to follow ideal rationality which is 
assumed by Thaler and Sunstein who believe that “inside every Human there 
is an Econ” (Sugden, 2009a, p. 370).9 Sugden argues against the concept of ideal 
econ. He and others write that “the inner agent is pictured as the locus of the 
identity of the human being and as the source of normative authority about its 
interests and goals” (Infante et al., 2016, p. 1). Sugden does not like the idea of 
inner agent and he criticizes this view explicitly elsewhere. He argues:
I believe, is that when economists (and indeed many philosophers, and 
perhaps even some psychologists) think about human agency, they find it 
hard to avoid using a mental model in which humans are ultimately rational 
beings. This model may recognize that humans can hold irrational beliefs and 
make irrational decisions, but at some deep level, irrationality is understood 
as the product of mistakes. These mistakes must be defined relative to some 
‘true’ preferences – the preferences of the human individual’s ‘true self.’ This 
is the model of the inner rational agent. We need to recognize that this model 
is pre-scientific. (Sugden, 2015, p. 598)
The proponents of libertarian paternalism believe in the inner agent which 
has purified preferences that should be followed, because they are the best for 
people. Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 5) argue for this position because “in many 
cases, individuals make pretty bad decisions – decisions that they would not 
have made if they had paid full attention and possessed complete information, 
unlimited cognitive abilities, and complete self-control”. Sugden indicates that 
the libertarian paternalism assumes that “what makes an individual better off 
‘as judged by himself’ is defined by the preferences he would have revealed, had 
his decision-making not been affected by limitations of attention, information, 
cognitive ability or self-control” (Sugden, 2015, p. 583). This is why libertarian 
paternalism “treats context-dependant choices as the result of errors of 
reasoning” (Sugden, 2015, p. 583).
Sugden points out that to know what the ideal preferences are, we need to 
reconstruct “individuals’ latent preferences by simulating what they would have 
chosen, had their reasoning not been subject to these errors” (Sugden, 2015, 
p. 583). This is what the process of preference purification means. Sugden argues 
8 What a person would choose if it was not for cognitive biases (Hausman, 2012).
9 This objection can be somewhat controversial because Thaler is well aware of the fact that the 
ideal rationality is a normative, not a descriptive theory (Thaler, 1980).
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that libertarian paternalism “can overcome the problem of context-dependence 
in actual choices only if, as Sunstein and Thaler implicitly assume is the case, the 
corresponding latent preferences are context-independent” (Sugden, 2015, p. 583).
The fact that preferences are context-dependent was demonstrated on the example 
of menu-dependence which was introduced by Sen (1997, p. 752, 2002). Sugden 
and others (Infante et al., 2016) refer to Hausman’s interpretation of the concept 
of preferences used in economics to points out this relativity. Hausman gives an 
example to show how the concept of preferences works. He indicates that “to say 
that Jill prefers x to y is to say that when Jill has thought about everything she 
takes to bear on how much she values x and y, Jill ranks x above y” (Hausman, 
2012, p. 34). Therefore, preference is comparative (x is ranked above y). This 
comparison with regard to value and the valuation is subjective (“how much she 
values” (Hausman, 2012, p. 34)). Moreover, it takes into consideration all aspects 
that the agents consider as significant to the comparison (“everything she takes 
to bear on”, p. 34). To sum up, a preference is a “total subjective comparative 
evaluation” (Hausman, 2012, p. 34). Hausman (2012, p. 35) argues that this 
definition “matches most of current practice” in economics.
Sugden (2015, p. 580) highlights the problems which are the result of the fact that 
preferences are context-dependent. He writes that: 
Many economists and philosophers find the idea of respecting context 
dependent preferences problematic, either because there seems to be no good 
reason for thinking that such preferences are indicators of individual well-
being, or more fundamentally, because the concept of respecting a person’s 
preferences is thought to be ill-defined unless those preferences satisfy 
minimal properties of internal consistency. 
Sugden argues that the supporters of behavioural economics do not follow their 
premises. They do not want to conclude that preferences should not be respected 
at all and that experts should use their own judgments to decide on behalf of 
people about their well-being. Behavioural economists are reluctant to admit 
that because this position seems “unacceptably paternalistic” (Sugden, 2015, 
p. 580). Sugden perceives this as the inconsistency. If one assumes that context-
-dependent preferences should not be respected because of the problems, one 
should go all the way and call the whole concept of consumer’s sovereignty into 
question.
Sugden agrees with the findings of behavioural economics that people’s 
preferences are not coherent. However, he underlines that Thaler and Sunstein 
did not propose a strict method to find ‘purified preferences.’ They proposed 
only some vague hints on how to know what people’s real preferences are. 
The idea of purified preferences is essential in libertarian paternalism, because 
choice architects should nudge people towards choices that would be chosen if 
it was not for cognitive biases and lack of information (viz. purified preferences). 
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Thaler and Sunstein know that the state’s nudges are paternalistic, but they are 
justified, because they are created to “make choosers better off, as judged by 
themselves” (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 5) and this justification is repeated in 
the other places in the book (e.g., pp. 10, 12, 80). However, Thaler and Sunstein 
give very few insights on how we can discover those judgments (Sugden, 
2009a). Because of the potential power that is given to the government in 
libertarian paternalism, it needs to give clear criteria for how to discover purified 
preferences.
For example, Thaler and Sunstein give a vague explanation for nudges against 
obesity, drinking, and smoking. To justify nudges, they provide statistics 
concerning health risks. They conclude that “with respect to diet, smoking, and 
drinking, people’s current choices cannot reasonably be claimed to be the best 
means of promoting their well-being” (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 7). The same 
method is used to justify nudges towards more saving. Thaler and Sunstein 
highlight that the rate of saving in the US is very low, and then they claim that “it 
seems clear that the costs of saving too little are greater than the costs of saving 
too much” (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 106). Sugden argues that probably most 
people would agree with the statement that: 
there are many people who would be well-advised to eat less saturated fat, 
drink less alcohol, stop smoking and save more. But that is not the point. What, 
according to their own account, Thaler and Sunstein have to show is that those 
people are making bad choices as judged by themselves. (Sugden, 2009a, p. 371)
To justify the argument that people really want to be nudged, Thaler and Sunstein 
occasionally refer to ‘New Year’s resolution test.’ They ask “how many people 
vow to smoke more cigarettes, drink more martinis, or have more chocolate 
donuts in the morning next year?” (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 73). In the case 
of saving they use the survey that shows that two-thirds of employees claim 
that their savings rate as ‘too low’ when only one percent characterize it as ‘too 
high’. Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 107) argue that “such statements are not 
meaningless or random.” Sugden agrees with that. However, he argues it is not 
enough, because we need a criterion that “could discriminate between the New 
Year’s resolutions that many of us make without seriously expecting (or even 
trying) to keep and genuine personal commitments that fail only under intense 
psychological pressure” (Sugden, 2009a, p. 371). In Sugden’s view, Thaler and 
Sunstein do not provide such a criterion.
An even greater problem than lack of precision is that Thaler and Sunstein do 
not seem to think that this precision is required (Sugden, 2009a). They agree that 
the New Year’s resolution test has obvious limitations and that “people’s actions 
may tell us more than their words” (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 107). However, 
they argue that statements like “I should be saving (or dieting, or exercising) 
more” means that people “are open to a nudge” and “might even be grateful 
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for one” (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 107). Therefore, Thaler and Sunstein do 
not claim that these statements give evidence that people want to be nudged 
but only that they might want to be nudged. This is the problem for Sugden 
who thinks that we need a precise criterion because nudges can have a major
influence on individuals’ lives and they cannot be treated so lightly as it is done 
by Thaler and Sunstein (Sugden, 2009a).
The problem of the vagueness of the method also concerns the government 
and cost-benefit analysis. Thaler and Sunstein argue that planners should use 
where it is possible “a form of cost-benefit analysis” whose goal is “to measure 
the full ramifications of any design choice” (Sunstein, & Thaler, 2003, p. 1190). 
They understand that in many cases this method can be expensive and difficult. 
Therefore, it should be subjective and open-ended. Despite the relativity, the 
cost-benefit analysis can work. Thaler and Sunstein present the cost-benefit 
analysis on the example of automatic enrolment in savings plans. It should 
demonstrate that it will make some people better-off and some worse-off and 
that “a cost-benefit analysis would attempt to evaluate these gains and losses” 
(Sunstein, & Thaler, 2003, p. 1190). Thaler and Sunstein assume that this cost-
benefit analysis will indicate that gains are larger than losses. They write that 
“in the abstract, it is reasonable to believe that the costs of having too little saved 
up for retirement are typically greater than the costs of having saved too much” 
(Sunstein, & Thaler, 2003, pp. 1190, 1191). However, they do not show how this 
calculation is done exactly (Sugden, 2008b).
Because of the problems with the cost-benefit analysis, Thaler and Sunstein 
argue that planners can just use “rules of thumb” to know what is in the best 
interest of people (Sunstein, & Thaler, 2003b, p. 1190). However, as Sugden 
(2008b, p. 233) points out:
it is hard to see how one can judge whether a rule of thumb provides a good 
approximation to the results of a full cost-benefit analysis unless one knows 
how, in principle, a cost-benefit analysis would work. The vagueness of 
Sunstein and Thaler’s descriptions of cost-benefit analysis strongly suggests 
that the difficulties they have perceived are conceptual rather than practical.
Sugden’s criticism does not mean that he is against the foundation on which 
libertarian paternalism is based upon. Sugden agrees that preferences are 
unstable and context-dependent (Sugden, 2008b, p. 227). In libertarian pa-
ternalism these findings are used to argue that the state can help people with 
achieving well-being. However, Sugden (2008b, p. 234) argues that “Sunstein 
and Thaler have not shown how the truth value of this belief can be assessed”. 
Sugden understands that Thaler and Sunstein can respond to this criticism by 
stating that paternalism is unavoidable and planners must act even if they do 
not have objective criteria for purified preferences (Sugden, 2008b). The truth of 
this claim will be assessed later. 
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The last but not least issue for Sugden is the fact of the normativity of informed 
and rational desire accounts. For Sugden it is impossible to treat this criterion 
as empirical. We cannot know without making normative claims what complete 
information or unlimited cognitive abilities are (Sugden, 2008b). Moreover, 
Sugden thinks that this normativity enables choice architects to justify any kind 
of intervention and it is a real danger of libertarian paternalism. Sugden makes 
these point explicit when he writes that: 
The concepts of full attention, perfect information, unimpaired cognitive 
ability and complete self-control do not have objective definitions; they are 
inescapably normative. Just about any intervention that a paternalist sincerely 
judges to be in the individual’s best interests can be justified in this way if 
the paternalist is allowed to define what counts as attention, information, 
cognitive ability and self-control. (Sugden, 2009a, p. 370)
Answer to the criticism 
We can respond to Sugden’s criticism by using the previous conclusions from this 
book. Hausman argumentation will be used as well (Hausman, 2016). To begin 
with, we need to recognize and agree with Sugden that rational desire account 
(purified preferences) is a normative conception. However, as was concluded in 
Chapter 6, normativity does not mean that something is unscientific or unworthy 
of study. Therefore, there is nothing wrong, in principle, with the fact that the 
‘rational desire account’ is normative. Moreover, the revealed preference theory 
which is criticized by Thaler and Sunstein is a normative conception as well. 
(If one only describes what people do, it is not a normative claim. However, 
when one assumes that what people do is the best for them, then one makes 
a normative claim.)
Sugden argues that we do not know how and if we can ever know what purified 
preferences are. However, in Chapter 4, it was indicated that sometimes we know 
when we deal with Dr. Jekyll and when with Mr. Hyde. Of course, these kinds 
of statements are very vague, and Sugden is right when he criticizes Thaler and 
Sunstein for not providing the strict method to find what purified preferences are. 
However, one can use the findings from economics of happiness and behavioural 
economics to have some idea of what purified preferences are. Thanks to this 
knowledge, economists should be able to choose between the ‘long-term human’ 
(purified preferences) and ‘short-term human’ (revealed preferences). The enriched 
conception of multiple self can be used to justify Thaler’s and Sugden’s position. 
Also, the previous discussion about the weakness of will supports the idea of 
purified preferences. Of course, there is a problem between real commitments 
that people have and the others that are the result of social pressure. This is 
why the ‘New Year’s resolution test’ cannot discover purified preferences in 
every case and we should take some of people’s declaration with a pinch of salt 
(Bryan, Karlan, & Nelson, 2010; Carrera, Royer, Stehr, Sydnor, & Taubinsky, 2019; 
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Laibson, 2015; Sugden, 2018). However, it seems as a good starting point which 
can be improved by further statistical evidence. For example, we can discover if 
people’s resolutions are real by looking at how many people actively try to quit 
smoking (precommitment strategies). 
It is beyond doubt that the criticism expressed by Sugden is valuable. However, 
we need to look at the problems of purified preferences from a broader 
perspective. It is not enough to show the problems with purified preferences 
to dismiss this concept entirely. One needs to compare this approach with 
its competitor – revealed preference theory which is not without its flaws as 
was indicated through this book. It is true that the choice between these two 
competing approaches is normative. However, there is no other way and 
scientists sometimes must choose normatively between the competitive 
conceptions (Kuhn, 1962). 
We need to write a few words in defence of the state and cost-benefit analysis. 
Sugden and many orthodox libertarians are afraid that libertarian paternalism 
gives too much power to the state, which will abuse people eventually. They 
use here ‘slippery-slope argument.’10 To limit the influence of the state, Thaler 
and Sunstein endorse Rawls’s ‘publicity principle’ which in its simplest form 
“bans government from selecting a policy that it would not be able to defend 
publicly to its own citizens” (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 244). This rule of 
transparency of state’s functioning is not enough for some. Qizilbash argues that 
“The ‘publicity principle’ only requires that the government be able to defend 
a proposed intervention, not that public reasoning would actually endorse the 
intervention through debate and discussion” (Qizilbash, 2009, p. 39). Qizilbash’s 
unease with libertarian paternalism is understandable. However, this kind of 
criticism does not exclusively concern libertarian paternalism but, in general, 
it concerns the democratic system because it is hard to draw the line between 
the rules introduced thanks to public discussion and the rules imposed by 
politicians. In democracies there is a system of check and balances that should 
defend people from the force of the government. It works with various results 
but it seems the best that people can hope for. 
When it comes to the cost-benefit analysis, Thaler and Sunstein acknowledge 
its problems and they propose the approach based on the ‘rule of thumb’ which 
is open-ended. It is a problem for Sugden who thinks that one needs to have 
precise criteria for how some method works. It does not necessarily need to 
be the case because sometimes we cannot have absolute criteria that should be 
obeyed in all cases. In social sciences, and especially in public policy, vagueness 
is sometimes unavoidable. It can even be an advantage, because we do not need 
10 It is a type o logical fallacy. It suggests that taking a minor action will lead to extreme and 
sometimes ludicrous consequences.
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to stick to one rule and we can be open-minded.11 This is why an openness of 
cost-benefit analysis can be perceived as an advantage. Thaler and Sunstein 
argue that even if few people after the reflection and over time choose to opt 
out for savings plans, it indicates that people want to save more. This argument 
can be unconvincing for Sugden. However, the lack of precise criteria does not 
dismiss this approach, because sometimes we cannot provide strict criteria for 
some conceptions as was indicated in Chapter 5. 
Now, we can examine the arguments made by Hausman who seems to support 
libertarian paternalism to some degree. He responded (2016) directly to the 
criticism from Sugden and rest (Infante et al., 2016). They perceived Hausman 
and the idea of purified preferences as the embodiment of the problems with 
the whole project of behavioural welfare economics in which the assumptions 
of revealed preferences are questioned. This criticism also concerns libertarian 
paternalism. Hausman (2016) indicates three kinds of criticisms presented by 
Sugden and rest (Infante et al., 2016). 
1. The methodological criticism. It objects to the idea of context-independent 
preferences of the inner agent. Sugden and rest want to know how the inner 
agent forms its preferences. They also ask how it is possible that the inner agent 
has context-independent preferences. Moreover, they wonder if we can isolate 
a perfectly rational self. As was indicated before, Sugden and rest answer these 
questions negatively and they explain that the inner agent “is not a real human 
being whose thoughts and actions are governed by psychological mechanisms” 
(Infante et al., 2016, p. 13, 14). Hausman responses to these reservations by 
stating that “it seems to me that behavioral economists can deny that they are 
committed to any inner agent or to any process whereby they construct context-
-independent preferences” (Hausman, 2016, p. 27). Hausman expands this point 
by referring to the example of the cafeteria: 
To suppose that there are truth conditions for the claim that an agent has 
a true or purified preference for fruit, when the agent’s choice between cake 
and fruit depends on their location in the cafeteria line, does not commit the 
behavioral economist to postulating the existence of an inner agent who is 
capable of weighing the various considerations bearing on the choice between 
fruit and cake and determining an overall preference. (Hausman, 2016, p. 27)
It means that we do not need a monumental ontological conception of the inner 
agent in which it is justified why people always prefer fruit over a cake. It could 
only imply that in this particular case an agent is concerned about her health and 
physical appearance and regrets sugar binges (Hausman, 2016, pp. 27, 28). We 
do not need to invoke any conception of purified preferences or inner agent to 
11 Over the last years situational ethics has gained a lot of importance precisely because of the 
lack of absolute rules (see (Doris, 1998)). 
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assume that if an agent were fully rational, she would prefer the fruit (Hausman, 
2016, p. 28). Hausman indicates that “facts about the world provide evidence that 
the fruit promotes the agent’s health and appearance and features of the agent’s 
behavior and speech provide evidence that health and appearance matter more 
to the individual than the pleasures of sweets” (Hausman, 2016, p. 28).
The conclusion from Hausman’s argument is that we do not need the ontological 
conception of the inner agent. We can analyse case by case and decide what 
people want. Hausman is right, but it does not mean that Sugden is wrong. 
We need to have some criteria to know what the purified preferences are in 
a particular situation. These rules do not need to be absolute but we should have 
a reliable mechanism to know what people want. From the perspective of this 
book, observing people’s intentions and precommitment strategies is a good 
starting point to discover what people really want.
2. The epistemological criticism. It is similar to the methodological criticism. 
It also concerns the argument that it is impossible for behavioural economists to 
know what the purified preferences of inner agents are. In spite of being critical 
towards this idea, Sugden and others (Infante et al., 2016) admit that in some 
cases purified preferences can be known. They show the example of a consumers 
who fail to purchase electricity (an example of a homogeneous product) from the 
cheapest provider (Wilson, & Price, 2010). However, they treat this example as an 
exception. They want to know how it is possible for behavioural economists to 
find out whether the inner agent prefers fruit to cake when the choice depends on 
the placement of these goods. Sugden and rest understand that information about 
the past behaviours of people can indicate what they want. However, it seems 
that there is not much detailed evidence to be sure what purified preferences are. 
The more substantial problem for Sugden is that choice architects believe that 
they know what is the best for people. They assume that fruit is better for almost 
everyone and it satisfies purified preferences. The fact that some behavioural 
economists argue that their goal is to satisfy purified preferences of consumers 
and that they do not impose some arbitrary choices on people is a very dangerous 
practice for Sugden and others (Infante et al., 2016; Sugden, 2018). It is the case, 
because in the past when a government imposed some ‘best’ choices on people it 
was possible to discern that they are chosen arbitrary and individuals’ preferences 
did not matter. Libertarian paternalism is much trickier, because as a politician 
one can believe that one promotes somebody’s purified preferences and be happy 
about it. Hausman points out that it can be a problem, because in reality one does 
not know what purified preferences are, but one only assumes what they should 
be (Hausman, 2016, p. 28). 
Although Hausman recognizes the problems with finding purified preferences, 
he argues that thanks to the experiments we sometimes can know what 
individuals’ purified preferences are. He argues that “for example, one can 
182 	 7. Libertarian paternalism. The discussion on freedom and well-being
study whether most people choose cake or fruit when the two desserts are 
placed in equally prominent positions and when their calorie and nutritional 
content is prominently displayed” (Hausman, 2016, p. 28). In the case of saving 
for retirement, choice architect can make an unbiased (taking account of people’s 
cognitive biases) presentation about retirement plans and see whether people 
participate in a plan or not. Hausman (2016, p. 28) concludes that “if almost 
all of them choose to enroll, then there is a reason to believe that automatically 
enrolling employees with an opt-out option will satisfy their purified preferences 
better than requiring employees to opt in.” The experiments which are designed 
to give people the opportunity to choose should satisfy Sugden to some degree, 
because he is a supporter of opportunity criterion (Sugden, 2004).
3. Implicit normative criticism. It concerns the possibility of invoking the 
purified preferences to limit or change the choices that agents make. As was 
indicated earlier, Sugden and others are worried that the state can use the concept 
of purified preferences to decide on behalf of people. Moreover, Sugden sees the 
inconsistency in libertarian paternalists’ reasoning which concerns the concept 
of purified preferences. He argues that when one dismisses the idea of revealed 
preferences which is based on preference satisfaction, one also needs to dismiss 
the idea of purified preferences. It is the case, because purified preferences are 
also based on preference satisfaction, but we search for the ideal preferences. 
Hausman also acknowledges the potential inconsistency, but he defends the 
idea of the limited use of purified preferences. He writes:
I argue that the satisfaction of preferences does not constitute well-being and 
that social policy should not aim to satisfy preferences, except in those special 
circumstances in which preference satisfaction is a reliable indicator of well-
-being. Preference satisfaction is a reliable indicator of well-being when three 
conditions are met: people are competent evaluators (and free of rational 
flaws), they are self-interested, and they have accurate relevant information. 
When these conditions are met, what people prefer will be a good (albeit 
imperfect) guide to what is good for them. (Hausman, 2016, p. 29)
Hausman points out that only when specific conditions are met, social policies 
can aim to satisfy people’s preferences. For Hausman the conception of purified 
preferences “is neutral among conceptions of wellbeing” (Hausman, 2016, 
p. 29), because it does not assume that what individuals do is always the best for 
them. His approach is a “pragmatic suggestion” (Hausman, 2016, p. 30), not the 
welfare theory that always gives the answers. 
To conclude, the position of Sugden and Hausman seems to differ substantially. 
However, the differences are the result of the lens by which they look at libertarian 
paternalism and behavioural welfare economics. Hausman focuses on particular 
situations in which the state can help people. He argues that these situations 
must be analysed to know if nudges are justified. On the other hand, Sugden 
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is focused on the possible abuse and danger that come from the government 
that is using the conception of purified preferences. Both of them agree that 
the revealed preference theory is not ideal. However, they have very different 
attitudes towards libertarian paternalism. Hausman is more optimistic whereas 
Sugden is pessimistic when it comes to the concept of purified preference as 
a basis for welfare theory and policy.
7.5.3. Paternalism is not inevitable 
One of the main reasons which is used to justify a paternalistic dimension of 
libertarian paternalism is that paternalism is inevitable. Sunstein and Thaler 
(2003, p. 1162) argue for libertarian paternalism in contrast to “the dogmatic 
anti-paternalism of numerous analysts of law, including many economists and 
economically oriented lawyers.” Sunstein and Thaler claim that the dogmatic 
anti-paternalism is based on one false assumption and two misconceptions. The 
false assumption asserts that “almost all people, almost all of the time, make 
choices that are in their best interest or at the very least are better, by their 
own lights, than the choices that would be made by third parties.” The first 
misconception is that “there are viable alternatives to paternalism.” The second 
misconception is that “paternalism always involves coercion” (Sunstein, & 
Thaler, 2003, pp. 1163–1165). We will deal with each assertion in order. 
Sunstein and Thaler (2003, p. 1163) argue that the first assumption (people do 
what is the best for them) is “testable and false, indeed obviously false.” They 
support this claim by using the findings from psychology and behavioural 
economics (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008). Sugden (2008b) and Qizilbash (2009) agree 
that people do not always make good choices for themselves. However, they 
think that Sunstein and Thaler fight with a straw man. Nowadays, no economist 
believes that people are ideally rational and make the best choices. It is true that in 
the 1980s neoclassical economists were very sceptical of behavioural economics, 
because many of them really believed in homo economicus (see (Thaler, 2015)). 
However, today no economist holds this view. This is why the description of 
mainstream economics presented by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) to make their 
point is not true anymore (Qizilbash, 2009; Sugden, 2008b). 
Sugden and Qizilbash do not seem to be completely right. Although economists 
do not believe that people are ideally rational and make the best choice for 
themselves, these assumptions are still the basic conceptions that are taught in 
economic universities and they shape a way of thinking of young economists.12
Moreover, many supporters of a free market willingly use the argument that 
people are rational and make the best deals. When it turns out that people do not 
12 The discussion about how economics should be taught see (Decker, Elsner, & Flechtner, 2018; 
Ratajczak, 2014).
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make the best choices, it is argued that it is their own fault (a responsibility that 
comes with choice as a basis for capitalistic system). In the end, maybe nobody 
believes that people always make the best choices. However, the assertion that 
people make good deals most of the time and they should be held responsible 
for their actions is not controversial for most. This is why the claim of Thaler and 
Sunstein that the model of homo economicus is perceived as reality by economists 
is justified to some degree.
The first misconception is that ‘there are viable alternatives to paternalism.’ 
Thaler and Sunstein argue that the findings of behavioural economics prove 
that paternalism is inevitable and that any opposition to paternalism is a “literal 
nonstarter” (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 11). Moreover, they argue that revealed 
preferences should not be respected, because people’s preferences are context-
-dependent and unstable. It implies that for any decision there is some choice 
architecture which nudges people in some direction. Therefore, Thaler and 
Sunstein ask if there is any reasonable alternative to choice architects who nudge 
people towards the choices that are the best for them (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, 
pp. 4–11). We can get back to the cafeteria example to understand this argument. 
There, Thaler and Sunstein argue that the only reasonable option is to arrange 
the food in a way that improves a consumer’s well-being (from fruits to cakes). 
Sunstein and Thaler admit that this is a paternalistic behaviour. However, it is not 
a problem, because there are no alternatives to paternalism (consumer’s choice 
is always influenced by something because of context-dependent preferences).
This is why no anti-paternalist position makes sense. If that is the case, then the 
only task for libertarians is to provide freedom of choice. Sunstein and Thaler 
(2003, p. 1102) make this point explicit:
The central point is that effects on individual choices are often unavoidable. 
Of course it is usually good not to block choices, and we do not mean to 
defend non-libertarian paternalism here. But in an important respect the 
antipaternalist position is incoherent, simply because there is no way to avoid 
effects on behaviour and choices. The task for the committed libertarian is, in 
the midst of such effects, to preserve freedom of choice. 
Thaler and Sunstein recognize that both firms and governments can be choice 
architects and they can nudge people (e.g., the influence of employers in the 
case of retirement savings). However, it does not mean that both of them are 
paternalistic in the same sense. Qizilbash (2009, p. 24) points this out: 
But even if people or organizations make (or have to make) those choices, 
they do not always do so with a view to improving our lives or welfare. They 
may do so with a view to pursuing their own interests or profits. 
The difference between governments and firms is in the motivation why they 
nudge people. Firms want to earn money and not help people. Therefore, 
a market system is presented by Sugden as the opposition towards paternalism 
(see (Sugden, 2008b)). 
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In general, Sugden (2009a, 2018) thinks that libertarian paternalism is so popular 
because it appeals to anti-market sensibility. He is a supporter of market and 
he refers to Hayek’s idea that “market is a spontaneous order structured by 
the seeking of mutual advantage” (Sugden, 2008b, p. 239). He argues (2008b) 
that mutual advantage exists on the market even if people’s preferences are 
incoherent. Moreover, Sugden argues that market gives people what they really 
want. This is why he prefers a free market over libertarian paternalism:
Speaking for myself, and without wanting to claim that all forms of market 
regulation are undesirable, I welcome the fact that cafeterias are normally 
operated according to the principle of mutual advantage. I want it to be the 
case that they try to offer me products that I want to buy. I want their cakes to 
look attractive, and to be presented in ways that stimulate my appetite. It is not 
that I am a paragon of informed desire, acting on complete information with 
unlimited cognitive abilities and no lack of willpower. It is just that I would 
rather have my willpower challenged by tempting cakes than license cafeteria 
managers to compromise on the attractiveness of their products so as to steer 
me towards the ones that they think best for me. (Sugden, 2008b, p. 249)
Sugden understands that it is his personal opinion and that there are the others 
who may want to be steered towards the right choices. He writes: 
No doubt there are other people who recognise that they have real problems 
of dietary self-control, and want to be steered away from unhealthy food. 
I am not claiming that it is wrong for public policy to respond to this want, 
if enough people feel it. (Sugden, 2008b, p. 247)
He is also not an unconditional supporter of a free market and he is in favour 
of some regulations that soft paternalism advocate. For example, he advocates 
the “standardised labelling of food products, standardised tariff structures to 
facilitate price comparisons, or mandatory cooling-off periods before sales of 
financial products are confirmed” (Sugden, 2008b, p. 247).
The main problem for Sugden is not libertarian paternalism itself, but the scale of 
the claim that its supporters have made. According to him, even if the revealed 
preferences theory does not work, it does not mean that a policy advocated 
in libertarian paternalism does not restrict freedom. These interferences limit 
a market mechanism that could work for people’s benefits in normal conditions. 
Sugden ended his paper by dismissing Thaler’s and Sugden’s claim that 
paternalism is inevitable. He writes:
It is not enough to show that consumers’ preferences are incoherent and to 
assert that arguments against paternalism have thereby become non-starters. 
The question that this paper has addressed is not whether paternalism is 
good or bad. It is whether, given the findings of behavioural economics, there 
are viable alternatives to paternalism. I have argued that the answer to this 
question is ‘Yes’. There is a viable alternative to paternalism. It is what it has 
always been – the market. (Sugden, 2008b, p. 247)
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Answer to the criticism 
Sugden seems right in his suspicion that many behavioural economists are not 
especially fond of free market. In Chapter 3 in the context of subjective well-
being it was presented that it is possible for scientists to abuse their power and 
to decide on behalf of people what is the best for them. A free market in many 
ways secures that no third wise party will decide what is good for individuals. 
This is why the unease of Sugden is justified. The state can use the findings 
of behavioural economics (e.g., context-dependent preferences) to argue that 
people need to eat healthily or drink less alcohol. It can lead to the abuse of 
freedom. However, it does not necessarily imply that we need to dismiss 
libertarian paternalism. We can limit and constrain the potential scope and 
influence of this approach. 
In some way, it has been already done. Although Sugden is right to worry, it 
seems that he goes too far with his concerns. For Thaler and Sunstein a free market
is still the most important mechanism that copes with people’s preferences. The 
role of the state is limited. It should only influence people’s choices in specific 
situations when the state can discover what most people want (not in the case of 
buying soda, but when people choose saving plans for retirement). Thaler and 
Sunstein do not force one to choose either free market or libertarian paternalism 
(identified with the state). It is crucial to remember that there are different levels 
of market intervention. 
Sugden highlights the positive influence of a free market on people (mutual 
advantage),13 which is a true and important insight. However, one cannot forget 
that a free market does not work for the benefit of people in every situation 
and it does not always improve their well-being (Ostapiuk, 2018, 2019c). This 
point will not be elaborated further because the discussion on the advantages 
and disadvantages of market from the above-mentioned perspective goes far 
beyond the subject matter of this chapter (more about this discussion see in: 
(Frey, 2010, 2018; Friedman, 1962; Friedman M., & Friedman R., 1980; Galbraith, 
1998; Hayek, 1978; Nozick, 1974; Offer, 2006; Scitovsky, 1976; Sugden, 2010, 
2018)).
7.5.4. Libertarian paternalism does not provide freedom
The second misconception indicated by Sunstein and Thaler is that “paternalism 
always involves coercion” (Sunstein, & Thaler, 2003, p. 1165). As was presented 
on the example of the cafeteria, an interference in people’s choices is inevitable. 
Therefore, paternalism is inevitable as well. However, Thaler and Sunstein 
13  Bruni and Sugden (2013) argue that mutual benefit counts as a virtue for the market 
participants.
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added the libertarian part to their conception, because interference in people’s 
preferences is only justified when it does not limit the freedom to choose. 
Qizilbash (2009, p. 19) points out that “this makes the paternalism they are 
discussing ‘libertarian’ in the sense that it is a form of paternalism which should 
not be objectionable from the point of view of libertarians”. 
Thaler and Sunstein argue that their conception remains paternalistic even 
though it does not limit choice. The idea that paternalism needs coercion is, as 
was mentioned earlier, a ‘misconception’ (Sunstein, & Thaler, 2005, p. 180). For 
Thaler and Sunstein, paternalism implies that we want to increase people’s well-
-being by helping them to choose better. In the cafeteria example, the arrangement 
of products in the way to make people better off is what makes it paternalistic. 
However, in their opinion libertarians should not object to that because there is 
no restriction of freedom. This definition presented by Thaler and Sunstein is 
criticized by Qizilbash who writes:
But the thought that ‘paternalism does not require coercion’ does not seem 
to be a ‘misconception’ about paternalism, but merely a decision about how 
to define it. Sunstein and Thaler make that decision, in part, to be able to 
advance the idea of ‘libertarian paternalism’ as a coherent concept. (Qizilbash, 
2009, p. 24)
This semantics struggle is important, because by creating a specific definition 
of libertarianism, Thaler and Sunstein can argue that their conception should 
satisfy libertarians. This is not the case, because libertarians have a very specific 
understanding of what freedom means. For them freedom has an intrinsic value, 
which is not how freedom is perceived in libertarian paternalism. For libertarians 
Thaler and Sunstein add freedom dimension to their conception only to curb 
the potential criticism. This is why Thaler and Sunstein introduced the opt-out 
clauses in their approach. It is, however, not enough for libertarians who assign an 
intrinsic value to freedom. This is why Qizilbash criticizes libertarian paternalism. 
He argues that “the chief concern is not to advance autonomy or opportunity, 
but to improve decision making with a view to improving people’s lives and 
increasing welfare while protecting free choice” (Qizilbash, 2011, p. 38). 
Thaler and Sunstein used Mill’s idea in which autonomy means that people 
should be able to make their own mistakes to argue that libertarian paternalism 
preserves freedom (Sunstein, & Thaler, 2005, p. 181). In the end, libertarian 
paternalism lets people make mistakes by the opt-out clauses. People can 
decide to eat only cakes and not save for retirement. Because of that, Thaler 
and Sunstein think that their approach should not be dismissed by libertarians. 
Qizilbash agrees that Sunstein and Thaler do not block choice and to that 
degree their approach does not undermine autonomy (Qizilbash, 2009, p. 23). 
However, libertarians cannot agree to the fact that the state actively tries to 
interfere with human preferences even if it wants to improve their well-being. 
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To understand that improving well-being cannot justify the interference with 
people’s autonomy, we can refer to the ‘prudential value theory’ presented by 
Griffin (1986, p. 67): 
one element of agency is deciding for oneself. Even if I constantly made a mess 
of my life, even if you could do better if you took charge, I would not let you 
do it. Autonomy has a value of its own. 
This is the core of libertarians’ arguments. Liberty has an intrinsic value and 
even if one suffers or is miserable, nobody can take charge of one’s decisions. 
Libertarians argue that by nudging individuals the state takes charge of people’s 
lives even if they have opt-out clauses (Gill, & Gill, 2012; Grüne-Yanoff, 2012; 
Mitchell, 2005; Rebonato, 2014; Sugden, 2008b; White, 2013). 
It seems that there is no common ground between libertarians and nudges. 
Libertarian paternalism perceives people to be weak and in need of help. Even 
if this image is real (and findings of behavioural economics support this view), 
many libertarians will not accept it, because they cannot do it. Their whole 
worldview is based on the assumption that, in the end, people can and should 
decide on their own. Sometimes they do it better, sometimes worse, but it is 
demanded from people to take responsibility for their actions, because it is a part 
of human dignity. Therefore, for Sugden and Qizilbash the term ‘libertarian 
paternalism’ is an oxymoron even if Thaler and Sunstein try to present it as 
a coherent conception. 
Answer to the criticism 
The discussion on freedom is one of the greatest and most debated issues in 
science and the author will not even try to resolve this extremely intricate issue. 
The arguments presented in this section are directly connected with libertarian 
paternalism and should be perceived from this perspective only. 
Let us start with the argument that concerns the infantilization of people. 
In libertarian paternalism, it is assumed that people are weak because of cognitive 
biases. This perception of people attracts much criticism. The critics pointed out 
that this approach infantilizes people because the state needs to decide on behalf 
of them; and freedom of choice is precisely what gives people dignity (Grüne-
-Yanoff, 2012; Mitchell, 2005; Pettit, 1996; Rebonato, 2014). It is a misunderstanding 
of Thaler’s and Sunstein’s position for whom the default option is not a basic tool 
that the state uses. The state can also increase people’s freedom. For example, 
sometimes people do not want to make their own decisions and they rely on 
other people, institutions, or rules. In libertarian paternalism the state can force 
people to make an independent decision. Although it is a paternalistic action, 
it can increase people’s freedom. (e.g., Bush’s drug reimbursement program 
(Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, pp. 159–166)).
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The argument that the government in libertarian paternalism infantilizes people 
seems to be an exaggeration. This argument is not raised by the opponents of 
libertarian paternalism when in the face of some troubles people are looking for 
help from specialists such as doctor, mechanic, or lawyer. In libertarian paternalism, 
the state does not help people in every decision but only in specific ones. We do not 
see infantilization of people when the state helps them to choose among retirement 
portfolios if people do not have any idea about finance. From this perspective, 
the state does not prohibit people who have the knowledge and want to invest 
their all retirement money in the Romanian firm from the high tech industry. The 
main goal of libertarian paternalism is to provide warning signals for untutored 
customers. As it is done in the case of ski slopes where the inexperienced skiers 
are warned when the route is difficult (Thaler, & Sunstein, 2008, p. 241). The fear 
of ‘slippery slope argument’ in which it is argued that the state by helping people 
will make them unable to make any decisions independently in the future seems 
to be an exaggeration. We can compare this fear to one of the characters in Phaedo 
(Plato, 2013) who argues that the discovery of writing will result in the extinction 
of memory because people will not need it anymore. 
Of course, it does not mean that we should not scrutinize nudges carefully. 
Sugden is right to warn about default option and the fact that it can have too 
much influence on people and it can prohibit people from following their 
preferences. Even if people have the opt-out option, they can be too lazy to 
use it. However, it can indicate that they did want to have freedom primarily. 
From this perspective, it does not matter whether people make decisions in 
libertarian paternalism or in a free market because in both systems people do 
not really exercise their freedom. However, at least thanks to the default option 
in libertarian paternalism people have higher well-being. 
The next argument against the libertarian perception of freedom is the fact that 
freedom is not always good for people and it does not make their lives better. 
Schwartz (2004) argues that having too many choices makes people unhappy, 
because after a decision people are not sure if they have chosen the best option and 
it can lead to regret. Schwartz’s general conclusion is that people want freedom, 
but not too much freedom. Schwartz also argues that freedom is precisely 
connected with self-determination. People are taught that they are responsible 
for their actions. Both the successes and failures assess people as capable or 
incapable human beings. Schwartz indicates the problem with that view:
The more we are allowed to be the masters of our fates in one domain of 
life after another, the more we expect to be. Education is expected to be 
stimulating and useful. Work is supposed to be exciting, socially valuable, 
and remunerative. Spouses are supposed to be sexually, emotionally, and 
intellectually stimulating and also loyal and comforting. Friends are supposed 
to be fun to be with and devoted. Children are supposed to be beautiful, smart, 
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affectionate, obedient, and independent. Everything we buy is supposed to be 
the best of its kind. With all the choice available, people should never have 
to settle for things that are just good enough. In short, life is supposed to be 
perfect. Excessive emphasis on self-determination has, I believe, contributed 
to these unrealistic expectations. (Schwartz, 2000, p. 85)
The problem with that view is that people are not always in control. For 
example, some research demonstrates that people can do little about their weight 
(Seligman, 1994). Despite this fact, the contemporary western culture preaches 
that obesity is a matter of choice and personal responsibility. Nowadays, people 
in western countries are taught and believe that everything is in their control 
and power. People forget about fate and that there exist things that are not in 
their control which was indicated, for example, by ancient Greeks. In some 
way, people in western world started to believe in Sartre’s idea that they are 
responsible for all of their actions (Sartre, 2007). In general, taking responsibility 
for actions is desirable and beneficial because people can improve and change 
their unwise behaviours. However, when one is not in control and one cannot 
change something, the idea of self-determination can make one only feels bad 
about oneself and it does not make any good for anyone.
The idea of learning on mistakes and taking responsibility for actions is essential 
for liberals. Hayek (1978, p. 18) argues that “liberty does not mean all good 
things”. It means that freedom and making mistakes are intertwined. Moreover, 
he states that “liberty and responsibility are inseparable” (Hayek, 1978, p. 71). 
The supporters of libertarian paternalism do not disagree with the importance 
of responsibility. However, they point out the differences between choices. 
If choices are frequent and prosaic, people will learn on their own how to choose 
(e.g., buying bread that suits one’s taste). The completely different situation is 
when the choice is rare and it has a substantial influence on life. There is no time 
to learn when one chooses a house or a mortgage credit once for several dozen 
years. In these kinds of decisions, choice architects can be helpful because the costs 
of a bad decision can be severe. As Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 241) point out: 
We do not believe that children should learn the dangers of swimming pools 
by falling in and hoping for the best. Should pedestrians in London get hit 
by a double-decker bus to teach them to ’look right?’ Isn’t a reminder on the 
sidewalk better? 
In the case of a danger even libertarians allow for the restriction of people’s 
freedom because it is assumed that people in general do not want to die or to 
get harmed. More importantly in the case of danger people’s freedom to live 
is endangered. The most well-known example that justifies the restriction of 
liberty was presented by Mill who wrote:
Again, it is a proper office of public authority to guard against accidents. 
If either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross 
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a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to 
warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any 
real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, 
and he does not desire to fall into the river. (Mill, 2003, p. 165)
Because Mill was a supporter of freedom he immediately underlined the limited 
extent of freedom’s restriction:
Nevertheless, when there is not a certainty, but only a danger of mischief, no 
one but the person himself can judge of the sufficiency of the motive which 
may prompt him to incur the risk: in this case, therefore, (unless he is a child, 
or delirious, or in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible with the 
full use of the reflecting faculty) he ought, I conceive, to be only warned of the 
danger; not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it. (Mill, 2003, p. 165)14
In this context it seems justified to perceive libertarian paternalism as a way 
of warning. Thanks to the opt-out option it does not force one to something if 
one really does not want it. Of course, the term warning is vague. It is an open 
question to what extent and how we can warn people. The limits depend on 
the values with which one comes to the table (being a libertarian or supporter 
of state intervention). For libertarians default option is not acceptable but, for 
example, better information put on products which improves the transparency 
of information can be justified.15 Again, we can use Mill to justify these kinds of 
interventions:
Such a precaution, for example, as that of labelling the drug with some word 
expressive of its dangerous character, may be enforced without violation of 
liberty: the buyer cannot wish not to know that the thing he possesses has 
poisonous qualities. (Mill, 2003. p. 165)
As we can see, moderate nudges can be accepted by libertarians. However, most 
of such nudges are only interim measures which do not change people. They 
will not be able to learn on their own mistakes, and they will need nudges for the 
rest of their lives. Parents advise children because they believe that in the future 
children will be able to make independent choices. It seems that libertarian 
paternalism does not give this hope. 
Let us investigate further the connection between individuals’ moral respon-
sibility for their actions and freedom. Fromm was one of the most influential 
critics of the assumption that this connection is always beneficial to people. 
He argued that capitalism does not offer any personal identity for people as it 
was in Feudalism when people knew exactly what their purpose and position in 
14 Further discussion of Mill’s position see (Dworkin, 1972).
15 Therefore, in the case of cafeteria, we could add the placards with information about the 
nutritional value of each food instead of manipulating the arrangement of food (Hausman, 
& Welch, 2010, p. 129).
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life were. Capitalism resulted in people’s lack of security and loneliness. Fromm 
argues that these are the strongest fears and people try to escape from them. 
Frequently, it is an escape from self by becoming a part of some larger, more 
powerful entity (e.g., God, nation or consciousness). Being a part of some entity, 
people participate in its power and glory. However, people need to surrender their 
freedom in exchange for security and proud that are guaranteed by a powerful 
entity like nation or God. In his book Escape from freedom (1994) Fromm points out 
how weak people are and how often they do not want freedom. This is the result 
of the fact that freedom of choice means responsibility and negative consequences. 
People escape from freedom, because they do not want to be responsible and 
they do not want to deal with the negative consequences of their actions.16
People frequently escape from freedom. Earlier the example of precommitment 
strategies was presented to prove that point. Some libertarians can argue that 
in the case of precommitment strategies people choose on their own to limit 
freedom. However, other people or firms may help people with sticking to 
precommitment strategies. For example, people can use firms as tools to help 
them quit smoking. People can make an agreement with some company that 
if the result of the test shows that they smoke, then they will need to pay the 
company money, and it should motivate them to quit smoking. Moreover, many 
people do not want to have choices and this preference can be treated as the 
default option. This is why many smokers were happy after the state introduced 
the bill that prohibited smoking in pubs, restaurants and the other public places 
(Sondaż: Polacy zadowoleni…, 2010). Generally one may say that when there is no 
choice, the likelihood of falling into temptation becomes smaller for most people 
and it is easier for them to stick to the commitment. 
The last argument against treating freedom as intrinsic value refers to our dis-
cussion of ‘basic’ and ‘nonbasic’ values (Sen, 1970). When we treat freedom as 
a ‘nonbasic’ value, no discussion is possible. Moreover, it leads to dogmatism, 
which is often the case with the hard-core libertarians who do not want to 
compare freedom with the other values like well-being. Freedom should be 
fundamental, but one cannot forget that people frequently decide to have more 
well-being instead of more freedom. One needs to acknowledge and respect this 
choice. Intrinsic value does not need to mean unrespectable of other things. One 
can assign an intrinsic value to something, but at the same time one can compare 
this value with the other values and the comparison does not need to be all or 
nothing.
We can find this pragmatic understanding of freedom in libertarian paternalism. 
Thaler and Sunstein think that freedom has an intrinsic value which should be 
16 Milgram’s experiment is the best example of how people pass freedom to the authorities 
(Milgram, 1963).
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respected. However, it can be compared and exchanged with the other intrinsic 
values like well-being. Sugden sees this relativity as the flaw because it can 
lead to abuse of freedom. In this book, we have been trying to justify a view 
that there are no absolute values and we need to learn how to live in the world 
without objective Truth. Therefore, relativeness and pragmatism of libertarian 
paternalism do not necessarily need to be perceived as a flaw but as an advantage. 
It can be seen as an advantage because there is no absolute freedom which 
is cherished by libertarians. The idea of freedom is not as uncontroversial as 
many of them think. We even do not know what freedom really means. Is it 
negative freedom or a positive one? Moreover, when one looks back at the 
discussion on self and personal identity, one can see that the conception of self 
and consequently freedom is not as straightforward as it seems at first glance. 
Thaler and Sunstein propose, although not explicitly, their own version of 
freedom. The freedom which is connected with reason. They look for purified 
preferences which can be discovered thanks to deliberation and rationality. 
This argument is very close to the idea of ‘long-term human.’ Moreover, it can 
be supported by the arguments about the links between reason and freedom, 
which were presented in Chapter 6. One of its most important conclusions is 
that, in the end, people should be able to live the life that they have “reason to 
value” (Sen, 1999, p. 18).
7.6. Conclusions
The discussion about libertarian paternalism is necessary. Over the last years, 
many countries have been trying to implement some proposals presented by 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008). Therefore, libertarian paternalism started to have 
a significant impact on people’s lives. The idea of libertarian paternalism is very 
controversial and it triggers a lot of objections and reservations in academia and 
outside. It comes as a no surprise in the light of the fact that such fundamental 
issues like freedom and the legitimacy of state interference are discussed in 
libertarian paternalism. 
Much criticism of libertarian paternalism is valuable. We should be careful 
and scrutinize how much power is given to the state. Nudges cannot be taken 
lightly. We need to know the limits of their influence on people. Moreover, it is 
important to define the limits of libertarian paternalism better. Some flexibility 
is justified, but we need to have the criteria for purified preferences to know in 
which situations the state can interfere with revealed preferences. 
From a philosophical perspective, it is crucial to perceive the claims made by 
libertarian paternalism moderately. The rational approach (purified preferences) 
is not an all-encompassing ontological theory of the inner agent. It is a proposition 
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which does not make such high claims. We should be conscious that libertarian 
paternalism is mostly of a pragmatic character. It is not a magic wand that will 
help solve or mitigate every problem. It can be used only in very specific cases 
which are indicated by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). Moreover, the main focus 
of this approach should be put on the transparency of information which helps 
people make a choice. Default option is very useful but it should only be used 
when the other forms of nudges such as transparency of information do not work 
properly. 
Thaler and Sunstein do not provide sufficient philosophical background for 
their conception and because of that they were criticized. Even if pragmatic, 
their conception should have better defined rules and scope because otherwise 
it is vague and it attracts criticism. The previous chapters of this book can be 
used to provide some methodological grounding to libertarian paternalism. 
It was presented how we can find purified preferences and why they must be 
differentiated from revealed preferences (multiple selves and precommitment 
strategies). Although in some situations they will indicate what people really 
want, these conceptions will not provide us with an ironclad theory of purified 
preferences. However, when we look at the discussion on relativity in science 
it seems justified to argue that the libertarian paternalism’ lack of formalistic 
structure does not legitimize its dismissal. In the end, everything is in the eye of 
the beholder. Some people can be in favour of libertarian paternalism and some 
are not. However, it seems that this conception can be defended against a big 
chunk of criticisms.
It is noticeable that the very term ‘libertarian paternalism’ attracts a lot of 
criticism. It is the result of the fact that paternalism and libertarianism can be 
defined differently and used for different purposes. The change of the term 
‘libertarian paternalism’ is problematic, because it started to be popular and 
many papers were written using this term. Therefore, it is only suggested that 
the better (less controversial) term for Thaler’s and Sunstein’s idea would be 
‘soft paternalism’ (popularized by Feinberg (1986, p. 12)) which was the term 
used before Thaler and Sunstein’s book has gained popularity.
Moreover, it is important to underline that libertarian paternalism is in line with 
the argument presented in Chapter 6, where reason is identified with freedom. 
Libertarian paternalism supports and provides the practical implication to the 
main idea of this book that we should support ‘long-term human,’ because it 
identifies well-being with reason and it treats ‘short-term human’ (human with 
cognitive biases) as something that should be overcome. However, it must be 
added that the capability approach with the wider perception of agency and 
reason is much more in line with ‘long-term human.’ This is the case, because 
the other values rather than only ideal individual rationality are taken into 
consideration as it takes place in libertarian paternalism.
Conclusions
Chapter 1 starts with an analysis of the origins of value-free economics. It is 
demonstrated that logical positivism had a substantial influence on value-
free economics. Because of logical positivism Robbins dismissed ethics from 
economics and he popularized a distinction between positive and normative 
economics. Moreover, the crave for objectivity caused that economics dismissed 
psychology and it ceased to discuss human goals and motivations. Later on, 
Samuelson argued that mathematics was a common language of economics 
and he tried to mathematically formalize economics which resulted, among 
other things, in the revealed preference theory. Moreover, it is indicated why 
strict normative/positive dichotomy is not justified from the epistemological 
perspective of the contemporary philosophy of science. The conclusion is that 
this distinction should be ‘disinflated’ (Putnam, 2002, p. 19). Moreover, positive 
economics contains normative elements. 
The main goal of Chapter 2 was the analysis of Becker’s economic approach from 
the perspective of ‘scientific research programme’ (Lakatos, 1980). The ‘hard core’ 
of economic approach was indicated (maximization of utility and instrumental 
rationality). It was presented how the ‘protective belt’ was created around these 
assumptions which, consequently, enabled economists to absorb every kind of 
criticism from the other social sciences. The author made the analogy between 
the economic approach and value-free economics to demonstrate how axiomatic 
assumptions of value-free economics have led economists to overconfidence in 
explanatory strength of purely positive economics. Consequently, it has led to 
the dismissal of normative approaches in economics. Moreover, it is presented 
why the economic approach and the axiomatic assumptions of value-free 
economics have led to the tautology. It is argued that the economic approach is 
a degenerative programme, because new auxiliary hypotheses are not proposed 
to deal with new facts better but only to defend the ‘hard core.’ The main 
conclusion from Chapter 2 is that value-free economics should not be built on 
the axiomatic assumptions. The paradigm must change because of the problems 
that are the result of the economists’ reliance on axiomatic assumptions.
In Chapter 3 the author investigates whether economics of happiness with the 
conception of subjective well-being can lead to the ‘paradigm shift.’ Although it 
is better at depicting and predicting people’s behaviour than revealed preference 
theory, it creates problems on its own. The conclusion that we cannot assess 
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utility to find out what is best for people is well-known in the literature about 
happiness. The main task of this chapter was to compare revealed preference 
theory with different happiness approaches. The focus was put on the criticisms 
of revealed preference theory. Thanks to economics of happiness and positive 
psychology we know that revealed preferences are not always a good indicator 
of well-being. Individuals frequently make mistakes and they do not choose 
things which are the best for them. Despite the problems with revealed 
preferences theory, it was presented that economics of happiness has problems 
with subjective well-being. Firstly, malleability of preferences. As the result, 
establishing subjective happiness as the basis for well-being is problematic 
because it can change relatively easily. What is the most problematic issue 
here is that people can adjust to even dire conditions and feel happy. Secondly, 
there are other values than happiness which are not taken into consideration 
in subjective well-being measure (SWB). It can be very problematic, especially 
when people choose between freedom and happiness. Not distinguishing 
between values like happiness and freedom seems to overlook the motivations 
which strongly influence individuals’ choices. Therefore, we need to introduce 
the idea of values and goals which are independent of revealed preferences 
where utility is maximized by definition. The possibility of that is provided by 
objective approaches towards well-being (e.g., the capability approach). 
If we know that revealed preference theory’s assumption (people do what is the 
best for them) is not a positive conception and it leads to many problems, then it 
seems justified for economists to choose normatively what is the best for people 
and to indicate goals which are independent of individuals’ revealed choices. In 
Chapter 4 the author used the conception of multiple-self to address this issue. 
It is especially important in the case of choices over time (different preferences). 
I tried to provide a better framework for the original conception of multiple 
self. I used for this goal the conclusions and insights from the philosophical 
discussion on personal identity. 
One of the main goals of this chapter was to connect philosophical conception 
of intention with precommitment conception used in economics. I expanded 
Schelling’s idea and the framework was proposed in which we can explore 
what individuals’ real preferences are. The analysis was done in the context of 
weakens of will. It was presented why value-free economics cannot admit its 
existence. I showed a similar approach taken in philosophy (Hare, Plato) and 
it was demonstrated that the conception of weakness of will explains many 
phenomena that cannot be explained by value-free economics. 
I used the ideas of such philosophers as Dworkin and Frankfurt to support the 
claim that reason (‘second-order desires’ (Frankfurt, 1971), ‘meta-rankings’ (Sen, 
1977)) should indicate individuals’ real preferences. Kantian approach was used 
to justify the primacy of reason. Moreover, this approach was used to show the 
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limitations of ‘belief-desire account’ introduced by Hume and which is used in 
value-free economics. The conclusion is that we cannot embrace reason based on 
categorical imperative within the revealed preferences’ framework. 
Chapter 5 concerns philosophy of science. The purpose of that philosophical 
discussion was to highlight that absolute Truth cannot be found in science. This 
fact is well known in philosophy but not in economics. This is why it is interesting 
to analyse value-free economics from the perspective of the contemporary 
philosophy of science. It was demonstrated why value-free economics is 
perceived as objective by economists and why it is not true. Next, Weber’s insights 
were used to argue that we cannot escape from values in science. This analysis 
can be valuable, because Weber is frequently misinterpreted in economics 
as a person who preached value-free science. It was demonstrated why this 
misunderstanding happened. Moreover, it was indicated that economists cannot 
stick only to axioms and for the existence of any social science it is unavoidable 
to have some ‘methodological value judgments’ (Weber, 1949). 
Chapter 6 was an analysis of the capability approach. I tried to explain how 
the capability approach works from an economic perspective and whether 
(or to what extent) it is better in explaining the complexity of human behaviour 
(e.g., values, motivations) than the revealed preference theory and the other 
approaches (economics of happiness). This analysis was conducted to find out 
whether Sen’s flexible framework can explain what people should do in order to 
increase their freedom and well-being. The analysis of the capability approach 
was also used to support and strengthen my conception of ‘long-term human’ 
(Ostapiuk, 2019b). 
Chapter 7 provides some philosophical background to libertarian paternalism, 
which has not been done sufficiently by the founders of this approach. The pre-
vious insights from this book were used to justify Thaler’s and Sunstein’s 
claims. In particular, the discussion on weakens of will may help us to explore 
what individuals’ real preferences are. Thaler and Sunstein have not presented 
aconvincing method to do that. The conceptions of intentions and precommitment 
strategy were proposed as the methods by which one can answer that question.
Thanks to a philosophical background, it was possible to respond to the 
criticisms of libertarian paternalism and even to the broader criticisms of welfare 
behavioural economics. However, providing the philosophical justification for 
libertarian paternalism does not mean that I am uncritical of this idea. Libertarian
paternalism is not the best term because of its controversial nature. Instead, the 
term ‘soft paternalism’ (Feinberg, 1986, p. 12) is suggested. Secondly, only the 
limited version of libertarian paternalism is justified, because the difference 
between nudging and manipulation is very slight. Although the conclusion 
from this book is that libertarian paternalism can be perceived as a consistent 
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approach, not everyone will agree with that. It is the result of differences in how 
freedom is defined. First and foremost, whether it is treated as an intrinsic value 
that cannot be compared to well-being. 
The last few pages present synthetically the conclusions from the book. However, 
the reader may ask: what about the bold question that the author made at the 
beginning of the book? The question was: ‘Do the weaknesses of value-free 
economics imply the need for a paradigm shift?’ To begin with, it must be 
stated that the main question is purposefully not asked categorically (“imply 
the need”) because the purpose of this book is not to give the impression that 
we should completely dismiss value-free economics. Moreover, ‘paradigm shift’ 
is not perceived in this book as an overnight process.1 From this perspective, 
value-free economics, despite its problems, will be used by many economists. 
The unwillingness to answer the question of dismissing value-free economics 
directly is also the result of the author’s awareness about a limited scope of the 
analysis presented in this book. The focus was on choices over time to point 
out to what problems the assumptions of revealed preference theory has led 
in methodology and in reality. From this perspective, value-free economics 
seems not to work properly and can be perceived as degenerative programme. 
However, it is only a partial analysis of value-free economics. Therefore, we 
cannot firmly state that value-free economics should be dismissed. Last but not 
least, not one single author but a scientific community decide about ‘paradigm 
shift.’ In that context, it seems that value-free economics is less and less prominent 
and the limits of this approach are known to most economists. 
The most substantial criticism towards value-free economics presented in this 
book is that it has made some economists arrogant and dogmatic (due to the 
immunity from criticism).2 This is why it seems that this paradigm is degenerative 
programme. Doing good science is about scrutiny and critical thinking 
(fallibilism). Therefore, we cannot have values or assumptions that cannot be 
doubted and this is just what economists have been looking for in the economic 
approach. Of course, criticism alone is never enough. In order to decide whether 
economists should stick to value-free economics or move towards value-based 
economics, the alternative conceptions to value-free economics were analysed.
The most attention was paid to normative approaches, because they are very 
critical towards value-free economics (especially towards revealed preference 
theory). Although they seem to resolve some issues in comparison to the 
revealed preference theory (e.g., measuring well-being, which is not connected 
1 The idea of Copernicus was not approved overnight; and it took some time for value-free 
economics to overcome institutional economics at the beginning of the 20th century
2 Nowadays more and more economists criticize the arrogance of neoclassical economics 
and they argue that economics should be more humble, see (Colander, 2016; Hardt, 2021; 
Rodrik, 2015).
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with choice), they have problems of their own. The most significant one is their 
fundamental relativity (e.g., establishing goals and what happiness means). 
However, I do hope that the analysis of the contemporary philosophy of science 
may make clear for a reader that it is impossible to escape from some relativity in 
science. In social sciences, the accusation of relativity is not a sufficient argument 
to dismiss normative approaches. Moreover, it seems that both assumptions: 
a) people do what is the best for them, b) there is one self over time, do not 
correspond with observable reality and they lead to many problems. Normative 
approaches have their challenges. However, it is better to have the unprecise 
answer to an important question (e.g., well-being, freedom) rather than not 
asking these questions at all (axiomatic revealed preference theory).
If normative approaches are better than value-free economics (both descriptively 
and predictively), it seems natural to ask why the ‘paradigm shift’ has not taken 
place and why normative approaches are not the new mainstream? When one 
analyses normative approaches, one can see how problematic they are and how 
many problems they generate because of their relativity. However, the purpose 
of this book was to demonstrate that value-free economics by using the axiomatic 
assumptions (e.g., utility, rationality) has not solved the problems investigated 
in normative approaches either. In the end, the contemporary philosophy 
of science highlights that one should be pragmatic instead of striving for the 
definitive answers and absolute Truth (e.g., (Feyerabend 1975; Lakatos, 1980; 
McCloskey, 1985; Rorty, 1979)). Therefore, scientists should choose the theories 
that are progressive and can resolve more problems. From the perspective of the 
topics examined in this book, normative approaches seem to have the potential 
for improvement, whereas value-free economics seems to be degenerative 
programme. Moreover, it appears that axiomatic value-free economics hinders 
the potential improvement of normative theories. It gives justification to some 
economists to treat normative approaches as fads or unscientific theories and to 
push them into the category of heterodox approaches (viz. insignificant). 
The next reason why we have not observed ‘paradigm shift’ towards normative 
approaches is the complexity of these concepts. In science, simplicity is crucial 
(Mäki, 2009a; Mäki et al., 2017). The methodology of value-free economics is 
built on simplicity (a few axioms) and this is why, among other things, economic 
imperialism has been possible. At this moment normative theories indeed face 
many challenges and they are overcomplicated. However, with time and further 
work, some of these approaches can be improved and structured better. In this 
book, an attempt to synthesize the insights from normative approaches (multiple 
self conception, libertarian paternalism, capability approach, economics of 
happiness) has been undertaken. However, I am fully aware it is just a beginning, 
and there is still much to be done to achieve a satisfactory level of maturity of 
these normative concepts. 
200 	 Conclusions
If I were pressed to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the question of ‘paradigm shift’, the 
answer would be ‘yes.’ The problems with value-free economics imply the need 
for ‘paradigm shift,’ but with many qualifications that were made along the way. 
After answering the main question let us move to the implications of this book. 
Even though the part of this book analyses the history of economic thought, we 
need to have even more discussions on the foundations of value-free economics 
in the future. Otherwise, some scientists will still criticize this paradigm from 
descriptive perspective. The descriptive criticism of homo economicus (e.g., 
people are not rational and self-interested) misses the point when it comes to 
the real problems of value-free economics. What many opponents of value-
-free economics do it is the ‘strife over methods’ re-enact (positivism versus 
historicism). Economist community needs to know why value-free economics 
work as it works (methodology) to be able to move away from these unproductive 
discussions (historia magistra vitae).
A Weberian lens can be used to understand value-free economics as a science. 
Two concepts of Weber can be especially useful for economists: 1) ideal type, 
2) value-freeness of science. The second concept is essential from the perspective 
of value-free economics. It is the case, because economists need to understand 
how to do science in the new scientific world which has been shaped by the 
contemporary philosophy of science. Economists must understand that the rules 
of the game have changed and that there are no objective facts or theories that 
are impregnated from the criticism (received view3).
If we cannot avoid using values in science, then we need to put them on the table 
and have the philosophical self-reflection on economics. To accomplish this, we 
can do a genealogy of value-free economics, and this book was partly about 
this process. But much more should be done. It is so important, because thanks 
to genealogy (historical analysis of the emergence of philosophical beliefs, see 
(Foucault, 1978; Nietzsche, 2006)), we can observe how economists have been 
trying to conceive values and their self-interests in the disguise of objective 
science. The genealogy of value-free economics can be a vaccination against 
the hubris of economists which is based on the belief in being positive science. 
It was indicated a few times through this book that the worst thing for scientists 
is to be uncritical in spirit and build theories that are completely immune from 
the criticism. By using axiomatic assumptions, value-free economists have tried 
to establish that their theories are not only true but they are objectively true. 
A comprehensive understanding of the limits of economics should open 
the possibility to incorporate the insights from the other social sciences and 
3  Position in the philosophy of science that identifies a scientific theory with a set of propositions 
which are considered to be linguistic objects, such as axioms. Received view is very similar to 
positivism and was very popular in economics, see (Hands, 2003; McCloskey, 1983).
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humanities into economics (e.g., psychology, sociology, philosophy). It has 
been done over the last decades, but very often this knowledge was treated 
as a square in a round hole and it has not transformed economics. Economists 
have incorporated these insights but the ‘hard core’ of value-free economics 
have remained unchanged. It is worth studying, whether some paradigms 
from the other social sciences could change economics. The scrutiny of different 
paradigms is also important in the case of heterodox approaches which cannot 
gain enough appreciation because they struggle to have one simple and effective 
paradigm (Colander, & Su, 2018; Lawson, 2005). 
The openness towards other sciences and different paradigms also means asking 
questions that neoclassical economists do not ask frequently. We should start 
the discussion on some fundamental assumptions in economics like autonomy 
and free will. Many economists do not want to have this discussion because 
these topics are treated as Pandora’s box. Asking the problematic questions 
can only open the discussion that cannot be resolved (as Robbins indicated in 
the case of ethics). However, these topics are a time bomb and not answering 
them will backfire in the future. Economists could see that not addressing 
some problematic topics does not make them go away (e.g., ethics, rationality, 
institutions, and methodology of economics). 
Moreover, on the example of libertarian paternalism we observe that the lack of 
conversation on autonomy, its connection with free will and rationality results 
in many problems. Therefore, Sugden and Thaler talk past each other. They 
often cannot even agree to disagree. Scientists need to be explicit about their 
‘methodological value judgments’ when they start the discussion. Otherwise, 
they will not understand each other.
The general goal of this book was to stir up an honest conversation on hard core 
assumptions that neoclassical economics which aspires to be value-free takes for 
granted (instrumental rationality, maximization of utility). Economists live in 
the turbulent times of paradigm shift, when it is known that the old paradigm of 
value-free economics meets numerous challenges and the increasing number of 
economists are looking for something new. These times imply the constant need 
for the philosophical self-reflection about the state of economics as a science. 
This book, as one among many works over the last years which criticizes value-
free economics, has opened Pandora’s box to see what happens when we dismiss 
some axiomatic assumptions. It can be concluded that there are quite solid 
grounds for optimism. There can be a life after the value-free economics’ death. 
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